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January 8, 2024

Uncovering CyberCartel Threats in Latin America

Examine the growing threat of cyber cartels in Latin America and learn how to safeguard against their attacks.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst
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08
Jan 2024

Introduction

In September 2023, Darktrace published its first Half-Year Threat Report, highlighting Threat Research, Security Operation Center (SOC), model breach, and Cyber AI Analyst analysis and trends across the Darktrace customer fleet. According to Darktrace’s Threat Report, the most observed threat type to affect Darktrace customers during the first half of 2023 was Malware-as-a-Service (Maas). The report highlighted a growing trend where malware strains, specifically in the MaaS ecosystem, “use cross-functional components from other strains as part of their evolution and customization” [1].  

Darktrace’s Threat Research team assessed this ‘Frankenstein’ approach would very likely increase, as shown by the fact that indicators of compromise (IoCs) are becoming “less and less mutually exclusive between malware strains as compromised infrastructure is used by multiple threat actors through access brokers or the “as-a-Service” market” [1].

Darktrace investigated one such threat during the last months of summer 2023, eventually leading to the discovery of CyberCartel-related activity across a significant number of Darktrace customers, especially in Latin America.

CyberCartel Overview and Darktrace Coverage

During a threat hunt, Darktrace’s Threat Research team discovered the download of a binary with a unique Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) pattern. When examining Darktrace’s customer base, it was discovered that binaries with this same URI pattern had been downloaded by a significant number of customer accounts, especially by customers based in Latin America. Although not identical, the targets and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) resembled those mentioned in an article regarding a botnet called Fenix [2], particularly active in Latin America.

During the Threat Research team’s investigation, nearly 40 potentially affected customer accounts were identified. Darktrace’s global Threat Research team investigates pervasive threats across Darktrace’s customer base daily. This cross-fleet research is based on Darktrace’s anomaly-based detection capability, Darktrace DETECT™, and revolves around technical analysis and contextualization of detection information.

Amid the investigation, further open-source intelligence (OSINT) research revealed that most indicators observed during Darktrace’s investigations were associated to a Latin American threat group named CyberCartel, with a small number of IoCs being associated with the Fenix botnet. While CyberCartel seems to have been active since 2012 and relies on MaaS offerings from well-known malware families, Fenix botnet was allegedly created at the end of last year and “specifically targets users accessing government services, particularly tax-paying individuals in Mexico and Chile” [2].

Both groups share similar targets and TTPs, as well as objectives: installing malware with information-stealing capabilities. In the case of Fenix infections, the compromised device will be added to a botnet and execute tasks given by the attacker(s); while in the case of CyberCartel, it can lead to various types of second-stage info-stealing and Man-in-the-Browser capabilities, including retrieving system information from the compromised device, capturing screenshots of the active browsing tab, and redirecting the user to fraudulent websites such as fake banking sites. According to a report by Metabase Q [2], both groups possibly share command and control (C2) infrastructure, making accurate attribution and assessment of the confidence level for which group was affecting the customer base extremely difficult. Indeed, one of the C2 IPs (104.156.149[.]33) observed on nearly 20 customer accounts during the investigation had OSINT evidence linking it to both CyberCartel and Fenix, as well as another group known to target Mexico called Manipulated Caiman [3] [4] [5].

CyberCartel and Fenix both appear to target banking and governmental services’ users based in Latin America, especially individuals from Mexico and Chile. Target institutions purportedly include tax administration services and several banks operating in the region. Malvertising and phishing campaigns direct users to pages imitating the target institutions’ webpages and prompt the download of a compressed file advertised in a pop-up window. This file claims enhance the user’s security and privacy while navigating the webpage but instead redirects the user to a compromised website hosting a zip file, which itself contains a URL file containing instructions for retrieval of the first stage payload from a remote server.

pop-up window with malicious file
Figure 1: Example of a pop-up window asking the user to download a compressed file allegedly needed to continue navigating the portal. Connections to the domain srlxlpdfmxntetflx[.]com were observed in one account investigated by Darktrace

During their investigations, the Threat Research team observed connections to 100% rare domains (e.g., situacionfiscal[.]online, consultar-rfc[.]online, facturmx[.]info), many of them containing strings such as “mx”, “rcf” and “factur” in their domain names, prior to the downloads of files with the unique URI pattern identified during the aforementioned threat hunting session.

