AIがランサムウェアから重要インフラを保護

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12
May 2021
12
May 2021
In the wake of the Colonial Pipeline cyber-attack, this blog discusses the many threats facing critical infrastructure, and how Cyber AI disrupted a similar ‘double extortion’ ransomware attack against an electrical utilities supplier.

Modern Threats to OT Environments

2021年のRSAサイバーセキュリティカンファレンスにおいて、米国国土安全保障長官アレハンドロ・マヨルカス氏から、サイバーセキュリティ環境についてこの時代を定義する発言がありました:「はっきり言います。ランサムウェアは今や国家安全保障上の危機です。」

先週末、マヨルカス長官の言葉は現実となりました。米国東海岸のディーゼル、ガソリン、ジェット燃料の半分近くを担うColonial Pipelineに対するランサムウェア攻撃は、東海岸の多くの州に供給する重要な燃料ネットワークのシャットダウンを招きました。

この攻撃の影響は、ランサムウェアの結果がどれほど広範で被害の大きいものとなるかを証明しました。重要インフラに対し、サイバー攻撃は供給を中断し、環境を破壊し、場合によっては人命にかかわる危険性も持っています。

詳細な情報はまだ確認されていない部分もありますが、この攻撃はDarkSideと呼ばれるサイバー犯罪者の関連組織が実行したものと報じられており、おそらく一般的なリモートデスクトップツールを使ったとされています。リモートアクセスは、ICS(Industrial Control SystemsおよびOT(Operational Technology)を含む多くの組織が昨年行ったリモートワークへのシフトにより、重要インフラ内の悪用可能な脆弱性となりました。

産業用ランサムウェアの台頭

産業用環境を標的としたランサムウェアは増えつつあり、2018年以降に500%増加していると報告されています。多くの場合、これらの脅威はITとOTの統合を利用し、まずITを標的としてからOTに転回していきます。ICSプロセスを「キルリスト」に含めていたEKANSランサムウェア、ならびに最初にVPN(Virtual Private Network)の脆弱性を悪用してからICSに侵入したCring ランサムウェアでもそうした様子が見られました。

Colonial Pipelineへの侵害の最初の攻撃ベクトルが技術的な脆弱性をエクスプロイトしたものか、認証情報の流出があったのか、あるいは標的型スピアフィッシングであったのかはまだ明らかになっていません。攻撃は最初にITシステムに影響し、安全のための予防措置としてColonialがOTオペレーションをシャットダウンしたということが報じられています。Colonial はランサムウェアが「一時的にすべてのパイプライン操業を停止させ、ITシステムの一部に影響した」ことを確認しており、最終的にOTとITの両方が影響を受けたことがわかります。これは多くのOTシステムがITシステムに依存しており、ITサイバー攻撃がOTやICSプロセスをダウンさせることができるということを非常によく表している例です。

システムをダウンさせることに加えて、脅威アクターはColonialから100GBもの機密データを盗みました。ファイルの暗号化前にデータ抜き出しが行われるというこの種の二重恐喝攻撃は、残念ながら例外というよりも標準となっており、ランサムウェア攻撃の70%以上にはデータ抜き出しも含まれています。一部のランサムウェアギャングは暗号化を丸ごと放棄して、データ盗み出しと恐喝の手法を選択しています。

今年初め、Darktraceは重要インフラ企業に対する二重恐喝ランサムウェア攻撃を阻止しましたが、これには一般的なリモートアクセスツールが使用されていました。このブログでは発見された脅威を詳しく解説し、Darktraceの自己学習型AIがColonial Pipeline インシデントに非常によく似た攻撃に自律的に対処した事例を紹介します。

Darktraceによる脅威の発見

電力機器サプライヤーを標的としたランサムウェア

In an attack against a North American equipment supplier for electrical utilities earlier this year, Darktrace/OT demonstrated its ability to protect critical infrastructure against double extortion ransomware that targeted organizations with ICS and OT.

このランサムウェアは最初にITシステムを標的としましたが、自己学習型Cyber AIにより、OTシステムに拡大し業務を中断させる前に阻止されました。

12時間の間に、攻撃者はまず内部サーバーに侵入し、データを盗み出してランサムウェアを展開しようとしました。最初の侵入から展開までの時間が短いことは珍しいと言えます。ランサムウェア脅威アクターは多くの場合、できるだけ目立たずに数日間かけてサイバーエコシステム内を可能な限り広範囲に拡散してから攻撃するからです。

図1: 攻撃のタイムライン

攻撃は他のセキュリティスタックをどのようにすり抜けたか?

