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February 11, 2025

NIS2 Compliance: Interpreting 'State-of-the-Art' for Organisations

This blog explores key technical factors that define state-of-the-art cybersecurity. Drawing on expertise from our business, academia, and national security standards, outlining five essential criteria.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Livia Fries
Public Policy Manager, EMEA
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11
Feb 2025

NIS2 Background

17 October 2024 marked the deadline for European Union (EU) Member States to implement the NIS2 Directive into national law. The Directive aims to enhance the EU’s cybersecurity posture by establishing a high common level of cybersecurity for critical infrastructure and services. It builds on its predecessor, the 2018 NIS Directive, by expanding the number of sectors in scope, enforcing greater reporting requirements and encouraging Member States to ensure regulated organisations adopt ‘state-of-the-art' security measures to protect their networks, OT and IT systems.  

Timeline of NIS2
Figure 1: Timeline of NIS2

The challenge of NIS2 & 'state-of-the-art'

Preamble (51) - "Member States should encourage the use of any innovative technology, including artificial intelligence, the use of which could improve the detection and prevention of cyberattacks, enabling resources to be diverted towards cyberattacks more effectively."
Article 21 - calls on Member States to ensure that essential and important entities “take appropriate and proportionate” cyber security measures, and that they do so by “taking into account the state-of-the-art and, where applicable, relevant European and international standards, as well as the cost of implementation.”

Regulatory expectations and ambiguity of NIS2

While organisations in scope can rely on technical guidance provided by ENISA1 , the EU’s agency for cybersecurity, or individual guidelines provided by Member States or Public-Private Partnerships where they have been published,2 the mention of ‘state-of-the-art' remains up to interpretation in most Member States. The use of the phrase implies that cybersecurity measures must evolve continuously to keep pace with emerging threats and technological advancements without specifying what ‘state-of-the-art’ actually means for a given context and risk.3  

This ambiguity makes it difficult for organisations to determine what constitutes compliance at any given time and could lead to potential inconsistencies in implementation and enforcement. Moreover, the rapid pace of technological change means that what is considered "state-of-the-art" today will become outdated, further complicating compliance efforts.

However, this is not unique to NIS regulation. As EU scholars have noted, while “state-of-the-art" is widely referred to in legal text relating to technology, there is no standardised legal definition of what it actually constitutes.4

Defining state-of-the-art cybersecurity

In this blog, we outline technical considerations for state-of-the-art cybersecurity. We draw from expertise within our own business and in academia as well as guidelines and security standards set by national agencies, such as Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or Spain’s National Security Framework (ENS), to put forward five criteria to define state-of-the-art cybersecurity.

The five core criteria include:

  • Continuous monitoring
  • Incident correlation
  • Detection of anomalous activity
  • Autonomous response
  • Proactive cyber resilience

These principles build on long-standing security considerations, such as business continuity, vulnerability management and basic security hygiene practices.  

Although these considerations are written in the context of the NIS2 Directive, they are likely to also be relevant for other jurisdictions. We hope these criteria help organisations understand how to best meet their responsibilities under the NIS2 Directive and assist Competent Authorities in defining compliance expectations for the organisations they regulate.  

Ultimately, adopting state-of-the-art cyber defences is crucial for ensuring that organisations are equipped with the best tools to combat new and fast-growing threats. Leading technical authorities, such as the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), recognise that adoption of AI-powered cyber defences will offset the increased volume and impact of AI on cyber threats.5

State of the art cybersecurity in the context of NIS2

1. Continuous monitoring

Continuous monitoring is required to protect an increasingly complex attack surface from attackers.

First, organisations' attack surfaces have expanded following the widespread adoption of hybrid or cloud infrastructures and the increased adoption of connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices.6 This exponential growth creates a complex digital environment for organisations, making it difficult for security teams to track all internet-facing assets and identify potential vulnerabilities.

Second, with the significant increase in the speed and sophistication of cyber-attacks, organisations face a greater need to detect security threats and non-compliance issues in real-time.  