The reference to “rfc” is likely a reference to the Registro Federal de Contribuyentes, a unique registration number issued by Mexico’s tax collection agency, Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT). These domains were observed as being 100% rare for the environment and were connected to a few minutes prior to connections to CyberCartel endpoints. Most of the endpoints were newly registered, with creation dates starting from only a few months earlier in the first half of 2023. Interestingly, some of these domains were very similar to legitimate government websites, likely a tactic employed by threat actors to convince users to trust the domains and to bypass security measures.

Figure 2: Screenshot from similarweb[.]com showing the degree of affinity between malicious domains situacionfiscal[.]online and facturmx[.]info and the legitimate Mexican government hostname sat[.]gob[.]mx
Figure 3: Screenshot of the likely source infection website facturmx[.]info taken when visited in a sandbox environment

In other customer networks, connections to mail clients were observed, as well as connections to win-rar[.]com, suggesting an interaction with a compressed file. Connections to legitimate government websites were also detected around the same time in some accounts. Shortly after, the infected devices were detected connecting to 100% rare IP addresses over the HTTP protocol using WebDAV user agents such as Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/10.0.X and DavCInt. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning, in its full form, is a legitimate extension to the HTTP protocol that allows users to remotely share, copy, move and edit files hosted on a web server. Both CyberCartel and Fenix botnet reportedly abuse this protocol to retrieve the initial payload via a shortcut link. The use (or abuse) of this protocol allows attackers to evade blocklists and streamline payload distribution. In cases investigated by Darktrace, the use of this protocol was not always considered unusual for the breach device, indicating it also was commonly used for its legitimate purposes.

HTTP methods observed included PROPFIND, GET, and OPTIONS, where a higher proportion of PROPFIND requests were observed. PROPFIND is an HTTP method related to the use of WebDAV that retrieves properties in an exactly defined, machine-readable, XML document (GET responses do not have a define format). Properties are pieces of data that describe the state of a resource, i.e., data about data [7]. They are used in distributed authoring environments to provide for efficient discovery and management of resources.  

Figure 4: Device event log showing a connection to facturmx[.]info followed by a WebDAV connection to the 100% rare IP 172.86.68[.]104

In a number of cases, connections to compromised endpoints were followed by the download of one or more executable files with names following the regex pattern /(yes|4496|[A-Za-z]{8})/(((4496|4545)[A-Za-z]{24})|Herramienta_de_Seguridad_SII).(exe|jse), for example 4496UCJlcqwxvkpXKguWNqNWDivM.exe. PROPFIND and GET HTTP requests for dynamic-link library (DLL) files such as urlmon.dll and netutils.dll were also detected. These are legitimate Windows files that are essential to handle network and internet-related tasks in Windows. Irrespective of whether they had malicious or legitimate signatures, Darktrace DETECT was able to recognize that the download of these files was suspicious with rare external endpoints not previously observed on the respective customer networks.

Figure 5: Advanced Search results showing some of the HTTP requests made by the breach device to a CyberCartel endpoint via PROPFIND, GET, or OPTIONS methods for executable and DLL files

Following Darktrace DETECT’s model breaches, these HTTP connections were investigated by Cyber AI Analyst™. AI Analyst provided a summary and further technical details of these connections, as shown in figure 6.

Figure 6: Cyber AI Analyst incident showing a summary of the event, as well as technical details. The AI investigation process is also detailed

AI Analyst searched for all HTTP connections made by the breach device and found more than 2,500 requests to more than a hundred endpoints for one given device. It then looked for the user agents responsible for these connections and found 15 possible software agents responsible for the HTTP requests, and from these identified a single suspicious software agent, Microsoft-WebDAV-Min-Redir. As mentioned previously, this is a legitimate software, but its use by the breach device was considered unusual by Darktrace’s machine learning technology. By performing analysis on thousands of connections to hundreds of endpoints at machine speed, AI Analyst is able to perform the heavy lifting on behalf of human security teams and then collate its findings in a single summary pane, giving end-users the information needed to assess a given activity and quickly start remediation as needed. This allows security teams and administrators to save precious time and provides unparalleled visibility over any potentially malicious activity on their network.

