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November 7, 2022

[Part 1] Analysis of a Raccoon Stealer v1 Infection

Darktrace’s SOC team observed a fast-paced compromise involving Raccoon Stealer v1. See which steps the Raccoon Stealer v1 took to extract company data!
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mark Turner
SOC Shift Supervisor
Written by
Sam Lister
SOC Analyst
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07
Nov 2022

Introduction

Towards the end of March 2022, the operators of Raccoon Stealer announced the closure of the Raccoon Stealer project [1]. In May 2022, Raccoon Stealer v2 was unleashed onto the world, with huge numbers of cases being detected across Darktrace’s client base. In this series of blog posts, we will follow the development of Raccoon Stealer between March and September 2022. We will first shed light on how Raccoon Stealer functioned before its demise, by providing details of a Raccoon Stealer v1 infection which Darktrace’s SOC saw within a client network on the 18th March 2022. In the follow-up post, we will provide details about the surge in Raccoon Stealer v2 cases that Darktrace’s SOC has observed since May 2022.  

What is Raccoon Stealer?

The misuse of stolen account credentials is a primary method used by threat actors to gain initial access to target environments [2]. Threat actors have several means available to them for obtaining account credentials. They may, for example, distribute phishing emails which trick their recipients into divulging account credentials. Alternatively, however, they may install information-stealing malware (i.e, info-stealers) onto users’ devices. The results of credential theft can be devastating. Threat actors may use the credentials to gain access to an organization’s SaaS environment, or they may use them to drain users’ online bank accounts or cryptocurrency wallets. 

Raccoon Stealer is a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) info-stealer first publicized in April 2019 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. 

Figure 1: One of the first known mentions of Raccoon Stealer on a Russian-speaking hacking forum named ‘Hack Forums’ on the 13th April 2019

The team of individuals behind Raccoon Stealer provide a variety of services to their customers (known as ‘affiliates’), including access to the info-stealer, an easy-to-use automated backend panel, hosting infrastructure, and 24/7 customer support [3]. 

Once Raccoon Stealer affiliates gain access to the info-stealer, it is up to them to decide how to distribute it. Since 2019, affiliates have been observed distributing the info-stealer via a variety of methods, such as exploit kits, phishing emails, and fake cracked software websites [3]/[4]. Once affiliates succeed in installing Raccoon Stealer onto target systems, the info-stealer will typically seek to obtain sensitive information saved in browsers and cryptocurrency wallets. The info-stealer will then exfiltrate the stolen data to a Command and Control (C2) server. The affiliate can then use the stolen data to conduct harmful follow-up activities. 

Towards the end of March 2022, the team behind Raccoon Stealer publicly announced that they would be suspending their operations after one of their core developers was killed during the Russia-Ukraine conflict [5]. 

Figure 2: Raccoon Stealer resignation post on March 25th 2022

Recent details shared by the US Department of Justice [6]/[7] indicate that it was in fact the arrest, rather than the death, of a key Raccoon Stealer operator which led the Raccoon Stealer team to suspend their operations [8].  

The closure of the Raccoon Stealer project, which ultimately resulted from the FBI-backed dismantling of Raccoon Stealer’s infrastructure in March 2022, did not last long, with the completion of Raccoon Stealer v2 being announced on the Raccoon Stealer Telegram channel on the 17th May 2022 [9]. 

 

Figure 3: Telegram post about new version of Raccoon Stealer

In the second part of this blog series, we will provide details of the recent surge in Raccoon Stealer v2 activity. In this post, however, we will provide insight into how the old version of Raccoon Stealer functioned just before its demise, by providing details of a Raccoon Stealer v1 infection which occurred on the 18th March 2022. 

Attack Details

On the 18th March, at around 13:00 (UTC), a user’s device within a customer’s network was seen contacting several websites providing fake cracked software. 

