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May 12, 2021

How AI Protects Critical Infrastructure From Ransomware

Explore the role of AI in safeguarding critical infrastructure from ransomware, as revealed by Darktrace's latest insights.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
David Masson
VP, Field CISO
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12
May 2021

Modern Threats to OT Environments

At the 2021 RSA cyber security conference, US Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas made an era-defining statement regarding the cyber security landscape: “Let me be clear: ransomware now poses a national security threat.”

Last weekend, Mayorkas’ words rang true. A ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline – responsible for nearly half of the US East Coast’s diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel – resulted in the shutdown of a critical fuel network supplying a number of Eastern states.

The fallout from the attack demonstrated how widespread and damaging the consequences of ransomware can be. Against critical infrastructure and utilities, cyber-attacks have the potential to disrupt supplies, harm the environment, and even threaten human lives.

Though full details remain to be confirmed, the attack is reported to have been conducted by an affiliate of the cyber-criminal group called DarkSide, and likely leveraged common remote desktop tools. Remote access has been enabled as an exploitable vulnerability within critical infrastructure by the shift to remote work that many organizations made last year, including those with Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Operational Technology (OT).

The rise of industrial ransomware

Ransomware against industrial environments is on the rise, with a reported 500% increase since 2018. Oftentimes, these threats leverage the convergence of IT and OT systems, first targeting IT before pivoting to OT. This was seen with the EKANS ransomware that included ICS processes in its ‘kill list’, as well as the Cring ransomware that compromised ICS after first exploiting a vulnerability in a virtual private network (VPN).

It remains to be seen whether the initial attack vector in the Colonial Pipeline compromise exploited a technical vulnerability, compromised credentials, or a targeted spear phishing campaign. It has been reported that the attack first impacted IT systems, and that Colonial then shut down OT operations as a safety precaution. Colonial confirms that the ransomware “temporarily halted all pipeline operations and affected some of our IT systems,” showing that, ultimately, both OT and IT were affected. This is a great example of how many OT systems depend on IT, such that an IT cyber-attack has the ability to take down OT and ICS processes.

In addition to locking down systems, the threat actors also stole 100GB of sensitive data from Colonial. This kind of double extortion attack — in which data is exfiltrated before files are encrypted — has unfortunately become the norm rather than the exception, with over 70% of ransomware attacks involving exfiltration. Some ransomware gangs have even announced that they are dropping encryption altogether in favor of data theft and extortion methods.

Earlier this year, Darktrace defended against a double extortion ransomware attack waged against a critical infrastructure organization, which also leveraged common remote access tools. This blog will outline the threat find in depth, showing how Darktrace’s self-learning AI responded autonomously to an attack strikingly similar to the Colonial Pipeline incident.

Darktrace threat find

Ransomware against electric utilities equipment supplier

In an attack against a North American equipment supplier for electrical utilities earlier this year, Darktrace/OT demonstrated its ability to protect critical infrastructure against double extortion ransomware that targeted organizations with ICS and OT.

The ransomware attack initially targeted IT systems, and, thanks to self-learning Cyber AI, was stopped before it could spill over into OT and disrupt operations.

The attacker first compromised an internal server in order to exfiltrate data and deploy ransomware over the course of 12 hours. The short amount of time between initial compromise and deployment is unusual, as ransomware threat actors often wait several days to spread stealthily as far across the cyber ecosystem as possible before striking.

Figure 1: A timeline of the attack

How did the attack bypass the rest of the security stack?

The attacker leveraged ‘Living off the Land’ techniques to blend into the business’ normal ‘patterns of life’, using a compromised admin credential and a remote management tool approved by the organization, in its attempts to remain undetected.

Darktrace commonly sees the abuse of legitimate remote management software in attackers’ arsenal of techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs). Remote access is also becoming an increasingly common vector of attack in ICS attacks in particular. For example, in the cyber-incident at the Florida water treatment facility last February, attackers exploited a remote management tool in attempts to manipulate the treatment process.

The specific strain of ransomware deployed by this attacker also successfully evaded detection by anti-virus by using a unique file extension when encrypting files. These forms of ‘signatureless’ ransomware easily slip past legacy approaches to security that rely on rules, signatures, threat feeds, and lists of documented Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), as these are methods that can only detect previously documented threats.