Following the successful identification of CyberCartel activity by DETECT, Darktrace RESPOND™ is then able to contain suspicious behavior, such as by restricting outgoing traffic or enforcing normal patterns of life on affected devices. This would allow customer security teams extra time to analyze potentially malicious behavior, while leaving the rest of the network free to perform business critical operations. Unfortunately, in the cases of CyberCartel compromises detected by Darktrace, RESPOND was not enabled in autonomous response mode meaning preventative actions had to be applied manually by the customer’s security team after the fact.

Figure 7. Device event log showing connections to 100% rare CyberCartel endpoint 172.86.68[.]194 and subsequent suggested RESPOND actions.

Conclusion

Threat actors targeting high-value entities such as government offices and banks is unfortunately all too commonplace.  In the case of Cyber Cartel, governmental organizations and entities, as well as multiple newspapers in the Latin America, have cautioned users against these malicious campaigns, which have occurred over the past few years [8] [9]. However, attackers continuously update their toolsets and infrastructure, quickly rendering these warnings and known-bad security precautions obsolete. In the case of CyberCartel, the abuse of the legitimate WebDAV protocol to retrieve the initial payload is just one example of this. This method of distribution has also been leveraged by in Bumblebee malware loader’s latest campaign [10]. The abuse of the legitimate WebDAV protocol to retrieve the initial CyberCartel payload outlined in this case is one example among many of threat actors adopting new distribution methods used by others to further their ends.

As threat actors continue to search for new ways of remaining undetected, notably by incorporating legitimate processes into their attack flow and utilizing non-exclusive compromised infrastructure, it is more important than ever to have an understanding of normal network operation in order to detect anomalies that are indicative of an ongoing compromise. Darktrace’s suite of products, including DETECT+RESPOND, is well placed to do just that, with machine-speed analysis, detection, and response helping security teams and administrators keep their digital environments safe from malicious actors.

Credit to: Nahisha Nobregas, SOC Analyst

References

[1] https://darktrace.com/blog/darktrace-half-year-threat-report

[2] https://www.metabaseq.com/fenix-botnet/

[3] https://perception-point.io/blog/manipulated-caiman-the-sophisticated-snare-of-mexicos-banking-predators-technical-edition/

[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/104.156.149.33/community

[5] https://silent4business.com/tendencias/1

[6] https://www.metabaseq.com/cybercartel/

[7] http://www.webdav.org/specs/rfc2518.html#rfc.section.4.1

[8] https://www.csirt.gob.cl/alertas/8ffr23-01415-01/

[9] https://www.gob.mx/sat/acciones-y-programas/sitios-web-falsos

[10] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/bumblebee-malware-returns-in-new-attacks-abusing-webdav-folders/

Appendices  

Darktrace DETECT Model Detections

AI Analyst Incidents:

• Possible HTTP Command and Control

• Suspicious File Download

Model Detections:

• Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname

• Device / New User Agent and New IP

• Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

• Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

• Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location

List of IoCs

IoC - Type - Description + Confidence

f84bb51de50f19ec803b484311053294fbb3b523 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel Payload IoCs

4eb564b84aac7a5a898af59ee27b1cb00c99a53d - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

8806639a781d0f63549711d3af0f937ffc87585c - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

9d58441d9d31b5c4011b99482afa210b030ecac4 - SHA1 hash - Possible CyberCartel payload

37da048533548c0ad87881e120b8cf2a77528413 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

2415fcefaf86a83f1174fa50444be7ea830bb4d1 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

15a94c7e9b356d0ff3bcee0f0ad885b6cf9c1bb7 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

cdc5da48fca92329927d9dccf3ed513dd28956af - SHA1 hash - Possible CyberCartel payload

693b869bc9ba78d4f8d415eb7016c566ead839f3 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

04ce764723eaa75e4ee36b3d5cba77a105383dc5 - SHA1 hash - Possible CyberCartel payload

435834167fd5092905ee084038eee54797f4d23e - SHA1 hash - Possible CyberCartel payload

3341b4f46c2f45b87f95168893a7485e35f825fe - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

f6375a1f954f317e16f24c94507d4b04200c63b9 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

