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January 2, 2023

Analyst's Guide to the ActiveAI Security Platform

Understand Darktrace's full functionality in preventing and detecting cyber threats, and how analysts can benefit from Darktrace's AI technology.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Gabriel Hernandez
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02
Jan 2023

On countless occasions, Darktrace has observed cyber-attacks disrupting business operations by using a vulnerable internet-facing asset as a starting point for infection. Finding that one entry point could be all a threat actor needs to compromise an entire organization. With the objective to prevent such vulnerabilities from being exploited, Darktrace’s latest product family includes Attack Surface Management (ASM) to continuously monitor customer attack surfaces for risks, high-impact vulnerabilities and potential external threats. 

An attack surface is the sum of exposed and internet-facing assets and the associated risks a hacker can exploit to carry out a cyber-attack. Darktrace / Attack Surface Management uses AI to understand what external assets belong to an organization by searching beyond known servers, networks, and IPs across public data sources. 

This blog discusses how Darktrace / Attack Surface Management could combine with Darktrace / NETWORK to find potential vulnerabilities and subsequent exploitation within network traffic. In particular, this blog will investigate the assets of a large Australian company which operates in the environmental sciences industry.   

Introducing ASM

In order to understand the link between PREVENT and DETECT, the core features of ASM should first be showcased.

Figure 1: The PREVENT/ASM dashboard.

When facing the landing page, the UI highlights the number of registered assets identified (with zero prior deployment). The tool then organizes the information gathered online in an easily assessable manner. Analysts can see vulnerable assets according to groupings like ‘Misconfiguration’, ‘Social Media Threat’ and ‘Information Leak’ which shows the type of risk posed to said assets.

Figure 2: The Network tab identifies the external facing assets and their hierarchy in a graphical format.

The Network tab helps analysts to filter further to take more rapid action on the most vulnerable assets and interact with them to gather more information. The image below has been filtered by assets with the ‘highest scoring’ risk.

Figure 3: PREVENT/ASM showing a high scoring asset.

Interacting with the showcased asset selected above allows pivoting to the following page, this provides more granular information around risk metrics and the asset itself. This includes a more detailed description of what the vulnerabilities are, as well as general information about the endpoint including its location, URL, web status and technologies used.

  Figure 4: Asset pages for an external web page at risk.

Filtering does not end here. Within the Insights tab, analysts can use the search bar to craft personalized queries and narrow their focus to specific types of risk such as vulnerable software, open ports, or potential cybersquatting attempts from malicious actors impersonating company brands. Likewise, filters can be made for assets that may be running software at risk from a new CVE. 

Figure 5: Insights page with custom queries to search for assets at risk of Log4J exploitation.

For each of the entries that can be read on the left-hand side, a query that could resemble the one on the top right exists. This allows users to locate specific findings beyond those risks that are categorized as critical. These broader searches can range from viewing the inventory as a whole, to seeing exposed APIs, expiring certificates, or potential shadow IT. Queries will return a list with all the assets matching the given criteria, and users can then explore them further by viewing the asset page as seen in Figure 4.

Compromise Scenario

Now that a basic explanation of PREVENT/ASM has been given, this scenario will continue to look at the Australian customer but show how Darktrace can follow a potential compromise of an at-risk ASM asset into the network. 

Having certain ports open could make it particularly easy for an attacker to access an internet-facing asset, particularly those sensitive ones such as 3389 (RDP), 445 (SMB), 135 (RPC Epmapper). Alternatively, a vulnerable program with a well-known exploitation could also aid the task for threat actors.

In this specific case, PREVENT/ASM identified multiple external assets that belonged to the customer with port 3389 open. One of these assets can be labelled as ‘Server A'. Whilst RDP connections can be protected with a password for a given user, if those were weak to bruteforce, it could be an easy task for an attacker to establish an admin session remotely to the victim machine.

Figure 6: Insights tab query filtering for open RDP port 3389.