攻撃者は ‘Living off the Land’ (環境に寄生する)テクニックでこの会社の通常の「生活パターン」に溶け込もうとしました。盗んだ管理者認証情報と会社で認められたリモート管理ツールを使い、検知を免れようとしたのです。

Darktraceは正統なリモート管理ソフトウェアが攻撃者のTTP(戦術、テクニック、手順)で悪用される事例を数多く観測しています。リモートアクセスは特にICS攻撃において一般的になりつつある攻撃ベクトルでもあります。たとえば、2月に発生したフロリダ州の水処理施設で発生したサイバーインシデントでは、攻撃者はリモート管理ツールを使って水処理のプロセスを操作しようとしました。

この攻撃者が使った種類のランサムウェアは、ファイルを暗号化する際独自のファイル拡張子を使うことによってアンチウィルスソフトの検知を回避することに成功しています。こうした形の「シグネチャのない」ランサムウェアは、ルール、シグネチャ、脅威フィード、およびCVE(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)リストに依存する従来のアプローチを簡単にすり抜けます。これらの手法は過去に文書化された脅威しか検知できないからです。

シグネチャのないランサムウェアなど以前に見られたことのない脅威を検知する唯一の方法は、「既知の悪」のリストに頼ることではなく、異常な動作を見つけることです。これは組織内のあらゆるデバイス、ユーザー、コントローラ、およびそれらの間のすべての接続についての通常の「生活パターン」からのごくわずかな逸脱も見つけることができる自己学習型テクノロジーによって可能になります。

Darktrace の考察

最初の侵入と足掛かりの確立

Despite the abuse of a legitimate tool and the absence of known signatures, Darktrace/OT was able to use a holistic understanding of normal activity to detect the malicious activity at multiple points in the attack lifecycle.

Darktraceがアラートした、脅威の発生を示す最初の明確な兆候は、特権的認証情報の不審な使用でした。このデバイスはさらに、インシデントの直前にVeeamサーバーから不審なRDP(Remote Desktop Protocol)接続を受けており、攻撃者がネットワークの別の場所から水平移動してきた可能性を示しています。

3分後、このデバイスはリモート管理セッションを開始し、それは21時間続きました。これにより攻撃者は従来型の防御からは検知されないまま、サイバーエコシステム内を幅広く移動することができました。しかし、Darktraceは攻撃を示すさらなる早期の前触れとして、この不審なリモート管理の使用を検知していました。

二重脅威パート1:データ抜き出し

最初の侵入から1時間後、Darktraceは不審な量のデータが100%未知のクラウドストレージソリューション、pCloudに送信されていることを検知しました。送信されたデータはSSLを使って暗号化されていましたが、Darktraceはこのデバイスの通常の「生活パターン」からの著しい逸脱である大量の内部ダウンロードおよび外部アップロードに関連して複数のアラートを生成しました。

デバイスは9時間に渡ってデータの抜き出しを続けました。このデバイスにより暗号化されていないSMBプロトコルを使ってダウンロードされたファイルを分析したところ、これらは機密性が高いものであることを示唆していました。幸いなことに、Darktraceは抜き出されたファイルをピンポイントで特定することができたため、顧客は侵害の潜在的影響を即座に評価することができました。

二重脅威パート2:ファイル暗号化

そのすぐ後、現地時間 01:49 に、侵害されたデバイスはSharePointバックアップ共有ドライブでファイルを暗号化し始めました。その後3.5時間に渡り、デバイスは13,000個以上のファイルを少なくとも20個のSMB共有上で暗号化しました。Darktraceは問題のデバイスに対して合計で23個のアラートを生成し、それらは24時間に生成されたすべてのアラートの48%を占めていました。

DarktraceのCyber AI Analystはその後自動的に調査を開始し、内部のファイル転送とSMB上のファイル暗号化を特定しました。ここからCyber AI Analystはインシデントレポートを作成し、個別の異常の点と点をつなぎ合わせ、これらを明快なセキュリティ上の経緯説明にまとめました。これにより、セキュリティチームは即座に是正のためのアクションを取る体制ができました。

If the customer had been using Darktrace’s autonomous response technology, there is no doubt the activity would have been halted before significant volumes of data could have been exfiltrated or files encrypted. Fortunately, after seeing both the alerts and Cyber AI Analyst reports, the customer was able to use Darktrace’s ‘Ask the Expert’ (ATE) service for incident response to mitigate the impact of the attack and assist with disaster recovery.