Continuous monitoring, defined by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as the ability to maintain “ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats to support organizational risk management decisions,”7 has therefore become a cornerstone of an effective cybersecurity strategy. By implementing continuous monitoring, organisations can ensure a real-time understanding of their attack surface and that new external assets are promptly accounted for. For instance, Spain’s technical guidelines for regulation, as set forth by the National Security Framework (Royal Decree 311/2022), highlight the importance of adopting continuous monitoring to detect anomalous activities or behaviours and to ensure timely responses to potential threats (article 10).8  

This can be achieved through the following means:  

All assets that form part of an organisation's estate, both known and unknown, must be identified and continuously monitored for current and emerging risks. Germany’s BSI mandates the continuous monitoring of all protocol and logging data in real-time (requirement #110).9 This should be conducted alongside any regular scans to detect unknown devices or cases of shadow IT, or the use of unauthorised or unmanaged applications and devices within an organisation, which can expose internet-facing assets to unmonitored risks. Continuous monitoring can therefore help identify potential risks and high-impact vulnerabilities within an organisation's digital estate and eliminate potential gaps and blind spots.

Organisations looking to implement more efficient continuous monitoring strategies may turn to automation, but, as the BSI notes, it is important for responsible parties to be immediately warned if an alert is raised (reference 110).10 Following the BSI’s recommendations, the alert must be examined and, if necessary, contained within a short period of time corresponding with the analysis of the risk at hand.

Finally, risk scoring and vulnerability mapping are also essential parts of this process. Continuous monitoring helps identify potential risks and significant vulnerabilities within an organisation's digital assets, fostering a dynamic understanding of risk. By doing so, risk scoring and vulnerability mapping allows organisations to prioritise the risks associated with their most critically exposed assets.

2. Correlation of incidents across your entire environment

Viewing and correlating incident alerts when working with different platforms and tools poses significant challenges to SecOps teams. Security professionals often struggle to cross-reference alerts efficiently, which can lead to potential delays in identifying and responding to threats. The complexity of managing multiple sources of information can overwhelm teams, making it difficult to maintain a cohesive understanding of the security landscape.

This fragmentation underscores the need for a centralised approach that provides a "single pane of glass" view of all cybersecurity alerts. These systems streamline the process of monitoring and responding to incidents, enabling security teams to act more swiftly and effectively. By consolidating alerts into a unified interface, organisations can enhance their ability to detect and mitigate threats, ultimately improving their overall security posture.  

To achieve consolidation, organisations should consider the role automation can play when reviewing and correlating incidents. This is reflected in Spain’s technical guidelines for national security regulations regarding the requirements for the “recording of activity” (reinforcement R5).12 Specifically, the guidelines state that:  

"The system shall implement tools to analyses and review system activity and audit information, in search of possible or actual security compromises. An automatic system for collection of records, correlation of events and automatic response to them shall be available”.13  

Similarly, the German guidelines stress that automated central analysis is essential not only for recording all protocol and logging data generated within the system environment but also to ensure that the data is correlated to ensure that security-relevant processes are visible (article 115).14

Correlating disparate incidents and alerts is especially important when considering the increased connectivity between IT and OT environments driven by business and functional requirements. Indeed, organisations that believe they have air-gapped systems are now becoming aware of points of IT/OT convergence within their systems. It is therefore crucial for organisations managing both IT and OT environments to be able to visualise and secure devices across all IT and OT protocols in real-time to identify potential spillovers.  

By consolidating data into a centralised system, organisations can achieve a more resilient posture. This approach exposes and eliminates gaps between people, processes, and technology before they can be exploited by malicious actors. As seen in the German and Spanish guidelines, a unified view of security alerts not only enhances the efficacy of threat detection and response but also ensures comprehensive visibility and control over the organisation's cybersecurity posture.

3. Detection of anomalous activity  

Recent research highlights the emergence of a "new normal" in cybersecurity, marked by an increase in zero-day vulnerabilities. Indeed, for the first time since sharing their annual list, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance reported that in 2023, the majority of the most routinely exploited vulnerabilities were initially exploited as zero-days.15  

To effectively combat these advanced threats, policymakers, industry and academic stakeholders alike recognise the importance of anomaly-based techniques to detect both known and unknown attacks.

As AI-enabled threats become more prevalent,16 traditional cybersecurity methods that depend on lists of "known bads" are proving inadequate against rapidly evolving and sophisticated attacks. These legacy approaches are limited because they can only identify threats that have been previously encountered and cataloged. However, cybercriminals are constantly developing new, never-before-seen threats, such as signatureless ransomware or living off the land techniques, which can easily bypass these outdated defences.

The importance of anomaly detection in cybersecurity can be found in Spain’s technical guidelines, which states that “tools shall be available to automate the prevention and response process by detecting and identifying anomalies17” (reinforcement R4 prevention and automatic response to "incident management”).  