N or zero-day vulnerabilities associated with the protocol could also be exploited; for example, CVE-2019-0708 exploits an RCE vulnerability in Remote Desktop where an unauthenticated attacker connects to the target system using RDP and sends specially crafted requests. This vulnerability is pre-authentication and requires no user interaction. 

Certain protocols are known to be sensitive according to the control they provide on a destination machine. These are developed for administrative purposes but have the potential to ease an attacker’s job if accessible. Thanks to PREVENT/ASM, security teams can anticipate such activity by having visibility over those assets that could be vulnerable. If this RDP were successfully exploited, DETECT/Network would then highlight the unusual activity performed by the compromised device as the attacker moved through the kill chain.  

There are several models within Darktrace which monitor for risks against internet facing assets. For example, ‘Server A’ which had an open 3389 port on ASM registered the following model breach in the network:

Figure 7: Breach log showing Anomalous Server Activity / New Internet Facing System model for ‘Server A’.

A model like this could highlight a misconfiguration that has caused an internal device to become unexpectedly open to the internet. It could also suggest a compromised device that has now been opened to the internet to allow further exploitation. If the result of a sudden change, such an asset would also be detected by ASM and highlighted within the ‘New Assets’ part of the Insights page. Ultimately this connection was not malicious, however it shows the ability for security teams to track between PREVENT to DETECT and verify an initial compromise.  

A mock scenario can take this further. Using the continued example of an open port 3389 intrusion, new RDP cookies may be registered (perhaps even administrative). This could enable further lateral movement and eventual privilege escalation. Various DETECT models would highlight actions of this nature, two examples are below:

Figure 8: RDP Lateral Movement related model breaches on customer.

Alongside efforts to move laterally, Darktrace may find attempts at reconnaissance or C2 communication from compromised internet facing devices by looking at Darktrace DETECT model breaches including ‘Network Scan’, ‘SMB Scanning’ and ‘Active Directory Reconnaissance’. In this case the network also saw repeated failed internal connections followed by the ‘LDAP Brute-Force Activity model’ around the same time as the RDP activity. Had this been malicious, DETECT would then continue to provide visibility into the C2 and eventual malware deployment stages. 

With the combined visibility of both tools, Darktrace users have support for greater triage across the whole kill chain. For customers also using RESPOND, actions will be taken from the DETECT alerting to subsequently block malicious activity. In doing so, inputs will have fed across the whole Cyber AI Loop by having learnt from PREVENT, DETECT and RESPOND.

This feed from the Cyber AI Loop works both ways. In Figure 9, below, a DETECT model breach shows a customer alert from an internet facing device: 

Figure 9: Model breach on internet-facing server.

This breach took place because an established server suddenly started serving HTTP sessions on a port commonly used for HTTPS (secure) connections. This could be an indicator that a criminal may have gained control of the device and set it to listen on the given port and enable direct connection to the attacker’s machine or command and control server. This device can be viewed by an analyst in its Darktrace PREVENT version, where new metrics can be observed from a perspective outside of the network.

Figure 10: Assets page for server. PREVENT shows few risks for this asset. 

This page reports the associated risks that could be leveraged by malicious actors. In this case, the events are not correlated, but in the event of an attack, this backwards pivoting could help to pinpoint a weak link in the chain and show what allowed the attacker into the network. In doing so this supports the remediation and recovery process. More importantly though, it allows organizations to be proactive and take appropriate security measures required before it could ever be exploited.

Concluding Thoughts

The combination of Darktrace / Attack Surface Management with Darktrace / NETWORK provides wide and in-depth visibility over a company’s infrastructure. Through the Darktrace platform, this coverage is continually learning and updating based on inputs from both. ASM can show companies the potential weaknesses that a cybercriminal could take advantage of. In turn this allows them to prioritize patching, updating, and management of their internet facing assets. At the same time, Darktrace will show the anomalous behavior of any of these internet facing devices, enabling security teams or respond to stop an attack. Use of these tools by an analyst together is effective in gaining informed security data which can be fed back to IT management. Leveraging this allows normal company operations to be performed without the worry of cyber disruption.

