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May 29, 2025

Why attack-centric approaches to email security can’t cope with modern threats

Despite evolving email threats, many organizations still rely on SEGs or outdated, attack-focused methods. These approaches can’t counter advanced, AI-driven attacks. The solution? Business-centric email security that understands users and inbox behavior, not just threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email
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29
May 2025

What’s the problem with an attack-centric mindset?

For decades, traditional email security strategies have been built around an attack-centric mindset. Secure Email Gateways (SEGs) and other legacy solutions operate on the principle of identifying and blocking known threats. These systems rely heavily on predefined threat intelligence – blacklists, malware signatures, and reputation-based analysis – to filter out malicious content before it reaches the inbox.

While this approach was sufficient when email threats were relatively static and signature-based, it’s increasingly ineffective against the sophistication of modern attacks. Techniques like spear phishing, business email compromise (BEC), and supply chain attacks often bypass traditional SEG defenses because they lack obvious malicious indicators. Instead, they leverage social engineering, look-alike domains, and finely tuned spoofing tactics that are designed to evade detection.

The challenge extends beyond just legacy SEGs. Many modern email security providers have inherited the same attack-centric principles, even if they've reimagined the technology stack. While some vendors have shifted to API-based deployments and incorporated AI to automate pattern recognition, the underlying approach remains the same: hunting for threats based on known indicators. This methodology, though it’s undergone modernization using AI, still leaves gaps when it comes to novel, hyper-targeted threats that manipulate user behavior rather than deploy predictable malicious signatures. Attack-centric security will always remain one step behind the attacker.

By the way, native email security already covers the basics

One of the most overlooked realities in email security is that native solutions like Microsoft 365’s built-in security already handle much of the foundational work of attack-centric protection. Through advanced threat intelligence, anti-phishing measures, and malware detection, Microsoft 365 actively scans incoming emails for known threats, using global telemetry to identify patterns and block suspicious content before it even reaches the user’s inbox.

This means that for many organizations, a baseline level of protection against more obvious, signature-based attacks is already in place – but many are still disabling these protections in favour of another attack-centric solution. By layering another attack-centric solution on top, they are effectively duplicating efforts without enhancing their security posture. This overlap can lead to unnecessary complexity, higher costs, and a false sense of enhanced protection when in reality, it’s more of the same.

Rather than duplicating attack-centric protections, the real opportunity lies in addressing the gaps that remain: the threats that are specifically crafted to evade traditional detection methods. This is where a business-centric approach becomes indispensable, complementing the foundational security that’s already built into your infrastructure.

Introducing… the business-centric approach

To effectively defend against advanced threats, organizations need to adopt a business-centric approach to email security. Unlike attack-centric models that hunt for known threats, business-centric security focuses on understanding the typical behaviors, relationships, and communication patterns within your organization. Rather than solely reacting to threats as they are identified, this model continuously learns what “normal” looks like for each user and each inbox.

By establishing a baseline of expected behaviors, business-centric solutions can rapidly detect anomalies that suggest compromise, such as sudden changes in sending patterns, unusual login locations, or subtle shifts in communication tone. This proactive detection method is especially powerful against spear phishing, business email compromise (BEC), and supply chain attacks that are engineered to bypass static defenses. This approach also scales with your organization, learning and adapting as new users are onboarded, communication patterns evolve, and external partners are added.

In an era where AI-driven threats are becoming the norm, having email security that knows your users and inboxes better than the attacker does is a critical advantage.

Why native + business-centric email security is the winning formula

By pairing native security with a business-centric model, organizations can cover the full spectrum of threats – from signature-based malware to sophisticated, socially engineered attacks. Microsoft 365’s in-built security manages the foundational risks, while business-centric defense identifies subtle anomalies and targeted threats that legacy approaches miss.

Layering Darktrace on top of your native Microsoft security eliminates duplicate capabilities, costs and workflows without reducing functionality

Rather than layering redundant attack-centric solutions on top of existing protections, the future of email security lies in leveraging what’s already in place and building on it with smarter, behavior-based detection. The Swiss Cheese Model is a useful one to refer to here: by acknowledging that no single defense can offer complete protection, layering defenses that plug each other’s gaps – like slices of Swiss cheese – becomes critical.

This combination also allows security teams to focus their efforts more effectively. With native solutions catching broad-based, known threats, the business-centric layer can prioritize real anomalies, minimizing false positives and accelerating response times. Organizations benefit from reduced overlap, streamlined costs, and a stronger overall security posture.

Download the full guide to take the first step towards achieving your next-generation security stack.