Similarly, the UK NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) highlights how anomaly-based detection systems are capable of detecting threats that “evade standard signature-based security solutions” (Principle C2 - Proactive Security Event Discovery18). The CAF’s C2 principle further outlines:  

“The science of anomaly detection, which goes beyond using pre-defined or prescriptive pattern matching, is a challenging area. Capabilities like machine learning are increasingly being shown to have applicability and potential in the field of intrusion detection.”19

By leveraging machine learning and multi-layered AI techniques, organisations can move away from static rules and signatures, adopting a more behavioural approach to identifying and containing risks. This shift not only enhances the detection of emerging threats but also provides a more robust defence mechanism.

A key component of this strategy is behavioral zero trust, which focuses on identifying unauthorized and out-of-character attempts by users, devices, or systems. Implementing a robust procedure to verify each user and issuing the minimum required access rights based on their role and established patterns of activity is essential. Organisations should therefore be encouraged to follow a robust procedure to verify each user and issue the minimum required access rights based on their role and expected or established patterns of activity. By doing so, organisations can stay ahead of emerging threats and embrace a more dynamic and resilient cybersecurity strategy.  

4. Autonomous response

The speed at which cyber-attacks occur means that defenders must be equipped with tools that match the sophistication and agility of those used by attackers. Autonomous response tools are thus essential for modern cyber defence, as they enable organisations to respond to both known and novel threats in real time.  

These tools leverage a deep contextual and behavioral understanding of the organisation to take precise actions, effectively containing threats without disrupting business operations.

To avoid unnecessary business disruptions and maintain robust security, especially in more sensitive networks such as OT environments, it is crucial for organisations to determine the appropriate response depending on their environment. This can range from taking autonomous and native actions, such as isolating or blocking devices, or integrating their autonomous response tool with firewalls or other security tools to taking customized actions.  

Autonomous response solutions should also use a contextual understanding of the business environment to make informed decisions, allowing them to contain threats swiftly and accurately. This means that even as cyber-attacks evolve and become more sophisticated, organisations can maintain continuous protection without compromising operational efficiency.  

Indeed, research into the adoption of autonomous cyber defences points to the importance of implementing “organisation-specific" and “context-informed” approaches.20  To decide the appropriate level of autonomy for each network action, it is argued, it is essential to use evidence-based risk prioritisation that is customised to the specific operations, assets, and data of individual enterprises.21

By adopting autonomous response solutions, organisations can ensure their defences are as dynamic and effective as the threats they face, significantly enhancing their overall security posture.

5. Proactive cyber resilience  

Adopting a proactive approach to cybersecurity is crucial for organisations aiming to safeguard their operations and reputation. By hardening their defences enough so attackers are unable to target them effectively, organisations can save significant time and money. This proactive stance helps reduce business disruption, reputational damage, and the need for lengthy, resource-intensive incident responses.

Proactive cybersecurity incorporates many of the strategies outlined above. This can be seen in a recent survey of information technology practitioners, which outlines four components of a proactive cybersecurity culture: (1) visibility of corporate assets, (2) leveraging intelligent and modern technology, (3) adopting consistent and comprehensive training methods and (4) implementing risk response procedures.22 To this, we may also add continuous monitoring which allows organisations to understand the most vulnerable and high-value paths across their architectures, allowing them to secure their critical assets more effectively.  

Alongside these components, a proactive cyber strategy should be based on a combined business context and knowledge, ensuring that security measures are aligned with the organisation's specific needs and priorities.  

This proactive approach to cyber resilience is reflected in Spain’s technical guidance (article 8.2): “Prevention measures, which may incorporate components geared towards deterrence or reduction of the exposure surface, should eliminate or reduce the likelihood of threats materializing.”23 It can also be found in the NCSC’s CAF, which outlines how organisations can achieve “proactive attack discovery” (see Principle C2).24 Likewise, Belgium’s NIS2 transposition guidelines mandate the use of preventive measures to ensure the continued availability of services in the event of exceptional network failures (article 30).25  

Ultimately, a proactive approach to cybersecurity not only enhances protection but also lowers regulatory risk and supports the overall resilience and stability of the organisation.

Looking forward

The NIS2 Directive marked a significant regulatory milestone in strengthening cybersecurity across the EU.26 Given the impact of emerging technologies, such as AI, on cybersecurity, it is to see that Member States are encouraged to promote the adoption of ‘state-of-the-art' cybersecurity across regulated entities.  

