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April 22, 2025

How NDR and Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) Work Together to Achieve Network Security Outcomes

Learn how NDR and SASE solutions complement and interact with each other to create a robust network security strategy.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response
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22
Apr 2025

Modern networks are evolving rapidly, with traffic patterns, user behavior, and critical assets extending far beyond the boundaries of traditional network security tools. As organizations adopt hybrid infrastructures, remote working, and cloud-native services, it is essential to maintain visibility and protect this expanding attack surface.

Network Detection and Response (NDR) and Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) are two technologies commonly used to safeguard organizational networks. While both play crucial roles in enhancing security, one does not replace the other. Instead, NDR and SASE complement each other, taking on different roles to create a robust network security framework. This blog will unpack the relationship between NDR and SASE, including the component functionalities that comprise SASE, highlighting their unique contributions to maintaining a comprehensive and resilient network security strategy.

Network Detection and Response (NDR) and Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) explained

NDR solutions, such as Darktrace / NETWORK, are designed to detect, investigate, and respond to suspicious activities within any network. By leveraging machine learning and behavioral analytics, NDR continuously monitors network traffic to identify anomalies that could indicate potential threats and to contain those threats at machine speed. These solutions analyze both North-South traffic (between internal and external networks) and East-West traffic (within internal networks), providing comprehensive visibility into network activities.

SASE, on the other hand, comprises multiple solutions, focused on providing hybrid and remote users access to services while adhering to the Zero Trust principle of "never trust, always verify". Within SASE architectures, Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solutions provide secure remote access to private applications and services the user has been explicitly granted, and Secure Web Gateways (SWG) provide Internet access, again based on policy groups. Unlike traditional security models that grant implicit trust to users within the network perimeter, ZTNA requires continuous verification of user identity and device health before granting access to resources. This approach minimizes the attack surface and reduces the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive data and internal applications. Similarly, SWGs filter web traffic based on the verified user identity and can block known malware, further reducing the attack surface for the client estate.

Limitations of SASE highlights the importance of NDR

While SASE, including ZTNA and SWG, is a powerful tool for enforcing secure access to company networks and resources as well as the Internet, it is not a comprehensive security solution, or a replacement for dedicated network monitoring and NDR capabilities. Some of the main limitations include:

  • Focused on policies rather than security: SASE delivers strong networking outcomes but provides policy-based protections, rather than a full suite of security features. It can provide simple alerting for disallowed actions, but it lacks the security context needed for comprehensive threat detection, such as knowing if user credentials have been compromised.
  • Can only detect known threats: SASE solutions cannot detect novel attacks such as zero-days and insider threats. This is because they rely on a rule-based approach that does not have a behavioral understanding of network entities that can detect anomalies or suspicious activity.
  • Limited response capabilities: Due to the limited detection capabilities of SASE solutions, it is not possible to automate response actions to threats that slip past existing policies.  While access to internal resources and the Internet can be revoked or severely limited as part of a response, this must be done after human investigation and analysis, allowing more time for the threat to continue before being contained.
  • Limited scope: SASE provides cloud-hosted secure networking, which lends itself much more toward the client estate of any organization. As a result, servers and unmanaged devices—whether IT/IoT/OT—are mostly out of scope and do not benefit from the policies SASE enforces.

The complementary roles of NDR and ZTNA

NDR solutions provide full visibility into network activity, with the ability to detect and respond to threats that may bypass initial access controls and filters. When combined, NDR and SASE create a layered security approach that addresses different aspects of network security, for example:

  • Detection of novel, unknown and insider threats: NDR solutions can monitor all network traffic using behavioral anomaly detection. This can identify suspicious activities, such as insider threats from authorized users who have passed policy checks, or novel attacks that have never been seen before.
  • Validation of policies: By continuously monitoring network traffic, NDR can validate the effectiveness of existing policies and identify any gaps in security that need addressing due to organizational changes or outdated rule sets.
  • Reducing risk and impact of threats: Together, SASE and NDR solutions shift toward proactive security by reducing the potential impact of a threat through predefined policies and by detecting and containing a threat in its earliest stages, even if it is novel or nuanced.
  • Enhanced contextual information: Alerts raised by SASE solutions can provide additional context into potential threats, which can be used by NDR solutions to increase investigation quality and context.
  • Containment of network threats: SASE solutions can prohibit access to resources on an internal company network or on the Internet if predefined access control criteria are not met or a site matches a threat signature. When combined with an NDR solution, organizations can go far beyond this, detecting and responding to a much wider variety of network threats to prevent attacks from escalating.