252efff7f54bd19a5c96bbce0bfaeeecadb3752f - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

8080c94e5add2f6ed20e9866a00f67996f0a61ae - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

c5117cedc275c9d403a533617117be7200a2ed77 - SHA1 hash - Possible CyberCartel payload

19dd866abdaf8bc3c518d1c1166fbf279787fc03 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

548287c0350d6e3d0e5144e20d0f0ce28661f514 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

f0478e88c8eefc3fd0a8e01eaeb2704a580f88e6 - SHA1 hash - Possible CyberCartel payload

a9809acef61ca173331e41b28d6abddb64c5f192 - SHA1 hash - Likely CyberCartel payload

be96ec94f8f143127962d7bf4131c228474cd6ac - SHA1 hash -Likely CyberCartel payload

44ef336395c41bf0cecae8b43be59170bed6759d - SHA1 hash - Possible CyberCartel payload

facturmx[.]info - Hostname - Likely CyberCartel infection source

consultar-rfc[.]online - Hostname - Possible CyberCartel infection source

srlxlpdfmxntetflx[.]com - Hostname - Likely CyberCartel infection source

facturmx[.]online - Hostname - Possible CyberCartel infection source

rfcconhomoclave[.]mx - Hostname - Possible CyberCartel infection source

situacionfiscal[.]online - Hostname - Likely CyberCartel infection source

descargafactura[.]club - Hostname - Likely CyberCartel infection source

104.156.149[.]33 - IP - Likely CyberCartel C2 endpoint

172.86.68[.]194 - IP - Likely CyberCartel C2 endpoint

139.162.73[.]58 - IP - Likely CyberCartel C2 endpoint

172.105.24[.]190 - IP - Possible CyberCartel C2 endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic - Technique

Command and Control - Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)

Command and Control - Web Protocols (T1071.001)

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst

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May 16, 2025

Catching a RAT: How Darktrace neutralized AsyncRAT

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What is a RAT?

As the proliferation of new and more advanced cyber threats continues, the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) remains a classic tool in a threat actor's arsenal. RATs, whether standardized or custom-built, enable attackers to remotely control compromised devices, facilitating a range of malicious activities.

What is AsyncRAT?

Since its first appearance in 2019, AsyncRAT has become increasingly popular among a wide range of threat actors, including cybercriminals and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

Originally available on GitHub as a legitimate tool, its open-source nature has led to widespread exploitation. AsyncRAT has been used in numerous campaigns, including prolonged attacks on essential US infrastructure, and has even reportedly penetrated the Chinese cybercriminal underground market [1] [2].

How does AsyncRAT work?

Original source code analysis of AsyncRAT demonstrates that once installed, it establishes persistence via techniques such as creating scheduled tasks or registry keys and uses SeDebugPrivilege to gain elevated privileges [3].

Its key features include:

  • Keylogging
  • File search
  • Remote audio and camera access
  • Exfiltration techniques
  • Staging for final payload delivery

These are generally typical functions found in traditional RATs. However, it also boasts interesting anti-detection capabilities. Due to the popularity of Virtual Machines (VM) and sandboxes for dynamic analysis, this RAT checks for the manufacturer via the WMI query 'Select * from Win32_ComputerSystem' and looks for strings containing 'VMware' and 'VirtualBox' [4].

Darktrace’s coverage of AsyncRAT

In late 2024 and early 2025, Darktrace observed a spike in AsyncRAT activity across various customer environments. Multiple indicators of post-compromise were detected, including devices attempting or successfully connecting to endpoints associated with AsyncRAT.

On several occasions, Darktrace identified a clear association with AsyncRAT through the digital certificates of the highlighted SSL endpoints. Darktrace’s Real-time Detection effectively identified and alerted on suspicious activities related to AsyncRAT. In one notable incident, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response promptly took action to contain the emerging threat posed by AsyncRAT.

AsyncRAT attack overview

On December 20, 2024, Darktrace first identified the use of AsyncRAT, noting a device successfully establishing SSL connections to the uncommon external IP 185.49.126[.]50 (AS199654 Oxide Group Limited) via port 6606. The IP address appears to be associated with AsyncRAT as flagged by open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources [5]. This activity triggered the device to alert the ‘Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed' model.

Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK showing the repeated SSL connections to a rare external Self-Signed endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50.
Figure 1: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK showing the repeated SSL connections to a rare external Self-Signed endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50.

Following these initial connections, the device was observed making a significantly higher number of connections to the same endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 via port 6606 over an extended period. This pattern suggested beaconing activity and triggered the 'Compromise/Beaconing Activity to External Rare' model alert.

Further analysis of the original source code, available publicly, outlines the default ports used by AsyncRAT clients for command-and-control (C2) communications [6]. It reveals that port 6606 is the default port for creating a new AsyncRAT client. Darktrace identified both the Certificate Issuer and the Certificate Subject as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". This SSL certificate encrypts the packets between the compromised system and the server. These indicators of compromise (IoCs) detected by Darktrace further suggest that the device was successfully connecting to a server associated with AsyncRAT.

Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK displaying the Digital Certificate attributes, IP address and port number associated with AsyncRAT.
Figure 2: Model alert in Darktrace / NETWORK displaying the Digital Certificate attributes, IP address and port number associated with AsyncRAT.
Darktrace’s detection of repeated connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.126[.]50 over port 6606, indicative of beaconing behavior.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s detection of repeated connections to the suspicious IP address 185.49.126[.]50 over port 6606, indicative of beaconing behavior.
Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions blocking the suspicious IP address,185.49.126[.]50.
Figure 4: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions blocking the suspicious IP address,185.49.126[.]50.

A few days later, the same device was detected making numerous connections to a different IP address, 195.26.255[.]81 (AS40021 NL-811-40021), via various ports including 2106, 6606, 7707, and 8808. Notably, ports 7707 and 8808 are also default ports specified in the original AsyncRAT source code [6].

Darktrace’s detection of connections to the suspicious endpoint 195.26.255[.]81, where the default ports (6606, 7707, and 8808) for AsyncRAT were observed.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of connections to the suspicious endpoint 195.26.255[.]81, where the default ports (6606, 7707, and 8808) for AsyncRAT were observed.

Similar to the activity observed with the first endpoint, 185.49.126[.]50, the Certificate Issuer for the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 was identified as "CN=AsyncRAT Server". Further OSINT investigation confirmed associations between the IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and AsyncRAT [7].

Darktrace's detection of a connection to the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and the domain name identified under the common name (CN) of a certificate as AsyncRAT Server
Figure 6: Darktrace's detection of a connection to the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81 and the domain name identified under the common name (CN) of a certificate as AsyncRAT Server.

Once again, Darktrace's Autonomous Response acted swiftly, blocking the connections to 195.26.255[.]81 throughout the observed AsyncRAT activity.

Figure 7: Darktrace's Autonomous Response actions were applied against the suspicious IP address 195.26.255[.]81.

A day later, Darktrace again alerted to further suspicious activity from the device. This time, connections to the suspicious endpoint 'kashuub[.]com' and IP address 191.96.207[.]246 via port 8041 were observed. Further analysis of port 8041 suggests it is commonly associated with ScreenConnect or Xcorpeon ASIC Carrier Ethernet Transport [8]. ScreenConnect has been observed in recent campaign’s where AsyncRAT has been utilized [9]. Additionally, one of the ASN’s observed, namely ‘ASN Oxide Group Limited’, was seen in both connections to kashuub[.]com and 185.49.126[.]50.

This could suggest a parallel between the two endpoints, indicating they might be hosting AsyncRAT C2 servers, as inferred from our previous analysis of the endpoint 185.49.126[.]50 and its association with AsyncRAT [5]. OSINT reporting suggests that the “kashuub[.]com” endpoint may be associated with ScreenConnect scam domains, further supporting the assumption that the endpoint could be a C2 server.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response technology was once again able to support the customer here, blocking connections to “kashuub[.]com”. Ultimately, this intervention halted the compromise and prevented the attack from escalating or any sensitive data from being exfiltrated from the customer’s network into the hands of the threat actors.