In this blog, we have sought to translate what state-of-the-art cybersecurity may look like for organisations looking to enhance their cybersecurity posture. To do so, we have built on existing cybersecurity guidance, research and our own experience as an AI-cybersecurity company to outline five criteria: continuous monitoring, incident correlation, detection of anomalous activity, autonomous response, and proactive cyber resilience.

By embracing these principles and evolving cybersecurity practices in line with the state-of-the-art, organisations can comply with the NIS2 Directive while building a resilient cybersecurity posture capable of withstanding evolutions in the cyber threat landscape. Looking forward, it will be interesting to see how other jurisdictions embrace new technologies, such as AI, in solving the cybersecurity problem.

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References

[1] https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/implementation-guidance-on-nis-2-security-measures

[2] https://www.teletrust.de/fileadmin/user_upload/2023-05_TeleTrusT_Guideline_State_of_the_art_in_IT_security_EN.pdf

[3] https://kpmg.com/uk/en/home/insights/2024/04/what-does-nis2-mean-for-energy-businesses.html

[4] https://orbilu.uni.lu/bitstream/10993/50878/1/SCHMITZ_IFIP_workshop_sota_author-pre-print.pdf

[5]https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-of-ai-on-cyber-threat

[6] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949715923000793

[7] https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/information_security_continuous_monitoring

[8] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[9] https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/KRITIS/Konkretisierung_Anforderungen_Massnahmen_KRITIS.html

[10] https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/KRITIS/Konkretisierung_Anforderungen_Massnahmen_KRITIS.html

[12] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[13] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[14] https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/KRITIS/Konkretisierung_Anforderungen_Massnahmen_KRITIS.html

[15] https://therecord.media/surge-zero-day-exploits-five-eyes-report

[16] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-of-ai-on-cyber-threat

[17] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[18] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework/caf-objective-c-detecting-cyber-security-events/principle-c2-proactive-security-event-discovery

[19] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework/caf-objective-c-detecting-cyber-security-events/principle-c2-proactive-security-event-discovery

[20] https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/autonomous-cyber-defence-autonomous-agents

[21] https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/autonomous-cyber-defence-autonomous-agents

[22] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376170443_Cultivating_Proactive_Cybersecurity_Culture_among_IT_Professional_to_Combat_Evolving_Threats

[23] https://ens.ccn.cni.es/es/docman/documentos-publicos/39-boe-a-2022-7191-national-security-framework-ens/file

[24] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework/caf-objective-c-detecting-cyber-security-events/principle-c2-proactive-security-event-discovery

[25] https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/2024/05/17_1.pdf#page=49

[26] ENISA, NIS Directive 2

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Livia Fries
Public Policy Manager, EMEA

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November 6, 2025

Darktrace Named the Only 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Network Detection and Response

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Darktrace: The only Customers’ Choice for NDR in 2025

In a year defined by rapid change across the threat landscape, recognition from those who use and rely on security technology every day means the most.

That’s why we’re proud to share that Darktrace has been named the only Customers’ Choice in the 2025 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response (NDR).

Out of 11 leading NDR vendors evaluated, Darktrace stood alone as the sole Customers’ Choice, a recognition that we feel reflects not just our innovation, but the trust and satisfaction of the customers who secure their networks with Darktrace every day.

What the Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer means

“Voice of the Customer” is a document that synthesizes Gartner Peer Insights reviews into insights for buyers of technology and services. This aggregated peer perspective, along with the individual detailed reviews, is complementary to Gartner expert research and can play a key role in your buying process. Peers are verified reviewers of a technology product or service, who not only rate the offering, but also provide valuable feedback to consider before making a purchase decision. Vendors placed in the upper-right “Customers’ Choice” quadrant of the “Voice of the Customer” have scores that meet or exceed the market average for both axes (User Interest and Adoption, and Overall Experience).It’s not just a rating. We feel it’s a reflection of genuine customer sentiment and success in the field.

In our view, Customers consistently highlight Darktrace’s ability to:

  • Detect and respond to unknown threats in real time
  • Deliver unmatched visibility across IT, OT, and cloud environments
  • Automate investigations and responses through AI-driven insights

We believe this recognition reinforces what our customers already know: that Darktrace helps them see, understand, and stop attacks others miss.

A rare double: recognized by customers and analysts alike

This distinction follows another major recogniton. Darktrace’s placement as a Leader in the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Network Detection and Response earlier this year.