The only way to detect never-before-seen threats like signatureless ransomware is for a technology to find anomalous behavior, rather than rely on lists of ‘known bads’. This can be achieved with self-learning technology, which spots even the most subtle deviations from the normal ‘patterns of life’ for all devices, users, and all the connections between them.

Darktrace insights

Initial compromise and establishing foothold

Despite the abuse of a legitimate tool and the absence of known signatures, Darktrace/OT was able to use a holistic understanding of normal activity to detect the malicious activity at multiple points in the attack lifecycle.

The first clear sign of an emerging threat that was alerted by Darktrace was the unusual use of a privileged credential. The device also served an unusual remote desktop protocol (RDP) connection from a Veeam server shortly before the incident, indicating that the attacker may have moved laterally from elsewhere in the network.

Three minutes later, the device initiated a remote management session which lasted 21 hours. This allowed the attacker to move throughout the broader cyber ecosystem while remaining undetected by traditional defences. Darktrace, however, was able to detect unusual remote management usage as another early warning indicative of an attack.

Double threat part one: Data exfiltration

One hour after the initial compromise, Darktrace detected unusual volumes of data being sent to a 100% rare cloud storage solution, pCloud. The outbound data was encrypted using SSL, but Darktrace created multiple alerts relating to large internal downloads and external uploads that were a significant deviation from the device’s normal ‘pattern of life’.

The device continued to exfiltrate data for nine hours. Analysis of the files downloaded by the device, which were transferred using the unencrypted SMB protocol, suggests that they were sensitive in nature. Fortunately, Darktrace was able to pinpoint the specific files that were exfiltrated so that the customer could immediately evaluate the potential implications of the compromise.

Double threat part two: File encryption

A short time later, at 01:49 local time, the compromised device began encrypting files in a SharePoint back-up share drive. Over the next three and a half hours, the device encrypted over 13,000 files on at least 20 SMB shares. In total, Darktrace produced 23 alerts for the device in question, which amounted to 48% of all the alerts produced in the corresponding 24-hour period.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst then automatically launched an investigation, identifying the internal data transfers and the file encryption over SMB. From this, it was able to present incident reports that connected the dots among these disparate anomalies, piecing them together into a coherent security narrative. This put the security team in a position to immediately take remediating action.

If the customer had been using Darktrace’s autonomous response technology, there is no doubt the activity would have been halted before significant volumes of data could have been exfiltrated or files encrypted. Fortunately, after seeing both the alerts and Cyber AI Analyst reports, the customer was able to use Darktrace’s ‘Ask the Expert’ (ATE) service for incident response to mitigate the impact of the attack and assist with disaster recovery.

Figure 2: AI Analyst Incident reporting an unusual reprogram command using the MODBUS protocol. The incident includes a plain English summary, relevant technical information, and the investigation process used by the AI.  

Detecting the threat before it could disrupt critical infrastructure

The targeted supplier was overseeing OT and had close ties to critical infrastructure. By facilitating the early-stage response, Darktrace prevented the ransomware from spreading further onto the factory floor. Crucially, Darktrace also minimized operational disruption, helping to avoid the domino effect which the attack could have had, affecting not only the supplier itself, but also the electric utilities that this supplier supports.

As both the recent Colonial Pipeline incident and the above threat find reveal, ransomware is a pressing concern for organizations overseeing industrial operations across all forms of critical infrastructure, from pipelines to the power grid and its suppliers. With self-learning AI, these attack vectors can be dealt with before the damage is done through real-time threat detection, autonomous investigations, and — if activated — targeted machine-speed response.

Looking forward: Using Self-Learning AI to protect critical infrastructure across the board

In late April, the Biden administration announced an ambitious effort to “safeguard US critical infrastructure from persistent and sophisticated threats.” The Department of Energy’s (DOE) 100-day plan specifically seeks technologies “that will provide cyber visibility, detection, and response capabilities for industrial control systems of electric utilities.”

The Biden administration’s cyber sprint clearly calls for a technology that protects critical energy infrastructure, rather than merely best practice measures and regulations. As seen in the above threat find, Darktrace AI is a powerful technology that leverages unsupervised machine learning to autonomously safeguard critical infrastructure and its suppliers with machine speed and precision.

