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April 12, 2022

Efficient Incident Reporting: Darktrace AI Analyst

Discover how Darktrace's Cyber AI Analyst accelerates incident reporting to the US federal government, enhancing cybersecurity response times.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
Written by
Sally Kenyon Grant
VP, Darktrace Federal
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12
Apr 2022

On March 15, 2022, President Biden signed the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act into law, included as part of the Congressional Omnibus Appropriations bill. The law requires critical infrastructure owners and operators to quickly notify the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of ransomware payments and significant cyber-attacks.

The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act creates two new reporting requirements:

  1. an obligation to report certain cyber incidents to DHS CISA within 72 hours
  2. an obligation to report ransomware payments within 24 hours

Supporting the new law, Darktrace AI accelerates the cyber incident reporting process. Specifically, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst understands the connections among disparate security incidents with supervised machine learning and autonomously writes incident reports in human-readable language using natural language processing (NLP). These Darktrace incident reports allow human analysts to send reports to CISA quickly and efficiently.

In the below real-world attack case study, we demonstrate how Cyber AI Analyst facilitates seamless reporting for critical infrastructure organizations that fall victim to ransomware and malicious data exfiltration. The AI technology, trained on human analyst behavior, replicates investigations at machine speed and scale, surfacing relevant details in minutes and allowing security teams to understand what happened precisely and share this information with the relevant authorities.

The below threat investigation details a significant threat find on a step by step level in technical detail to demonstrate the power and speed of Cyber AI Analyst.

Cyber AI Analyst’s incident report

When ransomware struck this organization, Cyber AI Analyst was invaluable, autonomously investigating the full scope of the incident and generating a natural language summary that clearly showed the progression of the attack.

Figure 1: Cyber AI Analyst reveals the full scope of the attack

In the aftermath of this attack, Darktrace’s technology also offered analyst assistance in mapping out the timeline of the attack and identifying what files were compromised, helping the security team identify anomalous activity related to the ransomware attack.

Figure 2: Cyber AI Analyst showing the stages of the attack chain undergone by the compromised device

With Darktrace AI’s insights, the team easily identified the timeline of the attack, affected devices, credentials used, file shares accessed, files exfiltrated, and malicious endpoints contacted, enabling the customer to disclose the scale of the attack and notify necessary parties.

This example demonstrates how Cyber AI Analyst empowers critical infrastructure owners and operators to swiftly report major cyber-attacks to the federal government. Considering that 72 hours is the reporting period is for significant incidents — and 24 hours for ransomware payments — Cyber AI Analyst is no longer a nice-to-have but a must-have for critical infrastructure.

Attack breakdown: Ransomware and data exfiltration

Cyber AI Analyst delivered the most critical information in an easy-to-read report — with no human touch involved — as shown in the incident report above. We will now break down the attack further to demonstrate how Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI understood the unusual activity throughout the attack lifecycle.

In this double extortion ransomware, attackers exfiltrated data over 22 days. The detections made by Darktrace’s Self-Learning AI, and the parallel investigation by Cyber AI Analyst, were used to map the attack chain and identify how and what data had been exfiltrated and encrypted.

The attack consisted of three general groups of events:

  • Unencrypted FTP (File Transfer Protocol) data exfiltration to rare malicious external endpoint in Bulgaria (May 9 07:23:46 UTC – May 21 03:06:46 UTC)
  • Ransomware encryption of files in network file shares (May 25 01:00:27 UTC – May 30 07:09:53 UTC)
  • Encrypted SSH (Secure Shell) data exfiltration to rare malicious external endpoint (May 29 16:43:37 UTC – May 30 13:23:59 UTC)
Figure 3: Timeline of the attack alongside Darktrace model breaches

First, uploads of internal data to a rare external endpoint in Bulgaria were observed within the networks. The exfiltration was preceded by SMB reads of internal file shares before approximately 450GB of data was exfiltrated via FTP.

Darktrace’s AI identified this threatening activity on its own, and the organization was quickly able to pinpoint what data had been exfiltrated, including files camouflaged by markings such as ‘Talent Acquisition’ and ‘Engineering and Construction,’ and legal and financial documents — suggesting that these were documents of an extremely sensitive nature.