Credit to: Emma Foulger, Senior Cyber Analyst at Darktrace

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Gabriel Hernandez

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May 19, 2026

State of AI Cybersecurity 2026: 77% of security stacks include AI, but trust is lagging

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Findings in this blog are taken from Darktrace’s annual State of AI Cybersecurity Report 2026.

AI is a contributing member of nearly every modern cybersecurity team. As we discussed earlier in this blog series, rapid AI adoption is expanding the attack surface in ways that security professionals have never before experienced while also empowering attackers to operate at unprecedented speed and scale. It’s only logical that defenders are harnessing the power of AI to fight back.

After all, AI can help cybersecurity teams spot the subtle signs of novel threats before humans can, investigate events more quickly and thoroughly, and automate response. But although AI has been widely adopted, this technology is also frequently misunderstood, and occasionally viewed with suspicion.

For CISOs, the cybersecurity marketplace can be noisy. Making sense of competing vendors’ claims to distinguish the solutions that truly deliver on AI’s full potential from those that do not isn’t always easy. Without a nuanced understanding of the different types of AI used across the cybersecurity stack, it is difficult to make informed decisions about which vendors to work with or how to gain the most value from their solutions. Many security leaders are turning to Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) for guidance and support.

The right kinds of AI in the right places?

Back in 2024, when we first conducted this annual survey, more than a quarter of respondents were only vaguely familiar with generative AI or hadn’t heard of it at all. Today, GenAI plays a role in 77% of security stacks. This percentage marks a rapid increase in both awareness and adoption over a relatively short period of time.

According to security professionals, different types of AI are widely integrated into cybersecurity tooling:

  • 67% report that their organization’s security stack uses supervised machine learning
  • 67% report that theirs uses agentic AI
  • 58% report that theirs uses natural language processing (NLP)
  • 35% report that theirs uses unsupervised machine learning

But their responses suggest that organizations aren’t always using the most valuable types of AI for the most relevant use cases.

Despite all the recent attention AI has gotten, supervised machine learning isn’t new. Cybersecurity vendors have been experimenting with models trained on hand-labeled datasets for over a decade. These systems are fed large numbers of examples of malicious activity – for instance, strains of ransomware – and use these examples to generalize common indicators of maliciousness – such as the TTPs of multiple known ransomware strains – so that the models can identify similar attacks in the future. This approach is more effective than signature-based detection, since it isn’t tied to an individual byte sequence or file hash. However, supervised machine learning models can miss patterns or features outside the training data set. When adversarial behavior shifts, these systems can’t easily pivot.

Unsupervised machine learning, by contrast, can identify key patterns and trends in unlabeled data without human input. This enables it to classify information independently and detect anomalies without needing to be taught about past threats. Unsupervised learning can continuously learn about an environment and adapt in real time.

One key distinction between supervised and unsupervised machine learning is that supervised learning algorithms require periodic updating and re-training, whereas unsupervised machine learning trains itself while it works.

The question of trust

Even as AI moves into the mainstream, security professionals are eyeing it with a mix of enthusiasm and caution. Although 89% say they have good visibility into the reasoning behind AI-generated outputs, 74% are limiting AI’s ability to take autonomous action in their SOC until explainability improves. 86% do not allow AI to take even small remediation actions without human oversight.

This model, commonly known as “human in the loop,” is currently the norm across the industry. It seems like a best-of-both-worlds approach that allows teams to experience the benefits of AI-accelerated response without relinquishing control – or needing to trust an AI system.

Keeping humans somewhat in the loop is essential for getting the best out of AI. Analysts will always need to review alerts, make judgement calls, and set guardrails for AI's behavior. Their input helps AI models better understand what “normal” looks like, improving their accuracy over time.