Darktrace enhances detection, mitigation, and forensic capabilities to detect  sophisticated and novel attacks, along with insider threats and pre-existing infections, using Self-Learning Cyber AI, without rules, signatures, or lists of CVEs. Incident investigations provided in real time by Cyber AI Analyst jumpstart remediation with actionable insights, containing emerging attacks at their early stages, before they escalate into crisis.

Enable near real-time situational awareness and response capabilities

Darktrace immediately understands, identifies, and investigates all anomalous activity in ICS/OT networks, whether human or machine driven. Additionally, Darktrace actions targeted response where appropriate to neutralize threats, either actively or in human confirmation mode. Because Self-learning AI adapts alongside evolutions in the ecosystem, organizations benefit from real-time awareness with no tuning or human input necessary

Deploy technologies to increase visibility of threats in ICS and OT systems

Darktrace contextualizes security events, adapts to novel techniques, and translates findings into a security narrative that can be actioned by humans in minutes. Delivering a unified view across IT and OT systems.

Darktrace detects, investigates, and responds to threats at higher Purdue levels and in IT systems before they ‘spill over’ into OT. ‘Plug and play’ deployment seamlessly integrates with technological architecture, presenting 3D network topology with granular visibility into all users, devices, and subnets.

Darktrace's asset identification continuously catalogues all ICS/OT devices and identifies and investigates all threatening activity indicative of emerging attacks – be it ICS ransomware, APTs, zero-day exploits, insider threats, pre-existing infections, DDoS, crypto-mining, misconfigurations, or never-before-seen attacks.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Oakley Cox for his insights on the above threat find.

Darktrace model detections:

  • Initial compromise:
  • User / New Admin Credential on Client
  • Data exfiltration:
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed by Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • File encryption:
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Anomalous RDP Followed by Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
David Masson
VP, Field CISO

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April 29, 2025

MFA Under Attack: AiTM Phishing Kits Abusing Legitimate Services

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In late 2024 and early 2025, the Darktrace Security Operations Center (SOC) investigated alerts regarding separate cases of Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) account compromises on two customer environments that presented several similarities, suggesting they were part of a wider phishing campaign.

This campaign was found to leverage the project collaboration and note-taking application, Milanote, and the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit.

Legitimate services abused

As highlighted in Darktrace's 2024 Annual Threat Report [1], threat actors are abusing legitimate services, like Milanote, in their phishing campaigns. By leveraging these trusted platforms and domains, malicious actors can bypass traditional security measures, making their phishing emails appear benign and increasing the likelihood of successful attacks.

Darktrace categorizes these senders and platforms as free content senders. These services allow users to send emails containing custom content (e.g., files) from fully validated, fixed service address belonging to legitimate corporations. Although some of these services permit full body and subject customization by attackers, the structure of these emails is generally consistent, making it challenging to differentiate between legitimate and malicious emails.

What is Tycoon 2FA?

Tycoon 2FA is an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing kit, first seen in August 2023 and distributed via the Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) model [2]. It targets multi-factor authentication (MFA) by intercepting credentials and MFA tokens during authentication on fake Microsoft or Google login pages. The attacker captures session cookies after MFA is completed, allowing them to replay the session and access the user account, even if credentials are reset. The rise in MFA use has increased the popularity of AitM phishing kits like Tycoon 2FA and Mamba 2FA, another AiTM phishing kit investigated by Darktrace.

Initial access via phishing email

At the beginning of 2025, Darktrace observed phishing emails leveraging Milanote being sent to multiple internal recipients in an organization. In this attack, the same email was sent to 19 different users, all of which were held by Darktrace.

The subject line of the emails mentioned both a legitimate internal user of the company, the company name, as well as a Milanote board regarding a “new agreement” in German. It is a common social engineering technique to mention urgent matters, such as unpaid invoices, expired passwords, or awaiting voicemails, in the subject line to prompt immediate action from the user. However, this tactic is now widely covered in phishing awareness training, making users more suspicious of such emails. In this case, while the subject mentioned a “new agreement,” likely raising the recipient’s curiosity, the tone remained professional and not overly alarming. Additionally, the mention of a colleague and the standardized language typical of free content sender emails further helped dispel concerns regarding the email.