Figure 4: Screenshots showing two model breaches relating to external uploads over FTP
Figure 5: Screenshot showing SMB reads from a file share before FTP upload

Model breaches:

  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Data Volume
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Compromise / Ransomware / SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write
  • Unusual Activity / High Volume Server Data Transfer
  • Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Four days following this observed activity, Darktrace’s AI detected the deployment of ransomware when multiple compromised devices began making anomalous SMB connections to file shares that they do not typically access, reading and writing similar volumes to the SMB file shares, as well as writing additional extensions to files over SMB. The file extension comprised a random string of letters and was likely to be unique to this target.

Using Darktrace, the customer obtained a full list of files that had been encrypted. The list included apparent financial records in an ‘Accounts’ file share.

Figure 6: Model breach showing additional extension written to file during ransomware encryption

Model breaches:

  • Anomalous Connection / Unusual Incoming Data Volume
  • Anomalous File / Internal / Additional Extension Appended to SMB File
  • Compromise / Ransomware / Suspicious SMB Activity
  • Compromise / Ransomware / SMB Reads then Writes with Additional Extensions
  • Unusual Activity / Anomalous SMB Move & Write
  • Unusual Activity / High Volume Server Data Transfer
  • Unusual Activity / Sustained Anomalous SMB Activity
  • Device / SMB Lateral Movement

Simultaneously, uploads of internal data to a rare external endpoint were observed within the network. The uploads were all performed using encrypted SSH/SFTP. In total, approximately 3.5GB of data was exfiltrated this way.

Despite the attacker using an encrypted channel to exfiltrate this data, Darktrace detected anomalous SMB file transfers prior to the external upload, indicating which files were exfiltrated. Here, Darktrace’s ability to go ‘back in time’ proved invaluable in helping analysts determine which files had been exfiltrated, although they were exfiltrated via an encrypted means.

Figure 7: Model breaches showing anomalous SMB activity before upload over SSH

Model breaches:

  • Anomalous Server Activity / Outgoing from Server
  • Compliance / SSH to Rare External Destination
  • Unusual Activity / Enhanced Unusual External Data Transfer
  • Device / Anomalous SMB Followed By Multiple Model Breaches
  • Device / Large Number of Model Breaches
  • Anomalous Connection / Uncommon 1 GiB Outbound
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent to Rare Domain
  • Anomalous Connection / Data Sent To New External Device

How did the attack bypass the rest of the security stack?

Existing administrative credentials were used to escalate privileges within the network and perform malicious activity.

Had Darktrace Antigena been active, it would have actioned a targeted, autonomous response to contain the activity in its early stages. Antigena would have enforced the ‘pattern of life’ on the devices involved in anomalous SMB activity — containing activity such as reading from file shares that are not normally connected, appending extensions to files and blocking outgoing connections to rare external endpoints.

However, in this case, Antigena was not set up to take action – it was configured in Human Confirmation mode. The incident was clearly alerted on by Darktrace, and appeared as a top priority item in the security team’s workflow. However, the security team was not monitoring Darktrace’s user interface, and in the absence of any action taken by other tools, the attack was allowed to progress, and the organization was obligated to disclose the details of the incident.

Streamlining the reporting process

In the modern threat landscape, leaning on AI to stop fast-moving and sophisticated attacks at machine speed and scale is critical. As this attack shows, the technology also helps organizations fulfill reporting requirements in the aftermath of an attack.

New legislation requires timely disclosure; with many traditional approaches to security, organizations do not have the capacity to surface the full details after an attack. On top of this, collating these details can take days or weeks. This is why Darktrace is no longer a nice-to-have but a must-have for critical infrastructure organizations, which are now required to report significant incidents swiftly.

Darktrace’s AI detects malicious activity as it happens and empowers customers to quickly understand the timeline of a compromise, as well as files accessed and exfiltrated by an attacker. This not only prepares organizations to resist the most sophisticated attacks, but also accelerates and radically simplifies the process of reporting the data breach.

Security teams should not have to confront disclosure processes on their own. Attacks happen fast, and their aftermaths are messy – retrospective investigation of lost data can be a futile effort with traditional approaches. With Darktrace, security teams can meet disruptive and sudden attacks with precise and nimble means of uncovering data, as well as detection and mitigation of risk. And, should the need arise, rapid and accurate reporting of events is laid out on a silver platter by the AI.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Justin Fier
SVP, Red Team Operations
Written by
Sally Kenyon Grant
VP, Darktrace Federal

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March 26, 2026

Phantom Footprints: Tracking GhostSocks Malware

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Why are attackers using residential proxies?