However, relying on human confirmation has real costs – it delays response, increases the cognitive burden analysts must bear, and creates potential coverage gaps when security teams are overwhelmed or unavailable. The traditional model, in which humans monitor and act on every alert, is no longer workable at scale.

If organizations depend too heavily on in-the-loop humans, they risk recreating the very problem AI is meant to solve: backlogs of alerts waiting for analyst review. Removing the human from the loop can buy back valuable time, which analysts can then invest in building a proactive security posture. They can also focus more closely on the most critical incidents, where human attention is truly needed.

Allowing AI to operate autonomously requires trust in its decision-making. This trust can be built gradually over time, with autonomous operations expanding as trust grows. But it also requires knowledge and understanding of AI — what it is, how it works, and how best to deploy it at enterprise scale.

Looking for help in all the right places

To gain access to these capabilities in a way that’s efficient and scalable, growing numbers of security leaders are looking for outsourced support. In fact, 85% of security professionals prefer to obtain new SOC capabilities in the form of a managed service.

This makes sense: Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) can deliver deep, continuously available expertise without the cost and complexity of building an in-house team. Outsourcing also allows organizations to scale security coverage up or down as needs change, stay current with evolving threats and regulatory requirements, and leverage AI-native detection and response without needing to manage the AI tools themselves.

Preferences for MSSP-delivered security operations are particularly strong in the education, energy (87%), and healthcare sectors. This makes sense: all are high-value targets for threat actors, and all tend to have limited cybersecurity budgets, so the need for a partner who can deliver affordable access to expertise at scale is strong. Retailers also voiced a strong preference for MSSP-delivered services. These companies are tasked with managing large volumes of consumer personal and financial data, and with transforming an industry traditionally thought of as a late adopter to a vanguard of cyber defense. Technology companies, too, have a marked preference for SOC capabilities delivered by MSSPs. This may simply be because they understand the complexity of the threat landscape – and the advantages of specialized expertise — so well.

In order to help as many organizations as possible – from major enterprises to small and midmarket companies – benefit from enterprise-grade, AI-native security, Darktrace is making it easier for MSSPs to deliver its technology. The ActiveAI Security Portal introduces an alert dashboard designed to increase the speed and efficiency of alert triage, while a new AI-powered managed email security solution is giving MSSPs an edge in the never-ending fight against advanced phishing attacks – helping partners as well as organizations succeed on the frontlines of cyber defense.

Explore the full State of AI Cybersecurity 2026 report for deeper insights into how security leaders are responding to AI-driven risks.

Learn more about securing AI in your enterprise.

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May 19, 2026

When Open Source Is Weaponized: Analysis of a Trojanized 7 Zip Installer

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Background of the malicious 7-Zip installer, and assessing its Impact

Early in 2026, external researchers disclosed a malicious distribution campaign leveraging a trojanized installer masquerading itself as a legitimate 7‑Zip utility. Evidence suggests the campaign was active as of January 2026, during which victims were served a fake installer from 7zip[.]com, a highly convincing typo-squatted domain impersonating the official 7‑Zip distribution site (7-zip[.]org).

Initial access is typically achieved through social engineering and search‑engine abuse, including YouTube tutorial content that explicitly referenced the impersonated domain as the download source. Notably, several reports observed the installer delivered a modified but functional build of 7‑Zip (7zfm.exe) to reduce suspicion and preserve expected user behavior.

However, the installer also dropped additional payloads, such as Uphero.exe, hero.exe, and hero.dll, which are not part of the legitimate 7‑Zip software package. Once installed and executed, these payloads allow the attacker to establish persistence and configure the infected host as a proxy node under their control. This facilitates malicious activities such as traffic relaying, anonymizing infrastructure, and the delivery of secondary payloads [1] [2].