Figure 2: AI Analyst Incident reporting an unusual reprogram command using the MODBUS protocol. The incident includes a plain English summary, relevant technical information, and the investigation process used by the AI.  

重要インフラが停止させられる前に脅威を検知

標的となったサプライヤーはOTを管理しており重要インフラ分野に密接な関係を持っていました。早期段階での対応を促進することにより、Darktraceはランサムウェアが製造現場にまで拡散するのを防ぐことができました。重要な点として、Darktraceは業務の中断も最小化し、攻撃によって起こったかもしれないドミノ効果を避けることができました。攻撃によりこのサプライヤーだけでなく、サプライヤーがサポートする電力設備にも影響が及ぶ恐れがあったのです。

最近のColonial Pipelineインシデントや上記の脅威検知結果が示している通り、パイプラインから電力グリッドおよびそのサプライヤーに至るまで、あらゆる形態の重要インフラに対する産業用環境を管理している組織にとってランサムウェアは切実な悩みです。自己学習型AIにより、リアルタイムの脅威検知、自律的調査、そして有効に設定しておけば、的を絞ったマシンスピードの自動対処により、被害が出る前にこれらの脅威ベクトルに対して措置が可能です。

Looking forward: Using Self-Learning AI to protect critical infrastructure across the board

4月下旬、バイデン政権は「米国の重要インフラを執拗かつ巧妙な脅威から保護する」ための野心的取り組みを発表しました。エネルギー省(DOE)の100日計画は、「電力サイバー可視性、検知、対処能力を電力事業の産業用制御システムに提供する」テクノロジーを求めています。

バイデン政権のサイバー計画は単なるベストプラクティス手法や規制ではなく、重要なエネルギーインフラを保護するテクノロジーを明確に求めています。上記の脅威事例でも確認されたように、Darktrace AIは教師なし機械学習を活用して重要インフラおよびそのサプライヤーをマシンのスピードおよび精度で自律的に保護する強力なテクノロジーです。

Darktrace enhances detection, mitigation, and forensic capabilities to detect  sophisticated and novel attacks, along with insider threats and pre-existing infections, using Self-Learning Cyber AI, without rules, signatures, or lists of CVEs. Incident investigations provided in real time by Cyber AI Analyst jumpstart remediation with actionable insights, containing emerging attacks at their early stages, before they escalate into crisis.

Enable near real-time situational awareness and response capabilities

Darktrace immediately understands, identifies, and investigates all anomalous activity in ICS/OT networks, whether human or machine driven. Additionally, Darktrace actions targeted response where appropriate to neutralize threats, either actively or in human confirmation mode. Because Self-learning AI adapts alongside evolutions in the ecosystem, organizations benefit from real-time awareness with no tuning or human input necessary

Deploy technologies to increase visibility of threats in ICS and OT systems

Darktrace contextualizes security events, adapts to novel techniques, and translates findings into a security narrative that can be actioned by humans in minutes. Delivering a unified view across IT and OT systems.

Darktrace detects, investigates, and responds to threats at higher Purdue levels and in IT systems before they ‘spill over’ into OT. ‘Plug and play’ deployment seamlessly integrates with technological architecture, presenting 3D network topology with granular visibility into all users, devices, and subnets.

Darktrace's asset identification continuously catalogues all ICS/OT devices and identifies and investigates all threatening activity indicative of emerging attacks – be it ICS ransomware, APTs, zero-day exploits, insider threats, pre-existing infections, DDoS, crypto-mining, misconfigurations, or never-before-seen attacks.