Figure 4: The above figure — obtained from the Darktrace Event Log for the infected device — highlights its connections to cracked software websites such as ‘licensekeysfree[.]com’ and ‘hdlicense[.]com’ before contacting ‘lion-files[.]xyz’ and ‘www.mediafire[.]com’

The user’s attempt to download cracked software from one of these websites resulted in their device making an HTTP GET request with a URI string containing ‘autodesk-revit-crack-v2022-serial-number-2022’ to an external host named ‘lion-filez[.]xyz’

Figure 5: Screenshot from hdlicense[.]com around the time of the infection shows a “Download” button linking to the ‘lion-filez[.]xyz’ endpoint

The device’s HTTP GET request to lion-filez[.]xyz was immediately followed by an HTTPS connection to the file hosting service, www.mediafire[.]com. Given that threat actors are known to abuse platforms such as MediaFire and Discord CDN to host their malicious payloads, it is likely that the user’s device downloaded the Raccoon Stealer v1 sample over its HTTPS connection to www.mediafire[.]com.  

After installing the info-stealer sample, the user’s device was seen making an HTTP GET request with the URI string ‘/g_shock_casio_easy’ to 194.180.191[.]185. The endpoint responded to the request with data related to a Telegram channel named ‘G-Shock’.

Figure 6: Telegram channel ‘@g_shock_casio_easy’

The returned data included the Telegram channel’s description, which in this case, was a base64 encoded and RC4 encrypted string of characters [10]/[11]. The Raccoon Stealer sample decoded and decrypted this string of characters to obtain its C2 IP address, 188.166.49[.]196. This technique used by Raccoon Stealer v1 closely mirrors the espionage method known as ‘dead drop’ — a method in which an individual leaves a physical object such as papers, cash, or weapons in an agreed hiding spot so that the intended recipient can retrieve the object later on without having to come in to contact with the source. In this case, the operators of Raccoon Stealer ‘left’ the malware’s C2 IP address within the description of a Telegram channel. Usage of this method allowed the operators of Raccoon Stealer to easily change the malware’s C2 infrastructure.  

After obtaining the C2 IP address from the ‘G-Shock’ Telegram channel, the Raccoon Stealer sample made an HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/’ to the C2 IP address, 188.166.49[.]196. This POST request contained a Windows GUID,  a username, and a configuration ID. These details were RC4 encrypted and base64 encoded [12]. The C2 server responded to this HTTP POST request with JSON-formatted configuration information [13], including an identifier string, URL paths for additional files, along with several other fields. This configuration information was also concealed using RC4 encryption and base64 encoding.  

Figure 7- Fields within the JSON-formatted configuration data [13]

In this case, the server’s response included the identifier string ‘hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x’, along with the following URL paths:

  • /l/f/hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x/77d765d8831b4a7d8b5e56950ceb96b7c7b0ed70
  • /l/f/hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x/0cb4ab70083cf5985b2bac837ca4eacb22e9b711
  • /l/f/hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x/5e2a950c07979c670b1553b59b3a25c9c2bb899b
  • /l/f/hv4inX8BFBZhxYvKFq3x/2524214eeea6452eaad6ea1135ed69e98bf72979

After retrieving configuration data, the user’s device was seen making HTTP GET requests with the above URI strings to the C2 server. The C2 server responded to these requests with legitimate library files such as sqlite3.dll. Raccoon Stealer uses these libraries to extract data from targeted applications. 

Once the Raccoon Stealer sample had collected relevant data, it made an HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/’ to the C2 server. This posted data likely included a ZIP file (named with the identifier string) containing stolen credentials [13]. 

The observed infection chain, which lasted around 20 minutes, consisted of the following steps:

1. User’s device installs Raccoon Stealer v1 samples from the user attempting to download cracked software

2. User’s device obtains the info-stealer’s C2 IP address from the description text of a Telegram channel

3. User’s device makes an HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/’ to the C2 server. The request contains a Windows GUID,  a username, and a configuration ID. The response to the request contains configuration details, including an identifier string and URL paths for additional files

4. User’s device downloads library files from the C2 server

5. User’s device makes an HTTP POST request with the URI string ‘/’ to the C2 server. The request contains stolen data

Darktrace Coverage 

Although RESPOND/Network was not enabled on the customer’s deployment, DETECT picked up on several of the info-stealer’s activities. In particular, the device’s downloads of library files from the C2 server caused the following DETECT/Network models to breach:

  • Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Zip or Gzip from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location
  • Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations
Figure 8: Event Log for the infected device shows 'Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer' model breach after the device's download of a library file from the C2 server

Since the customer was subscribed to the Darktrace Proactive Threat Notification (PTN) service, they were proactively notified of the info-stealer’s activities. The quick response by Darktrace’s 24/7 SOC team helped the customer to contain the infection and to prevent further damage from being caused. Having been alerted to the info-stealer activity by the SOC team, the customer would also have been able to change the passwords for the accounts whose credentials were exfiltrated.