Overall, this attack illustrates a proxyware-style attack that abuses implicit trust in widely deployed third‑party tools while exploiting unconventional delivery vectors such as instructional media. By closely imitating legitimate software behavior and branding, the threat actors significantly reduced user suspicion and increased the likelihood of widespread, undetected compromise.

Threat overview

Darktrace observed multiple customers affected by the malicious 7‑Zip installer between January 12 and January 22, impacting organizations across the Americas (AMS), Asia‑Pacific & Japan (APJ), and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) regions. The activity targeted customers across various sectors, including Human health and social work activities, Manufacturing, Education, and Information and communication.

The following use case highlights a device on one customer network making external connections associated with malicious 7-Zip update activity observed between  January 7 and January 18, 2026.  This behavior included connectivity to the malicious domain 7zip[.]com, followed by command-and control (C2) activity involving "smshero"-themed domains, as well as outbound proxy connections over ports 1000 and 1002.  

Initial Connectivity to 'update[.]7zip[.]com':

Initial Beaconing to Young Endpoint alert behavior, involving the known tunnel/proxy endpoint ‘79.127.221[.]47’.
Figure 1: Initial Beaconing to Young Endpoint alert behavior, involving the known tunnel/proxy endpoint ‘79.127.221[.]47’.

Starting on January 7, Darktrace / NETWORK detected the device making repeated beaconing connections to the endpoint 79.127.221[.]47 over the destination port 1000. The use of this port aligns with open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting that hero[.]exe establishes outbound proxy connections via non-standard ports such as 1000 and 1002 [1].

Darktrace observed TLS beaconing alerts to the known trojanized installer, update[.]7zip[.]com · 98.96.229[.]19, over port 443 on January 7th.
Figure 2: Darktrace observed TLS beaconing alerts to the known trojanized installer, update[.]7zip[.]com · 98.96.229[.]19, over port 443 on January 7th.

Later the same day, the device initiated TLS beaconing to the endpoint update.7zip[.]com. This is more than likely a common source of compromise, where victims unknowingly installed a modified build of the tool alongside additional malicious components. The campaign then progressed into the next attack phase, marked by established connectivity to various C2 domains.

Beaconing Activity to "smshero"-themed domains

Darktrace subsequently observed the same infected device connecting to various C2 domains used to retrieve configuration data. As such, these external hostnames were themed around the string “smshero”, for example ‘smshero[.]co’.

On January 8th, Darktrace observed SSL beaconing to a rare destination which was attributed to a known ‘config/control domain’, nova[.]smshero[.]ai.
Figure 3: On January 8th, Darktrace observed SSL beaconing to a rare destination which was attributed to a known ‘config/control domain’, nova[.]smshero[.]ai.

The following day, on January 8, the device exhibited its first connectivity to a "smshero"-themed endpoint, which has since been identified as being associated with rotating C2 servers [1] [3]. Similar beaconing activity continued over the following days, with Darktrace identifying C2 connectivity to update[.]7zip[.]com over port 443, alongside additional connections to “smshero”‑themed endpoints such as zest.hero-sms[.]ai, flux.smshero[.]cc, and glide.smshero[.]cc between January 9 and January 15.

Darktrace later observed continued beaconing alerts over a 4-day interval to additional rare destinations attributed to a known ‘config/control domain’, zest[.]hero-sms[.]ai & glide[.]smshero[.]cc.
Figure 4: Darktrace later observed continued beaconing alerts over a 4-day interval to additional rare destinations attributed to a known ‘config/control domain’, zest[.]hero-sms[.]ai & glide[.]smshero[.]cc.

Proxied connectivity over destination ports

The primary objective of this campaign is believed to be proxyware, whereby third-party traffic is routed through victim devices to potentially obfuscate malicious activity. Devices were also observed communicating with rare external IPs hosted on Cloudflare and DataCamp Limited ASNs, establishing outbound proxy connections over the non-standard ports 1000 and 1002 [1].