In today's threat landscape, blending in to normal activity is the key to success for attackers and the growing reliance on residential proxies shows a significant shift in how threat actors are attempting to bypass IP detection tools.

The increasing dependency on residential proxies has exposed how prevalent proxy services are and how reliant a diverse range of threat actors are on them. From cybercriminal groups to state‑sponsored actors, the need to bypass IP detection tools is fundamental to the success of these groups. One malware that has quietly become notorious for its ability to avoid anomaly detection is GhostSocks, a malware that turns compromised devices into residential proxies.

What is GhostSocks?

Originally marketed on the Russian underground forum xss[.]is as a Malware‑as‑a‑Service (MaaS), GhostSocks enables threat actors to turn compromised devices into residential proxies, leveraging the victim's internet bandwidth to route malicious traffic through it.

How does Ghostsocks malware work? 

The malware offers the threat actor a “clean” IP address, making it look like it is coming from a household user. This enables the bypassing of geographic restrictions and IP detection tools, a perfect tool for avoiding anomaly detection. It wasn’t until 2024, when a partnership was announced with the infamous information stealer Lumma Stealer, that GhostSocks surged into widespread adoption and alluded to who may be the author of the proxy malware.

Written in GoLang, GhostSocks utilizes the SOCKS5 proxy protocol, creating a SOCKS5 connection on infected devices. It uses a relay‑based C2 implementation, where an intermediary server sits in between the real command-and-control (C2) server and the infected device.

How does Ghostsocks malware evade detection?

To further increase evasion, the Ghostsocks malware wraps its SOCKS5 tunnels in TLS encryption, allowing its malicious traffic to blend into normal network traffic.

Early variants of GhostSocks do not implement a persistence mechanism; however, later versions achieve persistence via registry run keys, ensuring sustained proxy operational time [1].

While proxying is its primary purpose, GhostSocks also incorporates backdoor functionality, enabling malicious actors to run arbitrary commands and download and deploy additional malicious payloads. This was evident with the well‑known ransomware group Black Basta, which reportedly used GhostSocks as a way of maintaining long‑term access to victims’ networks [1].

Darktrace’s detection of GhostSocks Malware

Darktrace observed a steady increase in GhostSocks activity across its customer base from late 2025, with its Threat Research team identifying multiple incidents involving the malware. In one notable case from December 2025, Darktrace detected GhostSocks operating alongside Lumma Stealer, reinforcing that the partnership between Lumma and GhostSocks remains active despite recent attempts to disrupt Lumma’s infrastructure.

Darktrace’s first detection of GhostSocks‑related activity came when a device on the network of a customer in the education sector began making connections to an endpoint with a suspicious self‑signed certificate that had never been seen on the network before.

The endpoint in question, 159.89.46[.]92 with the hostname retreaw[.]click, has been flagged by multiple open‑source intelligence (OSINT) sources as being associated with Lumma Stealer’s C2 infrastructure [2], indicating its likely role in the delivery of malicious payloads.

Darktrace’s detection of suspicious SSL connections to retreaw[.]click, indicating an attempted link to Lumma C2 infrastructure.
Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of suspicious SSL connections to retreaw[.]click, indicating an attempted link to Lumma C2 infrastructure.

Less than two minutes later, Darktrace observed the same device downloading the executable (.exe) file “Renewable.exe” from the IP 86.54.24[.]29, which Darktrace recognized as 100% rare for this network.

Darktrace’s detection of a device downloading the unusual executable file “Renewable.exe”.
Figure 2: Darktrace’s detection of a device downloading the unusual executable file “Renewable.exe”.

Both the file MD5 hash and the executable itself have been identified by multiple OSINT vendors as being associated with the GhostSocks malware [3], with the executable likely the backdoor component of the GhostSocks malware, facilitating the distribution of additional malicious payloads [4].

Following this detection, Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability recommended a blocking action for the device in an early attempt to stop the malicious file download. In this instance, Darktrace was configured in Human Confirmation Mode, meaning the customer’s security team was required to manually apply any mitigative response actions. Had Autonomous Response been fully enabled at the time of the attack, the connections to 86.54.24[.]29 would have been blocked, rendering the malware ineffective at reaching its C2 infrastructure and halting any further malicious communication.

 Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability suggesting blocking the suspicious connections to the unusual endpoint from which the malicious executable was downloaded.
Figure 3: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability suggesting blocking the suspicious connections to the unusual endpoint from which the malicious executable was downloaded.