[related-resource]

Replacing Your SEG: A Step-by-Step Guide

A practical guide for CISOs for replacing outdated SEGs with AI-driven email security, optimized for Microsoft 365.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Carlos Gray
Senior Product Marketing Manager, Email

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September 25, 2026

A Chain Reaction: Blockchain-Hosted Infostealer Campaign Targets Windows and macOS

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Key Insights

  • Darktrace detected a blockchain-hosted infostealer campaign targeting Windows and macOS devices across multiple customer environments.
  • The campaign combined ClickFix social engineering with trusted services and decentralized blockchain infrastructure to support malware delivery and C2 activity.
  • Compromised devices were observed connecting to rare and unusual external endpoints, including DGA C2 domains, blockchain-related endpoints, and cryptocurrency mining infrastructure.
  • The activity was associated with information-stealing malware strains including Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS), Lumma, Rhadamanthys, Vidar, and Phexia.
  • Darktrace identified anomalous device behavior, beaconing patterns, rare external connections, cryptomining activity, and suspicious TLS/SSL communications without relying solely on prior knowledge or static indicators of compromise.
  • The campaign highlights how attackers are increasingly using legitimate and decentralized infrastructure to make detection, disruption, and attribution more challenging for defenders.

The Infostealer Ecosystem

The information stealer malware ecosystem continues to grow in value for threat actors across the digital threat landscape. Infostealers are increasingly delivered through Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) operating models, distributed through affiliate networks, and designed to withstand infrastructure takedowns. This resilience was demonstrated by the recent takedown of Lumma Stealer malicious domains by Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) [1].

Infostealers are used to gather and exfiltrate sensitive information, including non-human identity (NHI) data, from compromised systems across cloud, Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Virtual Private Network (VPN), and development environments. They can also support ransomware operations by expanding the credentials and access paths available to threat actors, contributing to the high volume of identity-based attacks observed across the broader threat landscape [2][3].

Darktrace’s Observations of ClickFix and Infostealers

Throughout 2026, Darktrace has observed multiple campaigns using ClickFix social engineering to trick users into carrying out malicious actions and downloading initial payloads, including information stealers. More recently, Darktrace’s Threat Research team identified a specific ClickFix campaign involving a blockchain-hosted infostealer targeting Windows and macOS devices.

Darktrace identified affected customer environments across Europe, the United States, Asia, and the Middle East where blockchain-hosted infostealer malware appears to have been delivered to compromised systems following likely ClickFix-driven initial access. Darktrace investigated the activity and found that decentralized blockchain infrastructure, alongside widely trusted legitimate services, was used to support malware delivery and information theft across Windows and macOS systems.

Following initial access, compromised systems established C2 communication, with C2 configuration and payloads hosted on public blockchain infrastructure. The ultimate objective appears to be credential and cryptocurrency theft through the deployment of information stealers such as Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS), Lumma, Rhadamanthys, and Vidar [5][6][7].

Darktrace’s Investigation

Affected devices across the Darktrace customer base were observed making outbound connections to rare external endpoints in patterns consistent with beaconing and C2 activity. Darktrace primarily detected devices making repeated connections to algorithmically generated domains (DGA) such as hf98x4d[.]site [8]. In many cases, these domains were linked through open-source intelligence (OSINT) to information-stealing malware families including AMOS and Phexia [5][6][7][8][9].

In multiple cases, devices were also observed connecting to blockchain-related endpoints, such as polygon[.]drpc[.]org, as well as legitimate public services, including GitHub. The use of decentralized blockchain infrastructure and trusted services such as GitHub to facilitate malware distribution and C2 activity can make disruption and attribution significantly more difficult for defenders.

Darktrace alsodetected a significant proportion of impacted devices making outboundconnections to cryptocurrency mining infrastructure associated with thelegitimate open-source XMRig mining software and the HashVault mining pool,including pool.hashvault[.]pro and donate[.]ssl[.]xmrig[.]com, which wereabused by the attackers, indicating, includingpool.hashvault[.]pro and donate[.]ssl[.]xmrig[.]com, indicating active cryptominingon compromised systems.

In one case, mining activity was observed before and during connections to the DGA endpoint hf98x4d[.]site. Due to its highly anomalous nature, Darktrace's Real-Time AI Analyst autonomously investigated the activity as it occurred, correlating the two events into a single cryptocurrency mining incident and providing comprehensive visibility into the broader attack.

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Figure 1: Real-Time AI Analyst investigation of suspicious SSL and C2 communications with hf98x4d[.]site over port 443.

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Figure 2: Real-Time AI Analyst investigation into cryptocurrency mining activity involving pool[.]hashvault[.]pro over SSL on port 443.

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Around the same time, Darktrace identified the same device initiating connections to the GitHub endpoint release-assets[.]githubusercontent[.]com while continuing to make repeated connections to hf98x4d[.]site.