この脅威についての考察はDarktraceアナリストOakley Cox が協力しました。

Darktraceによるモデル検知:

  • 最初の侵入:
  • User / New Admin Credential on Client
  • データ漏えい:
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Low and Slow Exfiltration
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed by Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Download and Upload
  • ファイル暗号化:
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Anomalous Connection / SMB Enumeration
  • Device / Anomalous RDP Followed by Multiple Model Breaches
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Anomalous Connection / Sustained MIME Type Conversion
  • Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Read Write Ratio
  • Device / Multiple Lateral Movement Model Breaches

INSIDE THE SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
AUTHOR
ABOUT ThE AUTHOR
David Masson
Director of Enterprise Security

David Masson is Darktrace’s Director of Enterprise Security, and has over two decades of experience working in fast moving security and intelligence environments in the UK, Canada and worldwide. With skills developed in the civilian, military and diplomatic worlds, he has been influential in the efficient and effective resolution of various unique national security issues. David is an operational solutions expert and has a solid reputation across the UK and Canada for delivery tailored to customer needs. At Darktrace, David advises strategic customers across North America and is also a regular contributor to major international and national media outlets in Canada where he is based. He holds a master’s degree from Edinburgh University.

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Inside the SOC

A Thorn in Attackers’ Sides: How Darktrace Uncovered a CACTUS Ransomware Infection

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24
Apr 2024

What is CACTUS Ransomware?

In May 2023, Kroll Cyber Threat Intelligence Analysts identified CACTUS as a new ransomware strain that had been actively targeting large commercial organizations since March 2023 [1]. CACTUS ransomware gets its name from the filename of the ransom note, “cAcTuS.readme.txt”. Encrypted files are appended with the extension “.cts”, followed by a number which varies between attacks, e.g. “.cts1” and “.cts2”.

As the cyber threat landscape adapts to ever-present fast-paced technological change, ransomware affiliates are employing progressively sophisticated techniques to enter networks, evade detection and achieve their nefarious goals.

How does CACTUS Ransomware work?

In the case of CACTUS, threat actors have been seen gaining initial network access by exploiting Virtual Private Network (VPN) services. Once inside the network, they may conduct internal scanning using tools like SoftPerfect Network Scanner, and PowerShell commands to enumerate endpoints, identify user accounts, and ping remote endpoints. Persistence is maintained by the deployment of various remote access methods, including legitimate remote access tools like Splashtop, AnyDesk, and SuperOps RMM in order to evade detection, along with malicious tools like Cobalt Strike and Chisel. Such tools, as well as custom scripts like TotalExec, have been used to disable security software to distribute the ransomware binary. CACTUS ransomware is unique in that it adopts a double-extortion tactic, stealing data from target networks and then encrypting it on compromised systems [2].

At the end of November 2023, cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported instances of CACTUS attacks exploiting vulnerabilities on the Windows version of the business analytics platform Qlik, specifically CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-41265, and CVE-2023-48365, to gain initial access to target networks [3]. The vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41266 can be exploited to generate anonymous sessions and perform HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints, whilst CVE-2023-41265 does not require authentication and can be leveraged to elevate privileges and execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the application [2].

Darktrace’s Coverage of CACTUS Ransomware

In November 2023, Darktrace observed malicious actors leveraging the aforementioned method of exploiting Qlik to gain access to the network of a customer in the US, more than a week before the vulnerability was reported by external researchers.

Here, Qlik vulnerabilities were successfully exploited, and a malicious executable (.exe) was detonated on the network, which was followed by network scanning and failed Kerberos login attempts. The attack culminated in the encryption of numerous files with extensions such as “.cts1”, and SMB writes of the ransom note “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to multiple internal devices, all of which was promptly identified by Darktrace DETECT™.

While traditional rules and signature-based detection tools may struggle to identify the malicious use of a legitimate business platform like Qlik, Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was able to confidently identify anomalous use of the tool in a CACTUS ransomware attack by examining the rarity of the offending device’s surrounding activity and comparing it to the learned behavior of the device and its peers.

Unfortunately for the customer in this case, Darktrace RESPOND™ was not enabled in autonomous response mode during their encounter with CACTUS ransomware meaning that attackers were able to successfully escalate their attack to the point of ransomware detonation and file encryption. Had RESPOND been configured to autonomously act on any unusual activity, Darktrace could have prevented the attack from progressing, stopping the download of any harmful files, or the encryption of legitimate ones.

Cactus Ransomware Attack Overview

Holiday periods have increasingly become one of the favoured times for malicious actors to launch their attacks, as they can take advantage of the festive downtime of organizations and their security teams, and the typically more relaxed mindset of employees during this period [4].

Following this trend, in late November 2023, Darktrace began detecting anomalous connections on the network of a customer in the US, which presented multiple indicators of compromise (IoCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with CACTUS ransomware. The threat actors in this case set their attack in motion by exploiting the Qlik vulnerabilities on one of the customer’s critical servers.