As the attack was able to progress, two days later the device was detected downloading additional payloads from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site (23.106.58[.]48), including “Setup.exe”, “,.exe”, and “/vp6c63yoz.exe”.

Darktrace’s detection of a malicious payload being downloaded from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site.
Figure 4: Darktrace’s detection of a malicious payload being downloaded from the endpoint www.lbfs[.]site.

Once again, Darktrace recognized the anomalous nature of these downloads and suggested that a “group pattern of life” be enforced on the offending device in an attempt to contain the activity. By enforcing a pattern of life on a device, Darktrace restricts its activity to connections and behaviors similar to those performed by peer devices within the same group, while still allowing it to carry out its expected activity, effectively preventing deviations indicative of compromise while minimizing disruption. As mentioned earlier, these mitigative actions required manual implementation, so the activity was able to continue. Darktrace proceeded to suggest further actions to contain subsequent malicious downloads, including an attempt to block all outbound traffic to stop the attack from progressing.

An overview of download activity and the Autonomous Response actions recommended by Darktrace to block the downloads.
Figure 5: An overview of download activity and the Autonomous Response actions recommended by Darktrace to block the downloads.

Around the same time, a third executable download was detected, this time from the hostname hxxp[://]d2ihv8ymzp14lr.cloudfront.net/2021-08-19/udppump[.]exe, along with the file “udppump.exe”.While GhostSocks may have been present only to facilitate the delivery of additional payloads, there is no indication that these CloudFront endpoints or files are functionally linked to GhostSocks. Rather, the evidence points to broader malicious file‑download activity.

Shortly after the multiple executable files had been downloaded, Darktrace observed the device initiating a series of repeated successful connections to several rare external endpoints, behavior consistent with early-stage C2 beaconing activity.

Cyber AI Analyst’s investigation

Darktrace’s detection of additional malicious file downloads from malicious CloudFront endpoints.
Figure 7: Darktrace’s detection of additional malicious file downloads from malicious CloudFront endpoints.

Throughout the course of this attack, Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst carried out its own autonomous investigation, piecing together seemingly separate events into one wider incident encompassing the first suspicious downloads beginning on December 4, the unusual connectivity to many suspicious IPs that followed, and the successful beaconing activity observed two days later. By analyzing these events in real-time and viewing them as part of the bigger picture, Cyber AI Analyst was able to construct an in‑depth breakdown of the attack to aid the customer’s investigation and remediation efforts.

Cyber AI Analyst investigation detailing the sequence of events on the compromised device, highlighting its extensive connectivity to rare endpoints, the related malicious file‑download activity, and finally the emergence of C2 beaconing behavior.
Figure 8: Cyber AI Analyst investigation detailing the sequence of events on the compromised device, highlighting its extensive connectivity to rare endpoints, the related malicious file‑download activity, and finally the emergence of C2 beaconing behavior.

Conclusion

The versatility offered by GhostSocks is far from new, but its ability to convert compromised devices into residential proxy nodes, while enabling long‑term, covert network access—illustrates how threat actors continue to maximise the value of their victims’ infrastructure. Its growing popularity, coupled with its ongoing partnership with Lumma, demonstrates that infrastructure takedowns alone are insufficient; as long as threat actors remain committed to maintaining anonymity and can rapidly rebuild their ecosystems, related malware activity is likely to persist in some form.

Credit to Isabel Evans (Cyber Analyst), Gernice Lee (Associate Principal Analyst & Regional Consultancy Lead – APJ)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Content Manager)

Appendices

References

1.    https://bloo.io/research/malware/ghostsocks

2.    https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/retreaw.click/community

3.    https://synthient.com/blog/ghostsocks-from-initial-access-to-residential-proxy

4.    https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1810568/0/html

5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/url/fab6525bf6e77249b74736cb74501a9491109dc7950688b3ae898354eb920413

Darktrace Model Detections

Real-time Detection Models

Anomalous Connection / Suspicious Self-Signed SSL

Anomalous Connection / Rare External SSL Self-Signed

Anomalous File / EXE from Rare External Location

Anomalous File / Multiple EXE from Rare External Locations

Compromise / Possible Fast Flux C2 Activity

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Successful Connections

Compromise / Large Number of Suspicious Failed Connections

Compromise / Sustained SSL or HTTP Increase

Autonomous Response Models

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious File Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Controlled and Model Alert

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena File then New Outbound Block