That makes Darktrace the only vendor to achieve both:

  • A Leader status in the Gartner Magic Quadrant for NDR, and
  • A Customers’ Choice in Gartner Peer Insights 2025

It’s a rare double that we feel reflects both industry leadership and customer trust, two perspectives that, together, define what great cybersecurity looks like.

A Customers’ Choice across the network and the inbox

To us, this recognition also builds on Darktrace’s momentum across multiple domains. Earlier this year, Darktrace was also named a Customers’ Choice for Email Security Platforms in the Gartner® Peer Insights™ report.

With more than 1,000 verified reviews across Network Detection and Response, Email Security Platforms, and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), we at Darktrace are proud to be trusted across the full attack surface, from the inbox to the industrial network.

Thank you to our customers

We’re deeply grateful to every customer who shared their experience with Darktrace on Gartner Peer Insights. Your insights drive our innovation and continue to shape how we protect complex, dynamic environments across the world.

Discover why customers choose Darktrace for network and email security.

Gartner® Peer Insights™ content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences, and should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

GARTNER is a registered trademark and service mark of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and internationally and is used herein with permission. All rights reserved.

Magic Quadrant and Peer Insights are registered trademarks of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates and is used herein with permission. All rights reserved.

Gartner, Voice of the Customer for Network Detection and Response, By Peer Community Contributor, 30 October 2025

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Mikey Anderson
Product Marketing Manager, Network Detection & Response

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November 5, 2025

Tracking a Dragon: Investigating a DragonForce-affiliated ransomware attack with Darktrace

Tracking a Dragon: Investigating a DragonForce-affiliated ransomware attack with Darktrace Default blog imageDefault blog image

What is DragonForce?

DragonForce is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform that emerged in late 2023, offering broad-scale capabilities and infrastructure to threat actors. Recently, DragonForce has been linked to attacks targeting the UK retail sector, resulting in several high-profile cases [1][2]. Moreover, the group launched an affiliate program offering a revenue share of roughly 20%, significantly lower than commissions reported across other RaaS platforms [3].

This Darktrace case study examines a DragonForce-linked RaaS infection within the manufacturing industry. The earliest signs of compromise were observed during working hours in August 2025, where an infected device started performing network scans and attempted to brute-force administrative credentials. After eight days of inactivity, threat actors returned and multiple devices began encrypting files via the SMB protocol using a DragonForce-associated file extension. Ransom notes referencing the group were also dropped, suggesting the threat actor is claiming affiliation with DragonForce, though this has not been confirmed.

Despite Darktrace’s detection of the attack in its early stages, the customer’s deployment did not have Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability configured, allowing the threat to progress to data exfiltration and file encryption.

Darktrace's Observations

While the initial access vector was not clearly defined in this case study, it was likely achieved through common methods previously employed out by DragonForce affiliates. These include phishing emails leveraging social engineering tactics, exploitation of public-facing applications with known vulnerabilities, web shells, and/or the abuse of remote management tools.

Darktrace’s analysis identified internal devices performing internal network scanning, brute-forcing credentials, and executing unusual Windows Registry operations. Notably, Windows Registry events involving "Schedule\Taskcache\Tasks" contain subkeys for individual tasks, storing GUIDs that can be used to locate and analyze scheduled tasks. Additionally, Control\WMI\Security holds security descriptors for WMI providers and Event Tracing loggers that use non-default security settings respectively.

Furthermore, Darktrace identified data exfiltration activity over SSH, including connections to an ASN associated with a malicious hosting service geolocated in Russia.

1. Network Scan & Brute Force

Darktrace identified anomalous behavior in late August to early September 2025, originating from a source device engaging in internal network scanning followed by brute-force attempts targeting administrator credential, including “administrator”, “Admin”, “rdpadmin”, “ftpadmin”.

Upon further analysis, one of the HTTP connections seen in this activity revealed the use of the user agent string “OpenVAS-VT”, suggesting that the device was using the OpenVAS vulnerability scanner. Subsequently, additional devices began exhibiting network scanning behavior. During this phase, a file named “delete.me” was deleted by multiple devices using SMB protocol. This file is commonly associated with network scanning and penetration testing tool NetScan.

2. Windows Registry Key Update

Following the scanning phase, Darktrace observed the initial device then performing suspicious Winreg operations. This included the use of the ”BaseRegOpenKey” function across multiple registry paths.