Darktrace observed the server device making beaconing connections to the endpoint “zohoservice[.]net” (IP address: 45.61.147.176) over the course of three days. This endpoint is known to host a malicious payload, namely a .zip file containing the command line connection tool PuttyLink [5].

Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst was able to autonomously identify over 1,000 beaconing connections taking place on the customer’s network and group them together, in this case joining the dots in an ongoing ransomware attack. AI Analyst recognized that these repeated connections to highly suspicious locations were indicative of malicious command-and-control (C2) activity.

Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.
Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst Incident Log showing the offending device making over 1,000 connections to the suspicious hostname “zohoservice[.]net” over port 8383, within a specific period.

The infected device was then observed downloading the file “putty.zip” over a HTTP connection using a PowerShell user agent. Despite being labelled as a .zip file, Darktrace’s detection capabilities were able to identify this as a masqueraded PuttyLink executable file. This activity resulted in multiple Darktrace DETECT models being triggered. These models are designed to look for suspicious file downloads from endpoints not usually visited by devices on the network, and files whose types are masqueraded, as well as the anomalous use of PowerShell. This behavior resembled previously observed activity with regards to the exploitation of Qlik Sense as an intrusion technique prior to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware [5].

The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.
Figure 2: The downloaded file’s URI highlighting that the file type (.exe) does not match the file's extension (.zip). Information about the observed PowerShell user agent is also featured.

Following the download of the masqueraded file, Darktrace observed the initial infected device engaging in unusual network scanning activity over the SMB, RDP and LDAP protocols. During this activity, the credential, “service_qlik” was observed, further indicating that Qlik was exploited by threat actors attempting to evade detection. Connections to other internal devices were made as part of this scanning activity as the attackers attempted to move laterally across the network.

Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.
Figure 3: Numerous failed connections from the affected server to multiple other internal devices over port 445, indicating SMB scanning activity.

The compromised server was then seen initiating multiple sessions over the RDP protocol to another device on the customer’s network, namely an internal DNS server. External researchers had previously observed this technique in CACTUS ransomware attacks where an RDP tunnel was established via Plink [5].

A few days later, on November 24, Darktrace identified over 20,000 failed Kerberos authentication attempts for the username “service_qlik” being made to the internal DNS server, clearly representing a brute-force login attack. There is currently a lack of open-source intelligence (OSINT) material definitively listing Kerberos login failures as part of a CACTUS ransomware attack that exploits the Qlik vulnerabilities. This highlights Darktrace’s ability to identify ongoing threats amongst unusual network activity without relying on existing threat intelligence, emphasizing its advantage over traditional security detection tools.

Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.
Figure 4: Kerberos login failures being carried out by the initial infected device. The destination device detected was an internal DNS server.

In the month following these failed Kerberos login attempts, between November 26 and December 22, Darktrace observed multiple internal devices encrypting files within the customer’s environment with the extensions “.cts1” and “.cts7”. Devices were also seen writing ransom notes with the file name “cAcTuS.readme.txt” to two additional internal devices, as well as files likely associated with Qlik, such as “QlikSense.pdf”. This activity detected by Darktrace confirmed the presence of a CACTUS ransomware infection that was spreading across the customer’s network.

The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
Figure 5: The model, 'Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB', triggered in response to SMB file writes of the ransom note, ‘cAcTuS.readme.txt’, that was observed on the customer’s network.
CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.
Figure 6: CACTUS ransomware extensions, “.cts1” and “.cts7”, being appended to files on the customer’s network.

Following this initial encryption activity, two affected devices were observed attempting to remove evidence of this activity by deleting the encrypted files.

Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.
Figure 7: Attackers attempting to remove evidence of their activity by deleting files with appendage “.cts1”.

結論

In the face of this CACTUS ransomware attack, Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection enabled it to quickly identify multiple stages of the cyber kill chain occurring in the customer’s environment. These stages ranged from ‘initial access’ by exploiting Qlik vulnerabilities, which Darktrace was able to detect before the method had been reported by external researchers, to ‘actions on objectives’ by encrypting files. Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI was also able to detect a previously unreported stage of the attack: multiple Kerberos brute force login attempts.

If Darktrace’s autonomous response capability, RESPOND, had been active and enabled in autonomous response mode at the time of this attack, it would have been able to take swift mitigative action to shut down such suspicious activity as soon as it was identified by DETECT, effectively containing the ransomware attack at the earliest possible stage.

