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May 12, 2021

How AI Protects Critical Infrastructure From Ransomware

Explore the role of AI in safeguarding critical infrastructure from ransomware, as revealed by Darktrace's latest insights.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
David Masson
VP, Field CISO
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12
May 2021

Modern Threats to OT Environments

At the 2021 RSA cyber security conference, US Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas made an era-defining statement regarding the cyber security landscape: “Let me be clear: ransomware now poses a national security threat.”

Last weekend, Mayorkas’ words rang true. A ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline – responsible for nearly half of the US East Coast’s diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel – resulted in the shutdown of a critical fuel network supplying a number of Eastern states.

The fallout from the attack demonstrated how widespread and damaging the consequences of ransomware can be. Against critical infrastructure and utilities, cyber-attacks have the potential to disrupt supplies, harm the environment, and even threaten human lives.

Though full details remain to be confirmed, the attack is reported to have been conducted by an affiliate of the cyber-criminal group called DarkSide, and likely leveraged common remote desktop tools. Remote access has been enabled as an exploitable vulnerability within critical infrastructure by the shift to remote work that many organizations made last year, including those with Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Operational Technology (OT).

The rise of industrial ransomware

Ransomware against industrial environments is on the rise, with a reported 500% increase since 2018. Oftentimes, these threats leverage the convergence of IT and OT systems, first targeting IT before pivoting to OT. This was seen with the EKANS ransomware that included ICS processes in its ‘kill list’, as well as the Cring ransomware that compromised ICS after first exploiting a vulnerability in a virtual private network (VPN).

It remains to be seen whether the initial attack vector in the Colonial Pipeline compromise exploited a technical vulnerability, compromised credentials, or a targeted spear phishing campaign. It has been reported that the attack first impacted IT systems, and that Colonial then shut down OT operations as a safety precaution. Colonial confirms that the ransomware “temporarily halted all pipeline operations and affected some of our IT systems,” showing that, ultimately, both OT and IT were affected. This is a great example of how many OT systems depend on IT, such that an IT cyber-attack has the ability to take down OT and ICS processes.

In addition to locking down systems, the threat actors also stole 100GB of sensitive data from Colonial. This kind of double extortion attack — in which data is exfiltrated before files are encrypted — has unfortunately become the norm rather than the exception, with over 70% of ransomware attacks involving exfiltration. Some ransomware gangs have even announced that they are dropping encryption altogether in favor of data theft and extortion methods.

Earlier this year, Darktrace defended against a double extortion ransomware attack waged against a critical infrastructure organization, which also leveraged common remote access tools. This blog will outline the threat find in depth, showing how Darktrace’s self-learning AI responded autonomously to an attack strikingly similar to the Colonial Pipeline incident.

Darktrace threat find

Ransomware against electric utilities equipment supplier

In an attack against a North American equipment supplier for electrical utilities earlier this year, Darktrace/OT demonstrated its ability to protect critical infrastructure against double extortion ransomware that targeted organizations with ICS and OT.

The ransomware attack initially targeted IT systems, and, thanks to self-learning Cyber AI, was stopped before it could spill over into OT and disrupt operations.

The attacker first compromised an internal server in order to exfiltrate data and deploy ransomware over the course of 12 hours. The short amount of time between initial compromise and deployment is unusual, as ransomware threat actors often wait several days to spread stealthily as far across the cyber ecosystem as possible before striking.

Figure 1: A timeline of the attack

How did the attack bypass the rest of the security stack?

The attacker leveraged ‘Living off the Land’ techniques to blend into the business’ normal ‘patterns of life’, using a compromised admin credential and a remote management tool approved by the organization, in its attempts to remain undetected.

Darktrace commonly sees the abuse of legitimate remote management software in attackers’ arsenal of techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs). Remote access is also becoming an increasingly common vector of attack in ICS attacks in particular. For example, in the cyber-incident at the Florida water treatment facility last February, attackers exploited a remote management tool in attempts to manipulate the treatment process.

The specific strain of ransomware deployed by this attacker also successfully evaded detection by anti-virus by using a unique file extension when encrypting files. These forms of ‘signatureless’ ransomware easily slip past legacy approaches to security that rely on rules, signatures, threat feeds, and lists of documented Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), as these are methods that can only detect previously documented threats.

The only way to detect never-before-seen threats like signatureless ransomware is for a technology to find anomalous behavior, rather than rely on lists of ‘known bads’. This can be achieved with self-learning technology, which spots even the most subtle deviations from the normal ‘patterns of life’ for all devices, users, and all the connections between them.