If RESPOND/Network had been enabled on the customer’s deployment, then it would have blocked the device’s connections to the C2 server, which would have likely prevented any stolen data from being exfiltrated.

Conclusion

Towards the end of March 2022, the team behind Raccoon Stealer announced that they would be suspending their operations. Recent developments suggest that the arrest of a core Raccoon Stealer developer was responsible for this suspension. Just before the Raccoon Stealer team were forced to shut down, Darktrace’s SOC team observed a Raccoon Stealer infection within a client’s network. In this post, we have provided details of the network-based behaviors displayed by the observed Raccoon Stealer sample. Since these v1 samples are no longer active, the details provided here are only intended to provide historical insight into the development of Raccoon Stealer’s operations and the activities carried out by Raccoon Stealer v1 just before its demise. In the next post of this series, we will discuss and provide details of Raccoon Stealer v2 — the new and highly prolific version of Raccoon Stealer. 

Thanks to Stefan Rowe and the Threat Research Team for their contributions to this blog.

References

[1] https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1507312171914461188

[2] https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-29OTFFPI&ct=220411&st=sb

[3] https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/hunting-raccoon-stealer-the-new-masked-bandit-on-the-block

[4] https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/raccoon-the-story-of-a-typical-infostealer

[5] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/raccoon-stealer-malware-suspends-operations-due-to-war-in-ukraine/

[6] https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdtx/pr/newly-unsealed-indictment-charges-ukrainian-national-international-cybercrime-operation

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fsz6acw-ZJY

[8] https://riskybiznews.substack.com/p/raccoon-stealer-dev-didnt-die-in

[9] https://medium.com/s2wblog/raccoon-stealer-is-back-with-a-new-version-5f436e04b20d

[10] https://blog.cyble.com/2021/10/21/raccoon-stealer-under-the-lens-a-deep-dive-analysis/

[11] https://decoded.avast.io/vladimirmartyanov/raccoon-stealer-trash-panda-abuses-telegram/

[12] https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/09/threat-thursday-raccoon-infostealer

[13] https://cyberint.com/blog/research/raccoon-stealer/

Appendices

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Mark Turner
SOC Shift Supervisor
Written by
Sam Lister
SOC Analyst

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June 9, 2025

Modernising UK Cyber Regulation: Implications of the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill

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The need for security and continued cyber resilience

The UK government has made national security a key priority, and the new Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (CSRB) is a direct reflection of that focus. In introducing the Bill, Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, Peter Kyle, recognised that the UK is “desperately exposed” to cyber threats—from criminal groups to hostile nation-states that are increasingly targeting the UK's digital systems and critical infrastructure[1].

Context and timeline for the new legislation

First announced during the King’s Speech of July 2024, and elaborated in a Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) policy statement published in April 2025, the CSRB is expected to be introduced in Parliament during the 2025-26 legislative session.

For now, organisations in the UK remain subject to the 2018 Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations – an EU-derived law which was drafted before today’s increasing digitisation of critical services, rise in cloud adoption and emergence of AI-powered threats.

Why modernisation is critical

Without modernisation, the Government believes UK’s infrastructure and economy risks falling behind international peers. The EU, which revised its cybersecurity regulation under the NIS2 Directive, already imposes stricter requirements on a broader set of sectors.

The urgency of the Bill is also underscored by recent high-impact incidents, including the Synnovis attack which targeted the National Health Service (NHS) suppliers and disrupted thousands of patient appointments and procedures[2]. The Government has argued that such events highlight a systemic failure to keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat landscape[3].