Learning a network’s ‘normal’ to identify deviations from established patterns of behaviour enables Darktrace’s identify a potential compromise, even one that uses common and often legitimately used administrative tools. This allows Darktrace to stay one step ahead of the increasingly sophisticated TTPs used by ransomware actors.

Credit to Tiana Kelly, Cyber Analyst & Analyst Team Lead, Anna Gilbertson, Cyber Analyst

付録

参考文献

[1] https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/cactus-ransomware-prickly-new-variant-evades-detection

[2] https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cactus-ransomware-exploiting-qlik-sense-flaws-to-breach-networks/

[3] https://explore.avertium.com/resource/new-ransomware-strains-cactus-and-3am

[4] https://www.soitron.com/cyber-attackers-abuse-holidays/

[5] https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/qlik-sense-exploited-in-cactus-ransomware-campaign/

Darktrace DETECT Models

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)

Anomalous Connection / PowerShell to Rare External

Device / New PowerShell User Agent

Device / Suspicious SMB Scanning Activity

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous Connection / Unusual Internal Remote Desktop

User / Kerberos Password Brute Force

Compromise / Ransomware / Ransom or Offensive Words Written to SMB

Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Delete Volume

Anomalous Connection / Multiple Connections to New External TCP Port

Compromise / Slow Beaconing Activity To External Rare  

Compromise / SSL Beaconing to Rare Destination  

Anomalous Server Activity / Rare External from Server  

Compliance / Remote Management Tool On Server

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

Compromise / Suspicious File and C2  

Device / Internet Facing Device with High Priority Alert  

Device / Large Number of Model Breaches  

Anomalous File / Masqueraded File Transfer

Anomalous File / Internet facing System File Download  

Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server

Device / Initial Breach Chain Compromise  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Medium Period)  

Compromise / Agent Beacon (Long Period)  

IoC一覧

IoC - Type - Description

zohoservice[.]net: 45.61.147[.]176 - Domain name: IP Address - Hosting payload over HTTP

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT; Windows NT 10.0; en-US) WindowsPowerShell/5.1.17763.2183 - User agent -PowerShell user agent

.cts1 - File extension - Malicious appendage

.cts7- File extension - Malicious appendage

cAcTuS.readme.txt - Filename -Ransom note

putty.zip – Filename - Initial payload: ZIP containing PuTTY Link

MITRE ATT&CK マッピング

Tactic - Technique  - SubTechnique

Web Protocols: COMMAND AND CONTROL - T1071 -T1071.001

Powershell: EXECUTION - T1059 - T1059.001

Exploitation of Remote Services: LATERAL MOVEMENT - T1210 – N/A

Vulnerability Scanning: RECONAISSANCE     - T1595 - T1595.002

Network Service Scanning: DISCOVERY - T1046 - N/A

Malware: RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT - T1588 - T1588.001

Drive-by Compromise: INITIAL ACCESS - T1189 - N/A

Remote Desktop Protocol: LATERAL MOVEMENT – 1021 -T1021.001

Brute Force: CREDENTIAL ACCESS        T – 1110 - N/A

Data Encrypted for Impact: IMPACT - T1486 - N/A

Data Destruction: IMPACT - T1485 - N/A

File Deletion: DEFENSE EVASION - T1070 - T1070.004

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Tiana Kelly
Deputy Team Lead, London & Cyber Analyst

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The State of AI in Cybersecurity: How AI will impact the cyber threat landscape in 2024

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22
Apr 2024

About the AI Cybersecurity Report

We surveyed 1,800 CISOs, security leaders, administrators, and practitioners from industries around the globe. Our research was conducted to understand how the adoption of new AI-powered offensive and defensive cybersecurity technologies are being managed by organizations.

This blog is continuing the conversation from our last blog post “The State of AI in Cybersecurity: Unveiling Global Insights from 1,800 Security Practitioners” which was an overview of the entire report. This blog will focus on one aspect of the overarching report, the impact of AI on the cyber threat landscape.

To access the full report click here.

Are organizations feeling the impact of AI-powered cyber threats?

Nearly three-quarters (74%) state AI-powered threats are now a significant issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) agree that AI-powered threats will remain a major challenge into the foreseeable future, not just for the next one to two years.

However, only a slight majority (56%) thought AI-powered threats were a separate issue from traditional/non AI-powered threats. This could be the case because there are few, if any, reliable methods to determine whether an attack is AI-powered.