Darktrace’s Autonomous Response applied a total of nine actions against the IP address 191.96.207[.]246 and the domain 'kashuub[.]com', successfully blocking the connections.
Figure 8: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response applied a total of nine actions against the IP address 191.96.207[.]246 and the domain 'kashuub[.]com', successfully blocking the connections.

Due to the popularity of this RAT, it is difficult to determine the motive behind the attack; however, from existing knowledge of what the RAT does, we can assume accessing and exfiltrating sensitive customer data may have been a factor.

Conclusion

While some cybercriminals seek stability and simplicity, openly available RATs like AsyncRAT provide the infrastructure and open the door for even the most amateur threat actors to compromise sensitive networks. As the cyber landscape continually shifts, RATs are now being used in all types of attacks.

Darktrace’s suite of AI-driven tools provides organizations with the infrastructure to achieve complete visibility and control over emerging threats within their network environment. Although AsyncRAT’s lack of concealment allowed Darktrace to quickly detect the developing threat and alert on unusual behaviors, it was ultimately Darktrace Autonomous Response's consistent blocking of suspicious connections that prevented a more disruptive attack.

Credit to Isabel Evans (Cyber Analyst), Priya Thapa (Cyber Analyst) and Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendices

  • Real-time Detection Models
       
    • Compromise / Suspicious SSL Activity
    •  
    • Compromise / Beaconing Activity To      External Rare
    •  
    • Compromise / High Volume of      Connections with Beacon Score
    •  
    • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious      Self-Signed SSL
    •  
    • Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP      Increase
    •  
    • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare      Destination
    •  
    • Compromise / Suspicious Beaconing      Behaviour
    •  
    • Compromise / Large Number of      Suspicious Failed Connections
  •  
  • Autonomous     Response Models
       
    • Antigena / Network / Significant      Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert
    •  
    • Antigena / Network / Significant      Anomaly / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block

List of IoCs

·     185.49.126[.]50 - IP – AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·     195.26.255[.]81 – IP - AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·      191.96.207[.]246 – IP – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

·     CN=AsyncRAT Server - SSL certificate - AsyncRATC2 Infrastructure

·      Kashuub[.]com– Hostname – Likely AsyncRAT C2 Endpoint

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:

Tactic –Technique – Sub-Technique  

 

Execution– T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

DefenceEvasion – T1497 - Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks

Discovery– T1057 – Process Discovery

Discovery– T1082 – System Information Discovery

LateralMovement - T1021.001 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Collection/ Credential Access – T1056 – Input Capture: Keylogging

Collection– T1125 – Video Capture

Commandand Control – T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

Commandand Control – T1219 - Remote Access Software

Exfiltration– T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

 

References

[1]  https://blog.talosintelligence.com/operation-layover-how-we-tracked-attack/

[2] https://intel471.com/blog/china-cybercrime-undergrond-deepmix-tea-horse-road-great-firewall

[3] https://www.attackiq.com/2024/08/01/emulate-asyncrat/

[4] https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/spear-phishing-campaign-with-new-techniques-aimed-at-aviation-companies

[5] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/185.49.126[.]50/community

[6] https://dfir.ch/posts/asyncrat_quasarrat/

[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/195.26.255[.]81

[8] https://www.speedguide.net/port.php?port=8041

[9] https://www.esentire.com/blog/exploring-the-infection-chain-screenconnects-link-to-asyncrat-deployment

[10] https://scammer.info/t/taking-out-connectwise-sites/153479/518?page=26

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About the author
Isabel Evans
Cyber Analyst

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May 13, 2025

Revolutionizing OT Risk Prioritization with Darktrace 6.3

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Powering smarter protection for industrial systems

In industrial environments, security challenges are deeply operational. Whether you’re running a manufacturing line, a power grid, or a semiconductor fabrication facility (fab), you need to know: What risks can truly disrupt my operations, and what should I focus on first?

Teams need the right tools to shift from reactive defense, constantly putting out fires, to proactively thinking about their security posture. However, most OT teams are stuck using IT-centric tools that don’t speak the language of industrial systems, are consistently overwhelmed with static CVE lists, and offer no understanding of OT-specific protocols. The result? Compliance gaps, siloed insights, and risk models that don’t reflect real-world exposure, making risk prioritization seem like a luxury.