When implementing SASE and NDR solutions, it is also crucial to consider the best configurations to maximize interoperability, and integrations will often increase functionality. Well-designed implementations, combined with integrations, will strengthen both SASE and NDR solutions for organizations.

How Darktrace continues to secure SASE networks

With the latest 6.3 update, Darktrace continues to extend its capabilities with new innovations that support modern enterprise networks and the use of SASE across remote and hybrid worker devices. This expands on existing Darktrace integrations and partnerships with SASE vendors such as Netskope and Zscaler.

Traditional methods to contain remote access and internet-born threats are either signature or policy based, and response to nuanced threats requires manual, human-led investigation and decision-making. By the time security teams can react, the damage is often already done.

With Darktrace 6.3, customers using Zscaler can now configure Darktrace Autonomous Response to quarantine ZPA-connected user devices at machine speed. This provides a powerful new mechanism for containing remote threats at the earliest sign of suspicious activity, without disrupting broader operations.

By automatically shutting down ZPA access for compromised user accounts, Darktrace gives SOC teams valuable time to investigate and respond, while continuing to protect the rest of the organization. This integration enhances Darktrace’s ability to take actions for remote user devices, helping customers contain threats faster and keep the business running smoothly.

For organizations using SASE technologies to address the challenges of securing large, distributed networks across a range of geographies, SaaS applications and remote worker devices, Darktrace also now integrates with Netskope Cloud TAP to provide visibility into and analysis over tunneled traffic, reducing blind spots and enabling organizations to maintain detection capabilities across their expanding network perimeters.

Conclusion

While NDR and ZTNA serve distinct purposes, their integration is crucial for a comprehensive security strategy. ZTNA provides robust access controls, ensuring that only authorized users can access network resources. NDR, on the other hand, offers continuous visibility into network activities, detecting and responding to threats that may bypass initial access controls. By leveraging the strengths of both solutions, organizations can enhance their security posture and protect against a wide range of network security threats.

Understanding the complementary roles of NDR and ZTNA is essential for building a resilient security framework. As cyber threats continue to evolve, adopting a multi-layered, defense-in-depth security approach will be key to safeguarding organizational networks.

Click here for more information about the latest product innovations in Darktrace 6.3, or learn more about Darktrace / NETWORK here.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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March 5, 2026

Inside Cloud Compromise: Investigating Attacker Activity with Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

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Investigating Cloud Attacks with Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation™ is the industry’s first truly automated forensic solution purpose-built for the cloud. This blog will demonstrate how an investigation can be carried out against a compromised cloud server in minutes, rather than hours or days.

The compromised server investigated in this case originates from Darktrace’s Cloudypots system, a global honeypot network designed to observe adversary activity in real time across a wide range of cloud services. Whenever an attacker successfully compromises one of these honeypots, a forensic copy of the virtual server's disk is preserved for later analysis. Using Forensic Acquisition & Investigation, analysts can then investigate further and obtain detailed insights into the compromise including complete attacker timelines and root cause analysis.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation supports importing artifacts from a variety of sources, including EC2 instances, ECS, S3 buckets, and more. The Cloudypots system produces a raw disk image whenever an attack is detected and stores it in an S3 bucket. This allows the image to be directly imported into Forensic Acquisition & Investigation using the S3 bucket import option.

As Forensic Acquisition & Investigation runs cloud-natively, no additional configuration is required to add a specific S3 bucket. Analysts can browse and acquire forensic assets from any bucket that the configured IAM role is permitted to access. Operators can also add additional IAM credentials, including those from other cloud providers, to extend access across multiple cloud accounts and environments.

Figure 1: Forensic Acquisition & Investigation import screen.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation then retrieves a copy of the file and automatically begins running the analysis pipeline on the artifact. This pipeline performs a full forensic analysis of the disk and builds a timeline of the activity that took place on the compromised asset. By leveraging Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s cloud-native analysis system, this process condenses hour of manual work into just minutes.

Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.
Figure 2: Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.

Once processing is complete, the preserved artifact is visible in the Evidence tab, along with a summary of key information obtained during analysis, such as the compromised asset’s hostname, operating system, cloud provider, and key event count.

The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.
Figure 3: The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.

Clicking on the “Key events” field in the listing opens the timeline view, automatically filtered to show system- generated alarms.

The timeline provides a chronological record of every event that occurred on the system, derived from multiple sources, including:

  • Parsed log files such as the systemd journal, audit logs, application specific logs, and others.
  • Parsed history files such as .bash_history, allowing executed commands to be shown on the timeline.
  • File-specific events, such as files being created, accessed, modified, or executables being run, etc.

This approach allows timestamped information and events from multiple sources to be aggregated and parsed into a single, concise view, greatly simplifying the data review process.