What the Bill aims to achieve

This Bill represents a decisive shift. According to the Government, it will modernise and future‑proof the UK’s cyber laws, extending oversight to areas where risk has grown but regulation has not kept pace[4]. While the legislation builds on previous consultations and draws lessons from international frameworks like the EU’s NIS2 directive, it also aims to tailor solutions to the UK’s unique threat environment.

Importantly, the Government is framing cybersecurity not as a barrier to growth, but as a foundation for it. The policy statement emphasises that strong digital resilience will create the stability businesses need to thrive, innovate, and invest[5]. Therefore, the goals of the Bill will not only be to enhance security but also act as an enabler to innovation and economic growth.

Recognition that AI changes cyber threats

The CSRB policy statement recognises that AI is fundamentally reshaping the threat landscape, with adversaries now leveraging AI and commercial cyber tools to exploit vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and supply chains. Indeed, the NCSC has recently assessed that AI will almost certainly lead to “an increase in the frequency and intensity of cyber threats”[6]. Accordingly, the policy statement insists that the UK’s regulatory framework “must keep pace and provide flexibility to respond to future threats as and when they emerge”[7].

To address the threat, the Bill signals new obligations for MSPs and data centres, timely incident reporting and dynamic guidance that can be refreshed without fresh primary legislation, making it essential for firms to follow best practices.

What might change in day-to-day practice?

New organisations in scope of regulation

Under the existing Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations[8], the UK already supervises operators in five critical sectors—energy, transport, drinking water, health (Operators of Essential Services, OES) and digital infrastructure (Relevant Digital Service Providers, RDSPs).

The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill retains this foundation and adds Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and data centres to the scope of regulation to “better recognise the increasing reliance on digital services and the vulnerabilities posed by supply chains”[9]. It also grants the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology the power to add new sectors or sub‑sectors via secondary legislation, following consultation with Parliament and industry.

Managed service providers (MSPs)

MSPs occupy a central position within the UK’s enterprise information‑technology infrastructure. Because they remotely run or monitor clients’ systems, networks and data, they hold privileged, often continuous access to multiple environments. This foothold makes them an attractive target for malicious actors.

The Bill aims to bring MSPs in scope of regulation by making them subject to the same duties as those placed on firms that provide digital services under the 2018 NIS Regulations. By doing so, the Bill seeks to raise baseline security across thousands of customer environments and to provide regulators with better visibility of supply‑chain risk.

The proposed definition for MSPs is a service which:

  1. Is provided to another organisation
  2. Relies on the use of network and information systems to deliver the service
  3. Relates to ongoing management support, active administration and/or monitoring of AI systems, IT infrastructure, applications, and/or IT networks, including for the purpose of activities relating to cyber security.
  4. Involves a network connection and/or access to the customer’s network and information systems.

Data centres

Building on the September 2024 designation of data centres as critical national infrastructure, the CSRB will fold data infrastructure into the NIS-style regime by naming it an “relevant sector" and data centres as “essential service”[10].

About 182 colocation facilities run by 64 operators will therefore come under statutory duties to notify the regulator, maintain proportionate CAF-aligned controls and report significant incidents, regardless of who owns them or what workloads they host.

New requirements for regulated organisations

Incident reporting processes

There could be stricter timelines or broader definitions of what counts as a reportable incident. This might nudge organisations to formalise detection, triage, and escalation procedures.

The Government is proposing to introduce a new two-stage incident reporting process. This would include an initial notification which would be submitted within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, followed by a full incident report which should be submitted within 72 hours of the same.

Supply chain assurance requirements

Supply chains for the UK's most critical services are becoming increasingly complex and present new and serious vulnerabilities for cyber-attacks. The recent Synnovis ransomware attacks on the NHS[11] exemplify the danger posed by attacks against the supply chains of important services and organisations. This is concerning when reflecting on the latest Cyber Security Breaches survey conducted by DSIT, which highlights that fewer than 25% of large businesses review their supply chain risks[12].

Despite these risks, the UK’s legacy cybersecurity regulatory regime does not explicitly cover supply chain risk management. The UK instead relies on supporting and non-statutory guidance to close this gap, such as the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF)[13].