Additional operations such as “BaseRegOpenKey” and “BaseRegQueryValue” were also seen around this time. These operations are typically used to retrieve specific registry key values and allow write operations to registry keys.

The registry keys observed included “SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security” and “Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\Taskcache\Tasks”. These keys can be leveraged by malicious actors to update WMI access controls and schedule malicious tasks, respectively, both of which are common techniques for establishing persistence within a compromised system.

3. New Administrator Credential Usage

Darktrace subsequently detected the device using a highly privileged credential, “administrator”, via a successful Kerberos login for the first time. Shortly after, the same credential was used again for a successful SMB session.

These marked the first instances of authentication using the “administrator” credential across the customer’s environment, suggesting potential malicious use of the credential following the earlier brute-force activity.

Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in Kerberos login events by an infected device.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in Kerberos login events by an infected device.
Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in SMB sessions by an infected device.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of administrator credentials being used in SMB sessions by an infected device.

4. Data Exfiltration

Prior to ransomware deployment, several infected devices were observed exfiltrating data to the malicious IP 45.135.232[.]229 via SSH connections [7][8]. This was followed by the device downloading data from other internal devices and transferring an unusually large volume of data to the same external endpoint.

The IP address was first seen on the network on September 2, 2025 - the same date as the observed data exfiltration activity preceding ransomware deployment and encryption.

Further analysis revealed that the endpoint was geolocated in Russia and registered to the malicious hosting provider Proton66. Multiple external researchers have reported malicious activity involving the same Proton66 ASN (AS198953 Proton66 OOO) as far back as April 2025. These activities notably included vulnerability scanning, exploitation attempts, and phishing campaigns, which ultimately led to malware [4][5][6].

Data Exfiltration Endpoint details.

  • Endpoint: 45.135.232[.]229
  • ASN: AS198953 Proton66 OOO
  • Transport protocol: TCP
  • Application protocol: SSH
  • Destination port: 22
Darktrace’s summary of the external IP 45.135.232[.]229, first detected on September 2, 2025. The right-hand side showcases model alerts triggered related to this endpoint including multiple data exfiltration related model alerts.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s summary of the external IP 45.135.232[.]229, first detected on September 2, 2025. The right-hand side showcases model alerts triggered related to this endpoint including multiple data exfiltration related model alerts.

Further investigation into the endpoint using open-source intelligence (OSINT) revealed that it led to a Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager console webpage. This interface is typically used to configure and manage web servers. However, threat actors have been known to exploit similar setups, using fake certificate warnings to trick users into downloading malware, or deploying malicious IIS modules to steal credentials.

Live screenshot of the destination (45.135.232[.]229), captured via OSINT sources, displaying a Microsoft IIS Manager console webpage.
Figure 4: Live screenshot of the destination (45.135.232[.]229), captured via OSINT sources, displaying a Microsoft IIS Manager console webpage.

5. Ransomware Encryption & Ransom Note

Multiple devices were later observed connecting to internal devices via SMB and performing a range of actions indicative of file encryption. This suspicious activity prompted Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst to launch an autonomous investigation, during which it pieced together associated activity and provided concrete timestamps of events for the customer’s visibility.

During this activity, several devices were seen writing a file named “readme.txt” to multiple locations, including network-accessible webroot paths such as inetpub\ and wwwroot\. This “readme.txt” file, later confirmed to be the ransom note, claimed the threat actors were affiliated with DragonForce.

At the same time, devices were seen performing SMB Move, Write and ReadWrite actions involving files with the “.df_win” extension across other internal devices, suggesting that file encryption was actively occurring.

Darktrace’s detection of SMB events (excluding Read events) where the device was seen moving or writing files with the “.df_win” extension.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of SMB events (excluding Read events) where the device was seen moving or writing files with the “.df_win” extension.
Darktrace’s detection of a spike in SMB Write events with the filename “readme.txt” on September 9, indicating the start of file encryption.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of a spike in SMB Write events with the filename “readme.txt” on September 9, indicating the start of file encryption.

Conclusion

The rise of Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and increased attacker customization is fragmenting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), making it increasingly difficult for security teams to prepare for and defend against each unique intrusion. RaaS providers like DragonForce further complicate this challenge by enabling a wide range of affiliates, each with varying levels of sophistication [9].