Darktrace insights

Initial compromise and establishing foothold

Despite the abuse of a legitimate tool and the absence of known signatures, Darktrace/OT was able to use a holistic understanding of normal activity to detect the malicious activity at multiple points in the attack lifecycle.

The first clear sign of an emerging threat that was alerted by Darktrace was the unusual use of a privileged credential. The device also served an unusual remote desktop protocol (RDP) connection from a Veeam server shortly before the incident, indicating that the attacker may have moved laterally from elsewhere in the network.

Three minutes later, the device initiated a remote management session which lasted 21 hours. This allowed the attacker to move throughout the broader cyber ecosystem while remaining undetected by traditional defences. Darktrace, however, was able to detect unusual remote management usage as another early warning indicative of an attack.

Double threat part one: Data exfiltration

One hour after the initial compromise, Darktrace detected unusual volumes of data being sent to a 100% rare cloud storage solution, pCloud. The outbound data was encrypted using SSL, but Darktrace created multiple alerts relating to large internal downloads and external uploads that were a significant deviation from the device’s normal ‘pattern of life’.

The device continued to exfiltrate data for nine hours. Analysis of the files downloaded by the device, which were transferred using the unencrypted SMB protocol, suggests that they were sensitive in nature. Fortunately, Darktrace was able to pinpoint the specific files that were exfiltrated so that the customer could immediately evaluate the potential implications of the compromise.

Double threat part two: File encryption

A short time later, at 01:49 local time, the compromised device began encrypting files in a SharePoint back-up share drive. Over the next three and a half hours, the device encrypted over 13,000 files on at least 20 SMB shares. In total, Darktrace produced 23 alerts for the device in question, which amounted to 48% of all the alerts produced in the corresponding 24-hour period.

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst then automatically launched an investigation, identifying the internal data transfers and the file encryption over SMB. From this, it was able to present incident reports that connected the dots among these disparate anomalies, piecing them together into a coherent security narrative. This put the security team in a position to immediately take remediating action.

If the customer had been using Darktrace’s autonomous response technology, there is no doubt the activity would have been halted before significant volumes of data could have been exfiltrated or files encrypted. Fortunately, after seeing both the alerts and Cyber AI Analyst reports, the customer was able to use Darktrace’s ‘Ask the Expert’ (ATE) service for incident response to mitigate the impact of the attack and assist with disaster recovery.

Figure 2: AI Analyst Incident reporting an unusual reprogram command using the MODBUS protocol. The incident includes a plain English summary, relevant technical information, and the investigation process used by the AI.  

Detecting the threat before it could disrupt critical infrastructure

The targeted supplier was overseeing OT and had close ties to critical infrastructure. By facilitating the early-stage response, Darktrace prevented the ransomware from spreading further onto the factory floor. Crucially, Darktrace also minimized operational disruption, helping to avoid the domino effect which the attack could have had, affecting not only the supplier itself, but also the electric utilities that this supplier supports.

As both the recent Colonial Pipeline incident and the above threat find reveal, ransomware is a pressing concern for organizations overseeing industrial operations across all forms of critical infrastructure, from pipelines to the power grid and its suppliers. With self-learning AI, these attack vectors can be dealt with before the damage is done through real-time threat detection, autonomous investigations, and — if activated — targeted machine-speed response.

Looking forward: Using Self-Learning AI to protect critical infrastructure across the board

In late April, the Biden administration announced an ambitious effort to “safeguard US critical infrastructure from persistent and sophisticated threats.” The Department of Energy’s (DOE) 100-day plan specifically seeks technologies “that will provide cyber visibility, detection, and response capabilities for industrial control systems of electric utilities.”

The Biden administration’s cyber sprint clearly calls for a technology that protects critical energy infrastructure, rather than merely best practice measures and regulations. As seen in the above threat find, Darktrace AI is a powerful technology that leverages unsupervised machine learning to autonomously safeguard critical infrastructure and its suppliers with machine speed and precision.

Darktrace enhances detection, mitigation, and forensic capabilities to detect  sophisticated and novel attacks, along with insider threats and pre-existing infections, using Self-Learning Cyber AI, without rules, signatures, or lists of CVEs. Incident investigations provided in real time by Cyber AI Analyst jumpstart remediation with actionable insights, containing emerging attacks at their early stages, before they escalate into crisis.

Enable near real-time situational awareness and response capabilities

Darktrace immediately understands, identifies, and investigates all anomalous activity in ICS/OT networks, whether human or machine driven. Additionally, Darktrace actions targeted response where appropriate to neutralize threats, either actively or in human confirmation mode. Because Self-learning AI adapts alongside evolutions in the ecosystem, organizations benefit from real-time awareness with no tuning or human input necessary

Deploy technologies to increase visibility of threats in ICS and OT systems

Darktrace contextualizes security events, adapts to novel techniques, and translates findings into a security narrative that can be actioned by humans in minutes. Delivering a unified view across IT and OT systems.