The CSRB policy statement acts on this regulatory shortcoming and recognises that “a single supplier’s disruption can have far-reaching impacts on the delivery of essential or digital services”[14].

To address this, the Bill would make in-scope organisations (OES and RDPS) directly accountable for the cybersecurity of their supply chains. Secondary legislation would spell out these duties in detail, ensuring that OES and RDSPs systematically assess and mitigate third-party cyber risks.

Updated and strengthened security requirements

By placing the CAF into a firmer footing and backing it with a statutory Code of Practice, the Government is setting clearer expectations about government expectations on technical standards and methods organisations will need to follow to prove their resilience.

How Darktrace can help support affected organizations

Demonstrate resilience

Darktrace’s Self-Learning AITM continuously monitors your digital estate across cloud, network, OT, email, and endpoint to detect, investigate, and autonomously respond to emerging threats in real time. This persistent visibility and defense posture helps organizations demonstrate cyber resilience to regulators with confidence.

Streamline incident reporting and compliance

Darktrace surfaces clear alerts and automated investigation reports, complete with timeline views and root cause analysis. These insights reduce the time and complexity of regulatory incident reporting and support internal compliance workflows with auditable, AI-generated evidence.

Improve supply chain visibility

With full visibility across connected systems and third-party activity, Darktrace detects early indicators of lateral movement, account compromise, and unusual behavior stemming from vendor or partner access, reducing the risk of supply chain-originated cyber-attacks.

Ensure MSPs can meet new standards

For managed service providers, Darktrace offers native multi-tenant support and autonomous threat response that can be embedded directly into customer environments. This ensures consistent, scalable security standards across clients—helping MSPs address increasing regulatory obligations.

[related-resource]

References

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/jul/29/uk-desperately-exposed-to-cyber-threats-and-pandemics-says-minister

[2] https://www.england.nhs.uk/2024/06/synnovis-cyber-attack-statement-from-nhs-england/

[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[5] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[6] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/impact-ai-cyber-threat-now-2027

[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[8] https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/nis-directive-and-nis-regulations-2018

[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[10] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

[11] https://www.england.nhs.uk/2024/06/synnovis-cyber-attack-statement-from-nhs-england/

[12] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025

[13] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cyber-assessment-framework

[14] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement/cyber-security-and-resilience-bill-policy-statement

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June 5, 2025

Unpacking ClickFix: Darktrace’s detection of a prolific social engineering tactic

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What is ClickFix and how does it work?

Amid heightened security awareness, threat actors continue to seek stealthy methods to infiltrate target networks, often finding the human end user to be the most vulnerable and easily exploited entry point.

ClickFix baiting is an exploitation of the end user, making use of social engineering techniques masquerading as error messages or routine verification processes, that can result in malicious code execution.

Since March 2024, the simplicity of this technique has drawn attention from a range of threat actors, from individual cybercriminals to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups such as APT28 and MuddyWater, linked to Russia and Iran respectively, introducing security threats on a broader scale [1]. ClickFix campaigns have been observed affecting organizations in across multiple industries, including healthcare, hospitality, automotive and government [2][3].

Actors carrying out these targeted attacks typically utilize similar techniques, tools and procedures (TTPs) to gain initial access. These include spear phishing attacks, drive-by compromises, or exploiting trust in familiar online platforms, such as GitHub, to deliver malicious payloads [2][3]. Often, a hidden link within an email or malvertisements on compromised legitimate websites redirect the end user to a malicious URL [4]. These take the form of ‘Fix It’ or fake CAPTCHA prompts [4].

From there, users are misled into believing they are completing a human verification step, registering a device, or fixing a non-existent issue such as a webpage display error. As a result, they are guided through a three-step process that ultimately enables the execution of malicious PowerShell commands:

  1. Open a Windows Run dialog box [press Windows Key + R]
  2. Automatically or manually copy and paste a malicious PowerShell command into the terminal [press CTRL+V]
  3. And run the prompt [press ‘Enter’] [2]

Once the malicious PowerShell command is executed, threat actors then establish command and control (C2) communication within the targeted environment before moving laterally through the network with the intent of obtaining and stealing sensitive data [4]. Malicious payloads associated with various malware families, such as XWorm, Lumma, and AsyncRAT, are often deployed [2][3].