These emails were sent by the legitimate address support@milanote[.]com and referenced "Milanote" in the personal field of the header but originated from the freemail address “ahnermatternk.ef.od.13@gmail[.]com”. Darktrace / EMAIL recognized that none of the recipients had previously received a file share email from Milanote, making this sender unfamiliar in the customer's email environment

The emails contained several benign links to legitimate Milanote endpoints (including an unsubscribe link) which were not flagged by Darktrace. However, they also included a malicious link designed to direct recipients to a pre-filled credential harvesting page hosted on Milanote, prompting them to register for an account. Despite not blocking the legitimate Milanote links in the same email, Darktrace locked the malicious link, preventing users from visiting the credential harvester.

Credential harvesting page sent to recipients, as seen in. sandbox environment.
Figure 1: Credential harvesting page sent to recipients, as seen in. sandbox environment.

Around one minute later, one recipient received a legitimate email from Milanote confirming their successful account registration, indicating they had accessed the phishing page. This email had a lower anomaly score and was not flagged by Darktrace / EMAIL because, unlike the first email, it did not contain any suspicious links and was a genuine account registration notification. Similarly, in the malicious Milanote email, only the link leading to the phishing page was blocked, while the benign and legitimate Milanote links remained accessible, demonstrating Darktrace’s precise and targeted actioning.

A legitimate and a malicious Milanote email received by one recipient.
Figure 2: A legitimate and a malicious Milanote email received by one recipient.

Around the same time, Darktrace / NETWORK observed the same user’s device making DNS query for the domain name “lrn.ialeahed[.]com” , which has been flagged as a Tycoon 2FA domain [2], suggesting the use of this phishing platform.

Once the user had entered their details in the credential harvester, it is likely that they were presented a document hosted on Milanote that contained the final payload link – likely hidden behind text instructing users to access a “new agreement” document.

External research indicates that the user was likely directed to a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge meant to reroute unwanted traffic, such as automated security scripts and penetration testing tools [2] [3]. After these checks and other background processes are completed, the user is directed to the final landing page. In this case, it was likely a fake login prompt hosted on the attacker’s server, where the user is asked to authenticate to their account using MFA. By burrowing malicious links and files in this manner, threat actors can evade analysis by traditional security email gateways, effectively bypassing their protection.

Darktrace’s analysis of the structure and word content of the phishing emails resulted in an 82% probability score that the email was malicious, and the email further received a 67% phishing inducement score, representing how closely the structure and word content of the emails compared to typical phishing emails.

All these unusual elements triggered multiple alerts in Darktrace / EMAIL, focusing on two main suspicious aspects: a new, unknown sender with no prior correspondence with the recipients or the environment, and the inclusion of a link to a previously unseen file storage solution.

Milanote phishing email as seen within Darktrace / EMAIL.
Figure 3: Milanote phishing email as seen within Darktrace / EMAIL.

After detecting the fifth email, the “Sender Surge” model alert was triggered in Darktrace / EMAIL due to a significant number of recipients being emailed by this new suspicious sender in a short period. These recipients were from various departments across the customer’s organization, including sales, marketing, purchasing, and production. Darktrace / EMAIL determined that the emails were sent to a highly unusual group of internal recipients, further raising doubts about the business legitimacy.

Darktrace / EMAIL suggested actions to contain the attack by holding all Milanote phishing emails back from recipient’s inboxes, except for the detailed email with locked links. However, autonomous actions were not enabled at the time, allowing the initial email to reach recipients' inboxes, providing a brief window for interaction. Unfortunately, during this window, one recipient clicked on the Milanote payload link, leading to the compromise of their account.

SaaS account takeover

About three minutes after the malicious Milanote email was received, Darktrace / IDENTITY detected an unusual login to the email recipient’s SaaS account. The SaaS actor was observed accessing files from their usual location in Germany, while simultaneously, a 100% rare login occurred from a location in the US that had never been seen in the customer’s environment before. This login was also flagged as suspicious by Microsoft 365, triggering a 'Conditional Access Policy' that required MFA authentication, which was successfully completed.

Tycoon 2FA adnimistration panel login page dated from October 2023 [3].
Figure 4: Tycoon 2FA adnimistration panel login page dated from October 2023 [3].