Darktrace detects, investigates, and responds to threats at higher Purdue levels and in IT systems before they ‘spill over’ into OT. ‘Plug and play’ deployment seamlessly integrates with technological architecture, presenting 3D network topology with granular visibility into all users, devices, and subnets.

Darktrace's asset identification continuously catalogues all ICS/OT devices and identifies and investigates all threatening activity indicative of emerging attacks – be it ICS ransomware, APTs, zero-day exploits, insider threats, pre-existing infections, DDoS, crypto-mining, misconfigurations, or never-before-seen attacks.

Thanks to Darktrace analyst Oakley Cox for his insights on the above threat find.

Darktrace model detections:

  • Initial compromise:
  • User / New Admin Credential on Client
  • Data exfiltration:
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed by Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • File encryption:
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Anomalous RDP Followed by Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
David Masson
VP, Field CISO

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March 5, 2026

Inside Cloud Compromise: Investigating Attacker Activity with Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

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Investigating Cloud Attacks with Forensic Acquisition & Investigation

Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation™ is the industry’s first truly automated forensic solution purpose-built for the cloud. This blog will demonstrate how an investigation can be carried out against a compromised cloud server in minutes, rather than hours or days.

The compromised server investigated in this case originates from Darktrace’s Cloudypots system, a global honeypot network designed to observe adversary activity in real time across a wide range of cloud services. Whenever an attacker successfully compromises one of these honeypots, a forensic copy of the virtual server's disk is preserved for later analysis. Using Forensic Acquisition & Investigation, analysts can then investigate further and obtain detailed insights into the compromise including complete attacker timelines and root cause analysis.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation supports importing artifacts from a variety of sources, including EC2 instances, ECS, S3 buckets, and more. The Cloudypots system produces a raw disk image whenever an attack is detected and stores it in an S3 bucket. This allows the image to be directly imported into Forensic Acquisition & Investigation using the S3 bucket import option.

As Forensic Acquisition & Investigation runs cloud-natively, no additional configuration is required to add a specific S3 bucket. Analysts can browse and acquire forensic assets from any bucket that the configured IAM role is permitted to access. Operators can also add additional IAM credentials, including those from other cloud providers, to extend access across multiple cloud accounts and environments.

Figure 1: Forensic Acquisition & Investigation import screen.

Forensic Acquisition & Investigation then retrieves a copy of the file and automatically begins running the analysis pipeline on the artifact. This pipeline performs a full forensic analysis of the disk and builds a timeline of the activity that took place on the compromised asset. By leveraging Forensic Acquisition & Investigation’s cloud-native analysis system, this process condenses hour of manual work into just minutes.

Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.
Figure 2: Successful import of a forensic artifact and initiation of the analysis pipeline.

Once processing is complete, the preserved artifact is visible in the Evidence tab, along with a summary of key information obtained during analysis, such as the compromised asset’s hostname, operating system, cloud provider, and key event count.

The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.
Figure 3: The Evidence overview showing the acquired disk image.

Clicking on the “Key events” field in the listing opens the timeline view, automatically filtered to show system- generated alarms.

The timeline provides a chronological record of every event that occurred on the system, derived from multiple sources, including:

  • Parsed log files such as the systemd journal, audit logs, application specific logs, and others.
  • Parsed history files such as .bash_history, allowing executed commands to be shown on the timeline.
  • File-specific events, such as files being created, accessed, modified, or executables being run, etc.

This approach allows timestamped information and events from multiple sources to be aggregated and parsed into a single, concise view, greatly simplifying the data review process.

Alarms are created for specific timeline events that match either a built-in system rule, curated by Darktrace’s Threat Research team or an operator-defined created at the project level. These alarms help quickly filter out noise and highlight on events of interest, such as the creation of a file containing known malware, access to sensitive files like Amazon Web Service (AWS) credentials, suspicious arguments or commands, and more.

 The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.
Figure 4: The timeline view filtered to alarm_severity: “1” OR alarm_severity: “3”, showing only events that matched an alarm rule.