In this instance, Darktrace was able to identify several stages of the attack kill chain, including network scanning, the first-time use of privileged credentials, data exfiltration, and ultimately ransomware encryption. Had the customer enabled Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability, it would have taken timely action to interrupt the attack in its early stages, preventing the eventual data exfiltration and ransomware detonation.

Credit to Justin Torres, Senior Cyber Analyst, Nathaniel Jones, VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO, & Emma Foulger, Global Threat Research Operations Lead.

Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

References:

1. https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/dragonforce-goup-ms-coop-harrods/

2. https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/dragonforce-ransomware-attacks-retail-giants

3. https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/dragonforce-ransomware-redefining-hybrid-extortion-in-2025/

4. https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/proton66-part-1-mass-scanning-and-exploit-campaigns/

5. https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/proton66-part-2-compromised-wordpress-pages-and-malware-campaigns/

6. https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/proton66-infrastructure-tied-to-expanding-malware-campaigns-and-c2-operations

7. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/45.135.232.229

8. https://spur.us/context/45.135.232.229

9. https://www.group-ib.com/blog/dragonforce-ransomware/

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

·      45.135.232[.]229 - Endpoint Associated with Data Exfiltration

·      .readme.txt – Ransom Note File Extension

·      .df_win – File Encryption Extension Observed

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

DragonForce TTPs vs Darktrace Models

Initial Access:

·      Anomalous Connection::Callback on Web Facing Device

Command and Control:

·      Compromise::SSL or HTTP Beacon

·      Compromise::Beacon to Young Endpoint

·      Compromise::Beaconing on Uncommon Port

·      Compromise::Suspicious SSL Activity

·      Anomalous Connection::Devices Beaconing to New Rare IP

·      Compromise::Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity

·      DNS Tunnel with TXT Records

Tooling:

·      Anomalous File::EXE from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File::Masqueraded File Transfer

·      Anomalous File::Numeric File Download

·      Anomalous File::Script from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File::Uncommon Microsoft File then Exe

·      Anomalous File::Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location

·      Anomalous File::Uncommon Microsoft File then Exe

·      Anomalous File::Internet Facing System File Download

Reconnaissance:

·      Device::Suspicious SMB Query

·      Device::ICMP Address Scan

·      Anomalous Connection::SMB Enumeration

·      Device::Possible SMB/NTLM Reconnaissance

·      Anomalous Connection::Possible Share Enumeration Activity

·      Device::Possible Active Directory Enumeration

·      Anomalous Connection::Large Volume of LDAP Download

·      Device::Suspicious LDAP Search Operation

Lateral Movement:

·      User::Suspicious Admin SMB Session

·      Anomalous Connection::Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

·      Anomalous Connection::Unusual Long Remote Desktop Session

·      Anomalous Connection::Unusual Admin RDP Session

·      User::New Admin Credentials on Client

·      User::New Admin Credentials on Server

·      Multiple Device Correlations::Spreading New Admin Credentials

·      Anomalous Connection::Powershell to Rare External

·      Device::New PowerShell User Agent

·      Anomalous Active Directory Web Services

·      Compromise::Unusual SVCCTL Activity

Evasion:

·      Unusual Activity::Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

·      Persistence

·      Device::Anomalous ITaskScheduler Activity

·      Device::AT Service Scheduled Task

·      Actions on Objectives

·      Compromise::Ransomware::Suspicious SMB Activity (EM)

·      Anomalous Connection::Sustained MIME Type Conversion

·      Compromise::Ransomware::SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions

·      Compromise::Ransomware::Possible Ransom Note Write

·      Data Sent to Rare Domain

·      Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound

·      Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer

Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst Coverage/Investigation Events:

·      Web Application Vulnerability Scanning of Multiple Devices

·      Port Scanning

·      Large Volume of SMB Login Failures

·      Unusual RDP Connections

·      Widespread Web Application Vulnerability Scanning

·      Unusual SSH Connections

·      Unusual Repeated Connections

·      Possible Application Layer Reconnaissance Activity

·      Unusual Administrative Connections

·      Suspicious Remote WMI Activity

·      Extensive Unusual Administrative Connections

·      Suspicious Directory Replication Service Activity

·      Scanning of Multiple Devices

·      Unusual External Data Transfer

·      SMB Write of Suspicious File

·      Suspicious Remote Service Control Activity

·      Access of Probable Unencrypted Password Files

·      Internal Download and External Upload

·      Possible Encryption of Files over SMB

·      SMB Writes of Suspicious Files to Multiple Devices

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About the author
Justin Torres
Cyber Analyst
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