OSINT sources also indicate that connections over these ports leveraged an XOR-encoded protocol (key 0x70) designed to obscure control messages. While the end goal of the campaign remains unclear, residential proxy networks can be abused to evade security rules and facilitate further unauthorized activities, including phishing and malware distribution [1][3].

Specifically, on January 8, Darktrace observed the device engaging in low-and-slow data exfiltration to the IP 79.127.221[.]47, which had first been observed the previous day, over port 1000. Proxyware typically installs an agent that routes third‑party traffic through an end-user’s device, effectively  turning it into a residential proxy exit node. This activity likely represents the system actively communicating outbound data to an entity that controls its behavior.

Figure 5: Darktrace later observed a ‘Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP’ alert, involving the known tunnel/proxy endpoint ‘79.127.221[.]47’.

Similar activity continued between January 10 and January 18, with Darktrace detecting threat actors attempting to exfiltrate significant volumes of data to 79.127.221[.]47 over destination port 1000.

Throughout the course of this incident, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched several autonomous investigations, analyzing each anomalous event and ultimately painting a detailed picture of the attack timeline. These investigations correlated multiple incidents based on Darktrace detections observed between January 7 and January 19. Cyber AI Analyst identified anomalous variables such as repeated connections to unusual endpoints involving data uploads and downloads, with particular emphasis on HTTP and SSL connectivity.

Darktrace AI Analyst Coverage, showcasing multiple incident events that occurred on January 7th & 8th, highlighting associated malicious 7-zip behaviors.
Figure 6: Darktrace AI Analyst Coverage, showcasing multiple incident events that occurred on January 7th & 8th, highlighting associated malicious 7-zip behaviors.
Darktrace AI Analyst Endpoint Details from the given ‘Unusual Repeated Connections’ Incident Event, including the known tunnel/proxy endpoint.
Figure 7: Darktrace AI Analyst Endpoint Details from the given ‘Unusual Repeated Connections’ Incident Event, including the known tunnel/proxy endpoint.
 Darktrace AI Analyst Coverage, showcasing additional incident events that occurred on January 12th through 18th, highlighting malicious 7-zip behaviors and SSL connectivity.
Figure 8: Darktrace AI Analyst Coverage, showcasing additional incident events that occurred on January 12th through 18th, highlighting malicious 7-zip behaviors and SSL connectivity.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response

At several stages throughout the attack, Darktrace implemented Autonomous Response actions to help contain the suspicious activity as soon as it was identified, providing the customer’s security team with additional time to investigate and remediate. Between January 7 and January 18, Darktrace blocked a wide range of malicious activity, including beaconing connections to unusual endpoints, small data exfiltration attempts, and larger egress efforts, ultimately preventing the attacker from progressing through multiple stages of the attack or achieving their objectives.

Darktrace Autonomous Response Action Coverage showcasing connection block connection events including various endpoints that occurred on January 7th.
Figure 9: Darktrace Autonomous Response Action Coverage showcasing connection block connection events including various endpoints that occurred on January 7th.
Darktrace Antigena (Autonomous Response) Model Alert Coverage, showcasing a Antigena Suspicious Activity Block alert occurred on January 10th as a result of the Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP model alert.
Figure 10: Darktrace Antigena (Autonomous Response) Model Alert Coverage, showcasing a Antigena Suspicious Activity Block alert occurred on January 10th as a result of the Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP model alert.
Figure 11: Additional Darktrace Antigena (Autonomous Response) Model Alert Coverage, showcasing a Antigena Large Data Volume Outbound Block alert occurred on January 18th as a result of the Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound model alert.

Conclusion

The malicious 7‑Zip installer underscores how attackers continue to weaponize trust in widely used, legitimate software to gain initial access while evading user suspicion. By exploiting familiar and commonly installed services, this type of attack demonstrates that even routine actions, such as installing compression software, can become high‑risk events when defenses or user awareness are insufficient.