Alarms are created for specific timeline events that match either a built-in system rule, curated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team or an operator-defined created at the project level. These alarms help quickly filter out noise and highlight on events of interest, such as the creation of a file containing known malware, access to sensitive files like Amazon Web Service (AWS) credentials, suspicious arguments or commands, and more.

 The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.
Figure 4: The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.

In this case, several alarms were generated for suspicious Base64 arguments being passed to Selenium. Examining the event data, it appears the attacker spawned a Selenium Grid session with the following payload:

"request.payload": "[Capabilities {browserName: chrome, goog:chromeOptions: {args: [-cimport base64;exec(base64...], binary: /usr/bin/python3, extensions: []}, pageLoadStrategy: normal}]"

This is a common attack vector for Selenium Grid. The chromeOptions object is intended to specify arguments for how Google Chrome should be launched; however, in this case the attacker has abused the binary field to execute the Python3 binary instead of Chrome. Combined with the option to specify command-line arguments, the attacker can use Python3’s -c option to execute arbitrary Python code, in this instance, decoding and executing a Base64 payload.

Selenium’s logs truncate the Arguments field automatically, so an alternate method is required to retrieve the full payload. To do this, the search bar can be used to find all events that occurred around the same time as this flagged event.

Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].
Figure 5: Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].

Scrolling through the search results, an entry from Java’s systemd journal can be identified. This log contains the full, unaltered payload. GCHQ’s CyberChef can then be used to decode the Base64 data into the attacker’s script, which will ultimately be executed.[NJ9]

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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February 19, 2026

CVE-2026-1731: How Darktrace Sees the BeyondTrust Exploitation Wave Unfolding

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Note: Darktrace's Threat Research team is publishing now to help defenders. We will continue updating this blog as our investigations unfold.

Background

On February 6, 2026, the Identity & Access Management solution BeyondTrust announced patches for a vulnerability, CVE-2026-1731, which enables unauthenticated remote code execution using specially crafted requests.  This vulnerability affects BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and particular older versions of Privileged Remote Access (PRA) [1].

A Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit for this vulnerability was released publicly on February 10, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) reported exploitation attempts within 24 hours [2].

Previous intrusions against Beyond Trust technology have been cited as being affiliated with nation-state attacks, including a 2024 breach targeting the U.S. Treasury Department. This incident led to subsequent emergency directives from  the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and later showed attackers had chained previously unknown vulnerabilities to achieve their goals [3].

Additionally, there appears to be infrastructure overlap with React2Shell mass exploitation previously observed by Darktrace, with command-and-control (C2) domain  avg.domaininfo[.]top seen in potential post-exploitation activity for BeyondTrust, as well as in a React2Shell exploitation case involving possible EtherRAT deployment.

Darktrace Detections

Darktrace’s Threat Research team has identified highly anomalous activity across several customers that may relate to exploitation of BeyondTrust since February 10, 2026. Observed activities include:

Outbound connections and DNS requests for endpoints associated with Out-of-Band Application Security Testing; these services are commonly abused by threat actors for exploit validation.  Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Suspicious executable file downloads. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Outbound beaconing to rare domains. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

Unusual cryptocurrency mining activity. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Monero Mining
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

And model alerts for:

  • Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP

IT Defenders: As part of best practices, we highly recommend employing an automated containment solution in your environment. For Darktrace customers, please ensure that Autonomous Response is configured correctly. More guidance regarding this activity and suggested actions can be found in the Darktrace Customer Portal.  

Appendices

Potential indicators of post-exploitation behavior:

·      217.76.57[.]78 – IP address - Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://217.76.57[.]78:8009/index.js - URL -  Likely payload

·      b6a15e1f2f3e1f651a5ad4a18ce39d411d385ac7  - SHA1 - Likely payload

·      195.154.119[.]194 – IP address – Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://195.154.119[.]194/index.js - URL – Likely payload

·      avg.domaininfo[.]top – Hostname – Likely C2 server

·      104.234.174[.]5 – IP address - Possible C2 server

·      35da45aeca4701764eb49185b11ef23432f7162a – SHA1 – Possible payload

·      hXXp://134.122.13[.]34:8979/c - URL – Possible payload

·      134.122.13[.]34 – IP address – Possible C2 server

·      28df16894a6732919c650cc5a3de94e434a81d80 - SHA1 - Possible payload

References:

1.        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1731

2.        https://www.securityweek.com/beyondtrust-vulnerability-targeted-by-hackers-within-24-hours-of-poc-release/

3.        https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-1731-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-rce-beyondtrust-remote-support-rs-privileged-remote-access-pra/

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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