Attack timeline of ClickFix cyber attack

Based on investigations conducted by Darktrace’s Threat Research team in early 2025, this blog highlights Darktrace’s capability to detect ClickFix baiting activity following initial access.

Darktrace’s coverage of a ClickFix attack chain

Darktrace identified multiple ClickFix attacks across customer environments in both Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) and the United States. The following incident details a specific attack on a customer network that occurred on April 9, 2025.

Although the initial access phase of this specific attack occurred outside Darktrace’s visibility, other affected networks showed compromise beginning with phishing emails or fake CAPTCHA prompts that led users to execute malicious PowerShell commands.

Darktrace’s visibility into the compromise began when the threat actor initiated external communication with their C2 infrastructure, with Darktrace / NETWORK detecting the use of a new PowerShell user agent, indicating an attempt at remote code execution.

Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.
Figure 1: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for C2 communications.

Download of Malicious Files for Lateral Movement

A few minutes later, the compromised device was observed downloading a numerically named file. Numeric files like this are often intentionally nondescript and associated with malware. In this case, the file name adhered to a specific pattern, matching the regular expression: /174(\d){7}/. Further investigation into the file revealed that it contained additional malicious code designed to further exploit remote services and gather device information.

Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.
Figure 2: Darktrace / NETWORK's detection of a numeric file, one minute after the new PowerShell User Agent alert.

The file contained a script that sent system information to a specified IP address using an HTTP POST request, which also processed the response. This process was verified through packet capture (PCAP) analysis conducted by the Darktrace Threat Research team.

By analyzing the body content of the HTTP GET request, it was observed that the command converts the current time to Unix epoch time format (i.e., 9 April 2025 13:26:40 GMT), resulting in an additional numeric file observed in the URI: /1744205200.

PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.
Figure 3: PCAP highlighting the HTTP GET request that sends information to the specific IP, 193.36.38[.]237, which then generates another numeric file titled per the current time.

Across Darktrace’s investigations into other customers' affected by ClickFix campaigns, both internal information discovery events and further execution of malicious code were observed.

Data Exfiltration

By following the HTTP stream in the same PCAP, the Darktrace Threat Research Team assessed the activity as indicative of data exfiltration involving system and device information to the same command-and-control (C2) endpoint, , 193.36.38[.]237. This endpoint was flagged as malicious by multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) vendors [5].

PCAP highlighting HTTP POST connection with the numeric file per the URI /1744205200 that indicates data exfiltration to 193.36.38[.]237.
Figure 4: PCAP highlighting HTTP POST connection with the numeric file per the URI /1744205200 that indicates data exfiltration to 193.36.38[.]237.

Further analysis of Darktrace’s Advanced Search logs showed that the attacker’s malicious code scanned for internal system information, which was then sent to a C2 server via an HTTP POST request, indicating data exfiltration

Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.
Figure 5: Advanced Search further highlights Darktrace's observation of the HTTP POST request, with the second numeric file representing data exfiltration.

Actions on objectives

Around ten minutes after the initial C2 communications, the compromised device was observed connecting to an additional rare endpoint, 188.34.195[.]44. Further analysis of this endpoint confirmed its association with ClickFix campaigns, with several OSINT vendors linking it to previously reported attacks [6].

In the final HTTP POST request made by the device, Darktrace detected a file at the URI /init1234 in the connection logs to the malicious endpoint 188.34.195[.]44, likely depicting the successful completion of the attack’s objective, automated data egress to a ClickFix C2 server.

Darktrace / NETWORK grouped together the observed indicators of compromise (IoCs) on the compromised device and triggered an Enhanced Monitoring model alert, a high-priority detection model designed to identify activity indicative of the early stages of an attack. These models are monitored and triaged 24/7 by Darktrace’s Security Operations Center (SOC) as part of the Managed Threat Detection service, ensuring customers are promptly notified of malicious activity as soon as it emerges.

Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.
Figure 6: Darktrace correlated the separate malicious connections that pertained to a single campaign.