In this case, several alarms were generated for suspicious Base64 arguments being passed to Selenium. Examining the event data, it appears the attacker spawned a Selenium Grid session with the following payload:

"request.payload": "[Capabilities {browserName: chrome, goog:chromeOptions: {args: [-cimport base64;exec(base64...], binary: /usr/bin/python3, extensions: []}, pageLoadStrategy: normal}]"

This is a common attack vector for Selenium Grid. The chromeOptions object is intended to specify arguments for how Google Chrome should be launched; however, in this case the attacker has abused the binary field to execute the Python3 binary instead of Chrome. Combined with the option to specify command-line arguments, the attacker can use Python3’s -c option to execute arbitrary Python code, in this instance, decoding and executing a Base64 payload.

Selenium’s logs truncate the Arguments field automatically, so an alternate method is required to retrieve the full payload. To do this, the search bar can be used to find all events that occurred around the same time as this flagged event.

Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].
Figure 5: Pivoting off the previous event by filtering the timeline to events within the same window using timestamp: [“2026-02-18T09:09:00Z” TO “2026-02-18T09:12:00Z”].

Scrolling through the search results, an entry from Java’s systemd journal can be identified. This log contains the full, unaltered payload. GCHQ’s CyberChef can then be used to decode the Base64 data into the attacker’s script, which will ultimately be executed.[NJ9]

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About the author
Nathaniel Bill
Malware Research Engineer

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February 19, 2026

CVE-2026-1731: How Darktrace Sees the BeyondTrust Exploitation Wave Unfolding

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Note: Darktrace's Threat Research team is publishing now to help defenders. We will continue updating this blog as our investigations unfold.

Background

On February 6, 2026, the Identity & Access Management solution BeyondTrust announced patches for a vulnerability, CVE-2026-1731, which enables unauthenticated remote code execution using specially crafted requests.  This vulnerability affects BeyondTrust Remote Support (RS) and particular older versions of Privileged Remote Access (PRA) [1].

A Proof of Concept (PoC) exploit for this vulnerability was released publicly on February 10, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) reported exploitation attempts within 24 hours [2].

Previous intrusions against Beyond Trust technology have been cited as being affiliated with nation-state attacks, including a 2024 breach targeting the U.S. Treasury Department. This incident led to subsequent emergency directives from  the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and later showed attackers had chained previously unknown vulnerabilities to achieve their goals [3].

Additionally, there appears to be infrastructure overlap with React2Shell mass exploitation previously observed by Darktrace, with command-and-control (C2) domain  avg.domaininfo[.]top seen in potential post-exploitation activity for BeyondTrust, as well as in a React2Shell exploitation case involving possible EtherRAT deployment.

Darktrace Detections

Darktrace’s Threat Research team has identified highly anomalous activity across several customers that may relate to exploitation of BeyondTrust since February 10, 2026. Observed activities include:

Outbound connections and DNS requests for endpoints associated with Out-of-Band Application Security Testing; these services are commonly abused by threat actors for exploit validation.  Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Possible Tunnelling to Bin Services

Suspicious executable file downloads. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Outbound beaconing to rare domains. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)
  • Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)
  • Compromise / Sustained TCP Beaconing Activity To Rare Endpoint
  • Compromise / Beacon to Young Endpoint
  • Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server
  • Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination

Unusual cryptocurrency mining activity. Associated Darktrace models include:

  • Compromise / Monero Mining
  • Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining

And model alerts for:

  • Compromise / Rare Domain Pointing to Internal IP

IT Defenders: As part of best practices, we highly recommend employing an automated containment solution in your environment. For Darktrace customers, please ensure that Autonomous Response is configured correctly. More guidance regarding this activity and suggested actions can be found in the Darktrace Customer Portal.  

Appendices

Potential indicators of post-exploitation behavior:

·      217.76.57[.]78 – IP address - Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://217.76.57[.]78:8009/index.js - URL -  Likely payload

·      b6a15e1f2f3e1f651a5ad4a18ce39d411d385ac7  - SHA1 - Likely payload

·      195.154.119[.]194 – IP address – Likely C2 server

·      hXXp://195.154.119[.]194/index.js - URL – Likely payload

·      avg.domaininfo[.]top – Hostname – Likely C2 server

·      104.234.174[.]5 – IP address - Possible C2 server

·      35da45aeca4701764eb49185b11ef23432f7162a – SHA1 – Possible payload

·      hXXp://134.122.13[.]34:8979/c - URL – Possible payload

·      134.122.13[.]34 – IP address – Possible C2 server

·      28df16894a6732919c650cc5a3de94e434a81d80 - SHA1 - Possible payload

References:

1.        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1731

2.        https://www.securityweek.com/beyondtrust-vulnerability-targeted-by-hackers-within-24-hours-of-poc-release/

3.        https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-1731-critical-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-rce-beyondtrust-remote-support-rs-privileged-remote-access-pra/

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About the author
Emma Foulger
Global Threat Research Operations Lead
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