Darktrace / OT 6.3 was built in direct response to these challenges. Developed in close collaboration with OT operators and engineers, this release introduces powerful upgrades that deliver the context, visibility, and automation security teams need, without adding complexity. It’s everything OT defenders need to protect critical operations in one platform that understands the language of industrial systems.

additions to darktrace / ot 6/3

Contextual risk modeling with smarter Risk Scoring

Darktrace / OT 6.3 introduces major upgrades to OT Risk Management, helping teams move beyond generic CVE lists with AI-driven risk scoring and attack path modeling.

By factoring in real-world exploitability, asset criticality, and operational context, this release delivers a more accurate view of what truly puts critical systems at risk.

The platform now integrates:

  • CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) database
  • End-of-life status for legacy OT devices
  • Firewall misconfiguration analysis
  • Incident response plan alignment

Most OT environments are flooded with vulnerability data that lacks context. CVE scores often misrepresent risk by ignoring how threats move through the environment or whether assets are even reachable. Firewalls are frequently misconfigured or undocumented, and EOL (End of Life) devices, some of the most vulnerable, often go untracked.

Legacy tools treat these inputs in isolation. Darktrace unifies them, showing teams exactly which attack paths adversaries could exploit, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, with visibility into where legacy tech increases exposure.

The result: teams can finally focus on the risks that matter most to uptime, safety, and resilience without wasting resources on noise.

Automating compliance with dynamic IEC-62443 reporting

Darktrace / OT now includes a purpose-built IEC-62443-3-3 compliance module, giving industrial teams real-time visibility into their alignment with regulatory standards. No spreadsheets required!

Industrial environments are among the most heavily regulated. However, for many OT teams, staying compliant is still a manual, time-consuming process.

Darktrace / OT introduces a dedicated IEC-62443-3-3 module designed specifically for industrial environments. Security and operations teams can now map their security posture to IEC standards in real time, directly within the platform. The module automatically gathers evidence across all four security levels, flags non-compliance, and generates structured reports to support audit preparation, all in just a few clicks.Most organizations rely on spreadsheets or static tools to track compliance, without clear visibility into which controls meet standards like IEC-62443. The result is hidden gaps, resource-heavy audits, and slow remediation cycles.

Even dedicated compliance tools are often built for IT, require complex setup, and overlook the unique devices found in OT environments. This leaves teams stuck with fragmented reporting and limited assurance that their controls are actually aligned with regulatory expectations.

By automating compliance tracking, surfacing what matters most, and being purpose built for industrial environments, Darktrace / OT empowers organizations to reduce audit fatigue, eliminate blind spots, and focus resources where they’re needed most.

Expanding protocol visibility with deep insights for specialized OT operations

Darktrace has expanded its Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capabilities to support five industry-specific protocols, across healthcare, semiconductor manufacturing, and ABB control systems.

The new protocols build on existing capabilities across all OT industry verticals and protocol types to ensure the Darktrace Self-Learning AI TM can learn intelligently about even more assets in complex industrial environments. By enabling native, AI-driven inspection of these protocols, Darktrace can identify both security threats and operational issues without relying on additional appliances or complex integrations.

Most security platforms lack native support for industry-specific protocols, creating critical visibility gaps in customer environments like healthcare, semiconductor manufacturing, and ABB-heavy industrial automation. Without deep protocol awareness, organizations struggle to accurately identify specialized OT and IoT assets, detect malicious activity concealed within proprietary protocol traffic, and generate reliable device risk profiles due to insufficient telemetry.

These blind spots result in incomplete asset inventories, and ultimately, flawed risk posture assessments which over-index for CVE patching and legacy equipment.

By combining protocol-aware detection with full-stack visibility across IT, OT, and IoT, Darktrace’s AI can correlate anomalies across domains. For example, connecting an anomaly from a Medical IoT (MIoT) device with suspicious behavior in IT systems, providing actionable, contextual insights other solutions often miss.

Conclusion

Together, these capabilities take OT security beyond alert noise and basic CVE matching, delivering continuous compliance, protocol-aware visibility, and actionable, prioritized risk insights, all inside a single, unified platform built for the realities of industrial environments.

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About the author
Pallavi Singh
Product Marketing Manager, OT Security & Compliance
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