Identifying exactly when and where AI is being applied may not ever be possible. However, it is possible for AI to affect every stage of the attack lifecycle. As such, defenders will likely need to focus on preparing for a world where threats are unique and are coming faster than ever before.

a hypothetical cyber attack augmented by AI at every stage

Are security stakeholders concerned about AI’s impact on cyber threats and risks?

The results from our survey showed that security practitioners are concerned that AI will impact organizations in a variety of ways. There was equal concern associated across the board – from volume and sophistication of malware to internal risks like leakage of proprietary information from employees using generative AI tools.

What this tells us is that defenders need to prepare for a greater volume of sophisticated attacks and balance this with a focus on cyber hygiene to manage internal risks.

One example of a growing internal risks is shadow AI. It takes little effort for employees to adopt publicly-available text-based generative AI systems to increase their productivity. This opens the door to “shadow AI”, which is the use of popular AI tools without organizational approval or oversight. Resulting security risks such as inadvertent exposure of sensitive information or intellectual property are an ever-growing concern.

Are organizations taking strides to reduce risks associated with adoption of AI in their application and computing environment?

71.2% of survey participants say their organization has taken steps specifically to reduce the risk of using AI within its application and computing environment.

16.3% of survey participants claim their organization has not taken these steps.

These findings are good news. Even as enterprises compete to get as much value from AI as they can, as quickly as possible, they’re tempering their eager embrace of new tools with sensible caution.

Still, responses varied across roles. Security analysts, operators, administrators, and incident responders are less likely to have said their organizations had taken AI risk mitigation steps than respondents in other roles. In fact, 79% of executives said steps had been taken, and only 54% of respondents in hands-on roles agreed. It seems that leaders believe their organizations are taking the needed steps, but practitioners are seeing a gap.

Do security professionals feel confident in their preparedness for the next generation of threats?

A majority of respondents (six out of every ten) believe their organizations are inadequately prepared to face the next generation of AI-powered threats.

The survey findings reveal contrasting perceptions of organizational preparedness for cybersecurity threats across different regions and job roles. Security administrators, due to their hands-on experience, express the highest level of skepticism, with 72% feeling their organizations are inadequately prepared. Notably, respondents in mid-sized organizations feel the least prepared, while those in the largest companies feel the most prepared.

Regionally, participants in Asia-Pacific are most likely to believe their organizations are unprepared, while those in Latin America feel the most prepared. This aligns with the observation that Asia-Pacific has been the most impacted region by cybersecurity threats in recent years, according to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index.

The optimism among Latin American respondents could be attributed to lower threat volumes experienced in the region, but it's cautioned that this could change suddenly (1).

What are biggest barriers to defending against AI-powered threats?

The top-ranked inhibitors center on knowledge and personnel. However, issues are alluded to almost equally across the board including concerns around budget, tool integration, lack of attention to AI-powered threats, and poor cyber hygiene.

The cybersecurity industry is facing a significant shortage of skilled professionals, with a global deficit of approximately 4 million experts (2). As organizations struggle to manage their security tools and alerts, the challenge intensifies with the increasing adoption of AI by attackers. This shift has altered the demands on security teams, requiring practitioners to possess broad and deep knowledge across rapidly evolving solution stacks.

Educating end users about AI-driven defenses becomes paramount as organizations grapple with the shortage of professionals proficient in managing AI-powered security tools. Operationalizing machine learning models for effectiveness and accuracy emerges as a crucial skill set in high demand. However, our survey highlights a concerning lack of understanding among cybersecurity professionals regarding AI-driven threats and the use of AI-driven countermeasures indicating a gap in keeping pace with evolving attacker tactics.

The integration of security solutions remains a notable problem, hindering effective defense strategies. While budget constraints are not a primary inhibitor, organizations must prioritize addressing these challenges to bolster their cybersecurity posture. It's imperative for stakeholders to recognize the importance of investing in skilled professionals and integrated security solutions to mitigate emerging threats effectively.

To access the full report click here.

参考文献

1. IBM, X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2024, Available at: https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/L0GKXDWJ

2. ISC2, Cybersecurity Workforce Study 2023, Available at: https://media.isc2.org/-/media/Project/ISC2/Main/Media/ documents/research/ISC2_Cybersecurity_Workforce_Study_2023.pdf?rev=28b46de71ce24e6ab7705f6e3da8637e

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