Despite the successful authentication, Darktrace / IDENTITY recognized that the login from this unusual location, coupled with simultaneous activity in another geographically distant location, were highly suspicious. Darktrace went on to observe MFA-validated logins from three separate US-based IP addresses: 89.185.80[.]19, 5.181.3[.]68, and 38.242.7[.]252. Most of the malicious activity was performed from the latter, which is associated with the Hide My Ass (HMA) VPN network [5].

Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login from the US while the legitimate user was logged in from Germany.
Figure 5: Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login from the US while the legitimate user was logged in from Germany.
Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login following successful MFA authentication.
Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of the suspicious login following successful MFA authentication.

Following this, the malicious actor accessed the user’s inbox and created a new mailbox rule named “GTH” that deleted any incoming email containing the string “milanote” in the subject line or body. Rules like this are a common technique used by attackers to leverage compromised accounts for launching phishing campaigns and concealing replies to phishing emails that might raise suspicions among legitimate account holders. Using legitimate, albeit compromised, accounts to send additional phishing emails enhances the apparent legitimacy of the malicious emails. This tactic has been reported as being used by Tycoon 2FA attackers [4].

The attacker accessed over 140 emails within the legitimate user’s inbox, including both the inbox and the “Sent Items” folder. Notably, the attacker accessed five emails in the “Sent Items” folder and modified their attachments. These emails were mainly related to invoices, suggesting the threat actor may have been looking to hijack those email threads to send fake invoices or replicate previous invoice emails.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI AnalystTM launched autonomous investigations into the individual events surrounding this suspicious activity. It connected these separate events into a single, broad account takeover incident, providing the customer with a clearer view of the ongoing compromise.

Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of unusual SaaS account activities in a single incident.
Figure 7: Cyber AI Analyst’s detection of unusual SaaS account activities in a single incident.
Cyber AI Analyst investigation of suspicious activities performed by the attacker.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst investigation of suspicious activities performed by the attacker.

Darktrace's response

Within three minutes of the first unusual login alert, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response intervened, disabling the compromised user account for two hours.

As the impacted customer was subscribed to the Managed Threat Detection Service, Darktrace’s SOC team investigated the activity further and promptly alerted the customer’s security team. With the user’s account still disabled by Autonomous Response, the attack was contained, allowing the customer’s security team valuable time to investigate and remediate. Within ten minutes of receiving the alert from Darktrace’s SOC, they reset the user’s password, closed all active SaaS sessions, and deleted the malicious email rule. Darktrace’s SOC further supported the customer through the Security Operations Service Support service by providing information about the data accessed and identifying any other affected users.

Autonomous Response actions carried out by Darktrace / IDENTITY to contain the malicious activity
Figure 9: Autonomous Response actions carried out by Darktrace / IDENTITY to contain the malicious activity.

A wider Milanote phishing campaign?

Around a month before this compromise activity, Darktrace alerted another customer to similar activities involving two compromised user accounts. These accounts created new inbox rules named “GFH” and “GVB” to delete all incoming emails containing the string “milanote” in their subject line and/or body.

The phishing emails that led to the compromise of these user accounts were similar to the ones discussed above. Specifically, these emails were sent via the Milanote platform and referenced a “new agreement” (in Spanish) being shared by a colleague. Additionally, the payload link included in the phishing emails showed the same UserPrincipalName (UPN) attribute (i.e., click?upn=u001.qLX9yCzR), which has been seen in other Milanote phishing emails leveraging Tycoon 2FA reported by OSINT sources [6]. Interestingly, in some cases, the email also referenced a “new agreement” in Portuguese, indicating a global campaign.

Based on the similarities in the rule’s naming convention and action, as well as the similarities in the phishing email subjects, it is likely that these were part of the same campaign leveraging Milanote and Tycoon 2FA to compromise user accounts. Since its introduction, the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit has undergone several enhancements to increase its stealth and obfuscation methods, making it harder for security tools to detect. For example, the latest versions contain special source code to obstruct web page analysis by defenders, prevent users from copying meaningful text from the phishing webpages, and disable the right-click menu to prevent offline analysis [4].

Conclusion

Threat actors are continually employing new methods to bypass security detection tools and measures. As highlighted in this blog, even robust security mechanisms like MFA can be compromised using AitM phishing kits. The misuse of legitimate services such as Milanote for malicious purposes can help attackers evade traditional email security solutions by blurring the distinction between legitimate and malicious content.