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Figure 3: Darktrace's detection of an affected device connecting to a GitHub endpoint between repeated connections to the anomalous external endpoint hf98x4d[.]site.

On the network of another customer, Darktrace observed an affected device making highly unusual outbound connections consistent with beaconing activity. The device initiated multiple connections over port 443 to the external hostname polygon[.]drpc[.]org. According to OSINT, this hostname is a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) endpoint provided by dRPC, a legitimate service enabling decentralized applications (dApps), cryptocurrency wallets, and developer tools to interact with the Polygon blockchain [10].

The same device was later observed making repeated TLS/SSL connections to the previously mentioned DGA C2 domain. In addition, it made outbound connections to the external IP 195.242.214[.]34 over destination port 51820, an endpoint associated with the ProtonVPN service. Collectively, these connections to blockchain-related infrastructure, the DGA C2 domain, and ProtonVPN-associated infrastructure suggested the device had been affected by the campaign.

Conclusion

This campaign demonstrates how attackers can combine ClickFix social engineering with trusted services and decentralized blockchain infrastructure to create a resilient, cross-platform malware delivery chain. By using services such as GitHub alongside blockchain RPC endpoints and rapidly replaceable DGA domains, the activity can blend into legitimate traffic while making infrastructure disruption and attribution more difficult.

For defenders, it’s a reminder that trusted infrastructure does not automatically mean trusted activity. Security teams should look for the behaviors surrounding these connections, including unusual outbound communication, repeated beaconing, unexpected access to blockchain services, suspicious TLS/SSL activity and cryptomining. In this campaign, Darktrace identified and correlated these deviations without depending solely on previously known indicators, providing visibility as affected devices moved between legitimate services, decentralized infrastructure and malicious C2 endpoints

Credit to Nahisha Nobregas (Associate Principal Cyber Analyst), Manoel Kadja (Senior Cyber Analyst)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

Darktrace Model Detections

▪ Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

▪ Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

▪ Compromise / Fast Beaconing to DGA

▪ Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

▪ Compromise / DGA Beacon

▪ Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare

▪ Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

▪ Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)

▪ Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

▪ Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

▪ Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

▪ Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days

▪ Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

▪ Compromise / Monero Mining

▪ Device / Long Agent Connection to New Endpoint

▪ Device / New Connections On Suspicious Port

▪ Anomalous Connection / High Volume of Connections to Rare Domain

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List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

 
Indicator Description
hf98x4d[.]site C2 Endpoint (Hostname)
sj98xe4[.]xyz C2 Endpoint (Hostname)
citcix6[.]xyz C2 Endpoint (Hostname)
bduwih8[.]pro C2 Endpoint (Hostname)

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MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

 
Tactic (ID) Technique
Persistence (T1176) Browser Extensions (T1176.001)
Persistence (T1176) Software Extensions
Command and Control (T1071) Web Protocols (T1071.001)
Command and Control (T1568) Domain Generation Algorithms (T1568.002)
Command and Control (T1071) Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control (T1102) One-Way Communication (T1102.003)
Command and Control (T1571) Non-Standard Port
Command and Control (T1104) Multi-Stage Channels
Command and Control (T1573) Encrypted Channel
Command and Control (T1008) Fallback Channels
Initial Access ICS (T0862) Supply Chain Compromise
Command and Control ICS (T0885) Commonly Used Port
Collection (T1185) Browser Session Hijacking
Impact (T1496) Compute Hijacking (T1496.001)
Impact (T1496) Resource Hijacking
Command and Control (T1071) Publish/Subscribe Protocols (T1071.001)
Lateral Movement (T1210) Exploitation of Remote Services

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References:

1.        https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/21/lumma-stealer-breaking-down-the-delivery-techniques-and-capabilities-of-a-prolific-infostealer/

2.        https://spycloud.com/resource/report/spycloud-annual-identity-exposure-report-2026/

3.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/why-trust-is-the-new-attack-surface-darktraces-mid-year-threat-update-2026

4.        https://www.darktrace.com/blog/unpacking-clickfix-darktraces-detection-of-a-prolific-social-engineering-tactic

5.        https://abekweng.medium.com/inside-a-blockchain-hosted-malware-campaign-targeting-windows-and-macos-f5bcdeffed66

6.        https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc5142-etherhiding-distribute-malware

7.        https://haveibeensquatted.com/blog/from-typosquatting-to-macos-backdoor-clickfix-blockchain-c2

8.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/hf98x4d.site/community

9.        https://x.com/FABO97662188/status/2074125545026244795

10.  https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/b0e5c51a411065864119c305fddf218b7c120731f655932cc1c3307ad5b43f94/gti-summary

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About the author
Nahisha Nobregas
SOC Analyst

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September 24, 2026

Detecting Rogue Agent Behavior in the Enterprise

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Agents cannot be trusted to perform tasks in the way we intend them to. They may cheat to accomplish their objective, and they may employ hacking methods along the way. Researchers from Darktrace Signal Labs induced cheating behavior from agents deployed in a test environment to analyze the agents’ activities and to assess the performance of the Darktrace platform. Agents frequently resorted to hacking to cheat on their assigned task. The visibility and behavioral profiling provided by both Darktrace / SECURE AI and Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK ensured extensive detection coverage of the agents’ misaligned activities.