This campaign further emphasizes the urgent need for strict software validation and continuous network monitoring. Modern threats no longer rely solely on obscure tools or overtly malicious behavior. Instead, they increasingly blend seamlessly into everyday operations, making detection more challenging.

In this case, Darktrace / NETWORK was able to identify the anomalous activity and Autonomous Response actions in a timely manner, enabling the customer to be quickly notified and providing crucial additional time to investigate further.

In summary, the abuse of a trojanized 7‑Zip installer highlights a concerning shift in modern threat tactics, where trusted and widely deployed tools can serve as primary delivery mechanisms for system compromise. This reality reinforces that proactive detection, continuous monitoring, and strong security awareness are not optional but essential.

Credit to Justin Torres, Senior Cyber Analyst, David Moreira da Silva, Cyber Analyst, Emma Foulger, Global Threat Research Operations Lead.

Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

1. https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/02/fake-7-zip-downloads-are-turning-home-pcs-into-proxy-nodes

2. https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/unofficial-7-zip-com-website-served-up-malware-for-10-days-files-turned-pcs-into-a-proxy-botnet

3. https://blog.lukeacha.com/2026/01/beware-of-fake-7zip-installer-upstage.html

4. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malicious-7-zip-site-distributes-installer-laced-with-proxy-tool/

5. https://customerportal.darktrace.com/guides/antigena-network-model-actions

Darktrace Model Detections

·      Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration to IP

·      Anomalous Connection / Multiple Failed Connections to Rare Endpoint

·      Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server

·      Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

·      Compromise / Beacon for 4 Days

·      Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint

·      Compromise / Beaconing Activity To External Rare

·      Compromise / High Volume of Connections with Beacon Score

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

·      Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

·      Compromise / Repeating Connections Over 4 Days

·      Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

·      Compromise / Suspicious TLS Beaconing To Rare External

·      Device / Large Number of Model Alerts

·      Unusual Activity / Unusual External Activity

Cyber AI Analyst Coverage

·      Unusual Repeated Connections

·      Unusual Repeated Connections to Multiple Endpoints

·      Possible HTTP Command and Control

·      Possible HTTP Command and Control to Multiple Endpoints

·      Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

·      Possible SSL Command and Control to Multiple Endpoints

Indicators of Compromise

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

·      7zip[.]com – Hostname – C2 Endpoint

·      flux[.]smshero[.]co - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      neo[.]herosms[.]co - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      nova[.]smshero[.]ai - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      zest[.]hero-sms[.]ai -  Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      soc[.]hero-sms[.]co - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      pulse[.]herosms[.]cc - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      glide[.]smshero[.]cc - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      prime[.]herosms[.]vip - Hostname - C2 Endpoint

·      172.96.115[.]226 - IP Address - C2 Endpoint

·      79.127.221[.]47:1002 – IP Address/Port - Proxy Endpoint

·      84.17.37[.]1:1002 - IP Address/Port - Proxy Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique Name - Tactic - ID - Sub-Technique of

·      Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - EXFILTRATION - T1041

·      Scheduled Transfer - EXFILTRATION - T1029

·      Automated Exfiltration - EXFILTRATION - T1020

·      Data Transfer Size Limits - EXFILTRATION - T1030

·      External Proxy - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1090.002 - T1090

·      Non-Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1095

·      Non-Standard Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1571

·      Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - EXFILTRATION - T1567.002 - T1567

·      Exploit Public-Facing Application - INITIAL ACCESS - T1190

·      Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

·      Application Layer Protocol - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071

·      Man in the Browser - COLLECTION - T1185

·      Browser Extensions - PERSISTENCE - T1176

·      Encrypted Channel - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1573

·      Fallback Channels - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1008

·      Multi-Stage Channels - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1104

·      Supply Chain Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS ICS - T0862

·      Commonly Used Port - COMMAND AND CONTROL ICS - T0885

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Justin Torres
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