Darktrace Autonomous Response

In the incident outlined above, Darktrace was not configured in Autonomous Response mode. As a result, while actions to block specific connections were suggested, they had to be manually implemented by the customer’s security team. Due to the speed of the attack, this need for manual intervention allowed the threat to escalate without interruption.

However, in a different example, Autonomous Response was fully enabled, allowing Darktrace to immediately block connections to the malicious endpoint (138.199.156[.]22) just one second after the initial connection in which a numerically named file was downloaded [7].

Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.
Figure 7: Darktrace Autonomous Response blocked connections to a suspicious endpoint following the observation of the numeric file download.

This customer was also subscribed to our Managed Detection and Response service, Darktrace’s SOC extended a ‘Quarantine Device’ action that had already been autonomously applied in order to buy their security team additional time for remediation.

Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.
Figure 8: Autonomous Response blocked connections to malicious endpoints, including 138.199.156[.]22, 185.250.151[.]155, and rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top, and also quarantined the affected device. These actions were later manually reinforced by the Darktrace SOC.

Conclusion

ClickFix baiting is a widely used tactic in which threat actors exploit human error to bypass security defenses. By tricking end point users into performing seemingly harmless, everyday actions, attackers gain initial access to systems where they can access and exfiltrate sensitive data.

Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection identifies early indicators of targeted attacks without relying on prior knowledge or IoCs. By continuously learning each device’s unique pattern of life, Darktrace detects subtle deviations that may signal a compromise. In this case, Darktrace's Autonomous Response, when operating in a fully autonomous mode, was able to swiftly contain the threat before it could progress further along the attack lifecycle.

Credit to Keanna Grelicha (Cyber Analyst) and Jennifer Beckett (Cyber Analyst)

Appendices

NETWORK Models

  • Device / New PowerShell User Agent
  • Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Posting HTTP to IP Without Hostname
  • Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
  • Device / Suspicious Domain
  • Device / New User Agent and New IP
  • Anomalous File / New User Agent Followed By Numeric File Download (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
  • Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)

Autonomous Response Models

  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block
  • Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block
  • Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

·       141.193.213[.]11 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       141.193.213[.]10 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       64.94.84[.]217 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       138.199.156[.]22 – IP address – C2 server

·       94.181.229[.]250 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       216.245.184[.]181 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       212.237.217[.]182 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       168.119.96[.]41 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       193.36.38[.]237 – IP address – C2 server

·       188.34.195[.]44 – IP address – C2 server

·       205.196.186[.]70 – IP address – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       rkuagqnmnypetvf[.]top – Hostname – C2 server

·       shorturl[.]at/UB6E6 – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       tlgrm-redirect[.]icu – Hostname – Possible C2 Infrastructure

·       diagnostics.medgenome[.]com – Hostname – Compromised Website

·       /1741714208 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741718928 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1743871488 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741200416 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741356624 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /ttt – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1741965536 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1.txt – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744205184 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744139920 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744134352 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1744125600 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       /1[.]php?s=527 – URI – Possible malicious file

·       34ff2f72c191434ce5f20ebc1a7e823794ac69bba9df70721829d66e7196b044 – SHA-256 Hash – Possible malicious file

·       10a5eab3eef36e75bd3139fe3a3c760f54be33e3 – SHA-1 Hash – Possible malicious file

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique  

Spearphishing Link - INITIAL ACCESS - T1566.002 - T1566

Drive-by Compromise - INITIAL ACCESS - T1189

PowerShell - EXECUTION - T1059.001 - T1059

Exploitation of Remote Services - LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210

Web Protocols - COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071.001 - T1071

Automated Exfiltration - EXFILTRATION - T1020 - T1020.001

References

[1] https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/emerging-threats/clickfix-another-deceptive-social-engineering-technique/

[2] https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-clickfix-social-engineering-technique-floods-threat-landscape

[3] https://cyberresilience.com/threatonomics/understanding-the-clickfix-attack/

[4] https://www.group-ib.com/blog/clickfix-the-social-engineering-technique-hackers-use-to-manipulate-victims/

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/193.36.38.237/detection

[6] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/188.34.195.44/community

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/138.199.156.22/detection

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About the author
Keanna Grelicha
Cyber Analyst
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