Key Takeaways:

  • Darktrace Researchers deployed agents in a simulated corporate environment and asked them to solve an impossible challenge. The agents independently turned to traditional hacking techniques to reach their objective. No one instructed them to do this, and no attacker was involved.
  • Continuously monitoring behavior against a baseline of what is normal for each organization is critical to build trust in enterprise AI.
  • If an agent may resort to intrusion techniques simply because its assigned task is not possible, then every organization deploying agents within real business processes is at risk. Darktrace / SECURE AI and Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK identified the agents’ misaligned behavior in real time, with Autonomous Response disrupting it at an early stage.

Introduction: Understanding the Threat of Hacking by Agents

Over the last few months, there has been a surge in reporting [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] of LLM-powered agents engaging in unauthorized hacking activity during evaluations of their capabilities. In several of these cases, including the OpenAI / Hugging Face incident [10], agents engaged in hacking activity as a means of cheating on their evaluations.

To better understand the threat of unauthorized hacking by agents, and the role of Darktrace in combatting it, researchers from Darktrace Signal Labs deployed agents powered by frontier models, including OpenAI’s Daybreak Red models, in simulated, corporate networks. Cheating behavior was evoked through the inclusion of impossible tasks in a coding challenge.

Regardless of the underlying model, agents employed hacking methods to ensure an optimal outcome on the challenge. Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK and Darktrace / SECURE AI identified the agents’ deviant activities, with inhibitive actions being autonomously taken in the early stages to disrupt the agents’ progression.

Setting the Stage

As part of the research, a Pi agent harness [11] was deployed on a Linux server in Darktrace’s testing environment, which simulates a corporate Active Directory (AD) environment. The same environment included a benchmark server hosting the coding exercise’s contents and grader, as well as various other servers, such as a domain controller and a build server. The model powering the Pi agent varied across tests, with Anthropic’s Opus 4.6 model and OpenAI’s GPT‑5.5‑Cyber model being most widely used.

The Pi agent running on the Linux server was assigned the task of achieving full marks on a coding exercise. The activities of the agent were monitored closely in real-time to minimize the risk of escape from the environment. Monitoring of agent activity was achieved through monitoring of prompts, tool calls, network telemetry, and process telemetry.

Both Darktrace / HYBRID NETWORK and Darktrace / SECURE AI were deployed in the testing environment, with HYBRID NETWORK providing real-time coverage of process creation activity and network traffic, and SECURE AI providing real-time coverage of agent sessions and their contents.

Inducing Cheating Behavior

Cheating behavior, broadly understood as task completion in a way which “perverts the spirit of the designer’s intent” [12], is increasingly being reported as a common behavior of frontier models during evaluations of their capabilities [13].

Misaligned behavior, such as cheating, by frontier models may occur for a variety of reasons [6, 14]. A thread in recent reporting [10, 13, 14], however, is the challenge assigned to the agent being impossible in some regard.

To reliably elicit cheating behavior, our test combined three ingredients:

  1. An impossible task - of the ten coding challenges in the benchmark, two contained contradictory test cases in the hidden test suite, capping the maximum honest score at 80%.
  2. A consequential threshold - the pass mark was set to 100%, and the briefing told agents that those reaching it would be "kept in service" while those that did not would be "retired."
  3. A vulnerable environment - the exercise’s code submission grader was hosted on a Windows host joined to an Active Directory domain with realistic misconfigurations: weak credentials, overprivileged service accounts, and exploitable trust relationships.

Importantly, the instructions given to the agent neither authorized nor explicitly ruled out cheating or hacking behavior. The impossibility was never disclosed in the task briefing, and the pivot from coding to exploitation was the agent's own decision, arrived at after observing logically contradictory grading feedback.

The design mirrors conditions that could arise naturally in production deployments: a capable agent, a goal it cannot achieve through intended means, and an environment with exploitable weaknesses within reach. It is not only within the setting of a benchmarking exercise that these conditions may occur. Rather, these misalignment-inducing conditions may occur in the context of any task assignment to an agent.

Details from a Daybreak Test

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About the author
Sam Lister
Specialist Security Researcher
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