This is why security tools based on anomaly detection are crucial for defending against such attacks. However, user awareness is equally important. Delays in processing can impact the speed of response, making it essential for users to be informed about these threats.

Appendices

References

[1] https://www.darktrace.com/resources/annual-threat-report-2024

[2] https://www.validin.com/blog/tycoon_2fa_analyzing_and_hunting_phishing-as-a-service_domains

[3] https://blog.sekoia.io/tycoon-2fa-an-in-depth-analysis-of-the-latest-version-of-the-aitm-phishing-kit/#h-iocs-amp-technical-details

[4] https://blog.barracuda.com/2025/01/22/threat-spotlight-tycoon-2fa-phishing-kit

[5] https://spur.us/context/38.242.7.252    

[6] https://any.run/report/5ef1ac94e4c6c1dc35579321c206453aea80d414108f9f77abd2e2b03ffbd658/be5351d9-53c0-470b-8708-ee2e29300e70

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

IoC         Type      Description + Probability

89.185.80[.]19 - IP Address - Malicious login

5.181.3[.]68 - IP Address -Malicious login

38.242.7[.]252 - IP Address - Malicious login and new email inbox rule creation -  Hide My Ass VPN

lrn.ialeahed[.]com – Hostname - Likely Tycoon 2FA domain

Darktrace Model Detections

Email alerts

Platforms / Free Content Sender + High Sender Surge

Platforms / Free Content Sender + Sender Surge

Platforms / Free Content Sender + Unknown Initiator

Platforms / Free Content Sender

Platforms / Free Content Sender + First Time Recipient

Unusual / New Sender Surge

Unusual / Sender Surge

Antigena Anomaly / High Antigena Anomaly

Association / Unknown Sender

History / New Sender

Link / High Rarity Link to File Storage

Link/ Link To File Storage

Link / Link to File Storage + Unknown Sender

Link / Low Link Association

Platforms / Free Content Sender + First Time Initiator

Platforms / Free Content Sender + Unknown Initiator + Freemail

Platforms / Free Content Sender Link

Unusual / Anomalous Association

Unusual / Unlikely Recipient Association

IDENTITY

SaaS / Access / Unusual External Source for SaaS Credential Use

SaaS / Compromise / Login from Rare High Risk Endpoint

SaaS / Access / M365 High Risk Level Login

SaaS / Compromise / Login From Rare Endpoint While User Is Active

SaaS / Access / MailItemsAccessed from Rare Endpoint

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual SaaS Activities

SaaS / Unusual Activity / Multiple Unusual External Sources For SaaS Credential

SaaS / Compliance / Anomalous New Email Rule

SaaS / Compromise / Unusual Login and New Email Rule

SaaS / Compromise / SaaS Anomaly Following Anomalous Login

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS Activity Block

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from SaaS User Block

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Unusual Activity Block

Antigena / SaaS / Antigena Suspicious SaaS and Email Activity Block

Cyber AI Analyst Incident

Possible Hijack of Office365 Account

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique

DEFENSE EVASION, PERSISTENCE, PRIVILEGE ESCALATION, INITIAL ACCESS - Cloud Accounts

INITIAL ACCESS - Phishing

CREDENTIAL ACCESS - Steal Web Session Cookie

PERSISTENCE - Account Manipulation

PERSISTENCE - Outlook Rules

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - Email Accounts

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - Compromise Accounts

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About the author
Alexandra Sentenac
Cyber Analyst

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April 29, 2025

The Importance of NDR in Resilient XDR

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As threat actors become more adept at targeting and disabling EDR agents, relying solely on endpoint detection leaves critical blind spots.

Network detection and response (NDR) offers the visibility and resilience needed to catch what EDR can’t especially in environments with unmanaged devices or advanced threats that evade local controls.

This blog explores how threat actors can disable or bypass EDR-based XDR solutions and demonstrates how Darktrace’s approach to NDR closes the resulting security gaps with Self-Learning AI that enables autonomous, real-time detection and response.

Threat actors see local security agents as targets

Recent research by security firms has highlighted ‘EDR killers’: tools that deliberately target EDR agents to disable or damage them. These include the known malicious tool EDRKillShifter, the open source EDRSilencer, EDRSandblast and variants of Terminator, and even the legitimate business application HRSword.

The attack surface of any endpoint agent is inevitably large, whether the software is challenged directly, by contesting its local visibility and access mechanisms, or by targeting the Operating System it relies upon. Additionally, threat actors can readily access and analyze EDR tools, and due to their uniformity across environments an exploit proven in a lab setting will likely succeed elsewhere.

Sophos have performed deep research into the EDRShiftKiller tool, which ESET have separately shown became accessible to multiple threat actor groups. Cisco Talos have reported via TheRegister observing significant success rates when an EDR kill was attempted by ransomware actors.

With the local EDR agent silently disabled or evaded, how will the threat be discovered?

What are the limitations of relying solely on EDR?

Cyber attackers will inevitably break through boundary defences, through innovation or trickery or exploiting zero-days. Preventive measures can reduce but not completely stop this. The attackers will always then want to expand beyond their initial access point to achieve persistence and discover and reach high value targets within the business. This is the primary domain of network activity monitoring and NDR, which includes responsibility for securing the many devices that cannot run endpoint agents.

In the insights from a CISA Red Team assessment of a US CNI organization, the Red Team was able to maintain access over the course of months and achieve their target outcomes. The top lesson learned in the report was:

“The assessed organization had insufficient technical controls to prevent and detect malicious activity. The organization relied too heavily on host-based endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions and did not implement sufficient network layer protections.”

This proves that partial, isolated viewpoints are not sufficient to track and analyze what is fundamentally a connected problem – and without the added visibility and detection capabilities of NDR, any downstream SIEM or MDR services also still have nothing to work with.

Why is network detection & response (NDR) critical?

An effective NDR finds threats that disable or can’t be seen by local security agents and generally operates out-of-band, acquiring data from infrastructure such as traffic mirroring from physical or virtual switches. This means that the security system is extremely inaccessible to a threat actor at any stage.

An advanced NDR such as Darktrace / NETWORK is fully capable of detecting even high-end novel and unknown threats.

Detecting exploitation of Ivanti CS/PS with Darktrace / NETWORK

On January 9th 2025, two new vulnerabilities were disclosed in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure appliances that were under malicious exploitation. Perimeter devices, like Ivanti VPNs, are designed to keep threat actors out of a network, so it's quite serious when these devices are vulnerable.

An NDR solution is critical because it provides network-wide visibility for detecting lateral movement and threats that an EDR might miss, such as identifying command and control sessions (C2) and data exfiltration, even when hidden within encrypted traffic and which an EDR alone may not detect.

Darktrace initially detected suspicious activity connected with the exploitation of CVE-2025-0282 on December 29, 2024 – 11 days before the public disclosure of the vulnerability, this early detection highlights the benefits of an anomaly-based network detection method.

Throughout the campaign and based on the network telemetry available to Darktrace, a wide range of malicious activities were identified, including the malicious use of administrative credentials, the download of suspicious files, and network scanning in the cases investigated.

Darktrace / NETWORK’s autonomous response capabilities played a critical role in containment by autonomously blocking suspicious connections and enforcing normal behavior patterns. At the same time, Darktrace Cyber AI Analyst™ automatically investigated and correlated the anomalous activity into cohesive incidents, revealing the full scope of the compromise.

This case highlights the importance of real-time, AI-driven network monitoring to detect and disrupt stealthy post-exploitation techniques targeting unmanaged or unprotected systems.

Unlocking adaptive protection for evolving cyber risks

Darktrace / NETWORK uses unique AI engines that learn what is normal behavior for an organization’s entire network, continuously analyzing, mapping and modeling every connection to create a full picture of your devices, identities, connections, and potential attack paths.

With its ability to uncover previously unknown threats as well as detect known threats Darktrace is an essential layer of the security stack. Darktrace has helped secure customers against attacks including 2024 threat actor campaigns against Fortinet’s FortiManager , Palo Alto firewall devices, and more.  

Stay tuned for part II of this series which dives deeper into the differences between NDR types.

Credit to Nathaniel Jones VP, Security & AI Strategy, FCISO & Ashanka Iddya, Senior Director of Product Marketing for their contribution to this blog.

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About the author
Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO
Your data. Our AI.
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