Antigena / Network / Significant Anomaly / Antigena Alerts Over Time Block

Antigena / Network / External Threat / Antigena Suspicious Activity Block

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique

Resource Development – T1588 - Malware

Initial Access - T1189 - Drive-by Compromise

Persistence – T1112 – Modify Registry

Command and Control – T1071 – Application Layer Protocol

Command and Control – T1095 – Non-application Layer Protocol

Command and Control – T1071 – Web Protocols

Command and Control – T1571 – Non-Standard Port

Command and Control – T1102 – One-Way Communication

List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

86.54.24[.]29 - IP - Likely GhostSocks C2

http[://]86.54.24[.]29/Renewable[.]exe - Hostname - GhostSocks Distribution Endpoint

http[://]d2ihv8ymzp14lr.cloudfront[.]net/2021-08-19/udppump[.]exe - CDN - Payload Distribution Endpoint

www.lbfs[.]site - Hostname - Likely C2 Endpoint

retreaw[.]click - Hostname - Lumma C2 Endpoint

alltipi[.]com - Hostname - Possible C2 Endpoint

w2.bruggebogeyed[.]site - Hostname - Possible C2 Endpoint

9b90c62299d4bed2e0752e2e1fc777ac50308534 - SHA1 file hash – Likely GhostSocks payload

3d9d7a7905e46a3e39a45405cb010c1baa735f9e - SHA1 file hash - Likely follow-up payload

10f928e00a1ed0181992a1e4771673566a02f4e3 - SHA1 file hash - Likely follow-up payload

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About the author
Gernice Lee
Associate Principal Analyst & Regional Consultancy Lead

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March 27, 2026

State of AI Cybersecurity 2026: 92% of security professionals concerned about the impact of AI agents

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The findings in this blog are taken from Darktrace's annual State of AI Cybersecurity Report 2026.

AI is already embedded in day-to-day enterprise activity, with 78% of participants in one recent survey reporting that their organizations are using generative AI in at least one business function. Generative AI now acts as an always-on assistant, researcher, creator, and coach across an expanding array of departments and functions. Autonomous agents are performing multi-step operational workflows from end to end. AI features have been layered on top of every SaaS application. And vibe coding is making it possible for employees without deep technical expertise to build their own AI-powered automations.

According to Gartner, more than 80% of enterprises will have deployed GenAI models, applications, or APIs in production environments by the end of this year, up from less than 5% in 2023. Companies report a 130% increase in spending on AI over the same period, with 72% of business leaders using AI tools at least weekly. The outsized efficiency and productivity gains that were once a future vision are quickly becoming everyday reality.

AI is currently driving business growth and innovation, and organizations risk falling behind peers if they don’t keep up with the pace of adoption, but it is also quietly expanding the enterprise attack surface. The modern CISO is challenged to both enable innovation and protect the business from these emerging threats.

AI agents introduce new risks and vulnerabilities

AI agents are playing growing roles in enterprise production environments. In many cases, these agents act with broad permissions across multiple software systems and platforms. This means they’re granted far-reaching access – to sensitive data, business-critical applications, tokens and APIs, and IT and security tools. With this access comes risk for security leaders – 92% are concerned about the use of AI agents across the workforce and their impact on security.

These agents must be governed as identities, with least-privilege access and ongoing monitoring. They can’t be thought of as invisible aspects of the application estate. Understanding how AI agents behave, and how to manage their permissions, control their behavior, and limit their data access will be a top security priority throughout 2026.

Generative AI prompts: The next frontier

Prompts are how users – both human and agentic – interact with AI systems, and they’re where natural language gets translated into model behavior. Natural language is infinite in its potential combinations and permutations, making this aspect of the attack surface open-ended and far more complex than traditional CVEs. With carefully crafted prompts, bad actors may be able to coax models into disclosing sensitive data, bypassing guardrails, or initiating undesirable actions.

Among security leaders, the biggest worries about AI usage in their environments all involve ways that systems might be manipulated to bypass traditional controls.

  • 61% are most concerned about the exposure of sensitive data
  • 56% are most concerned about potential data security and policy violations
  • 51% are most concerned about the misuse or abuse of AI tools

The more employees rely on AI in their day-to-day workflows, the more critical it becomes for security teams to understand how prompt behavior determines model behavior – and where that behavior could go wrong.

What does “securing AI” mean in practice?

AI adoption opens new security risks that blur the boundaries between traditional security disciplines. A single malicious interaction with an AI model could involve identity misuse, sensitive data exposure, application logic abuse, and supply chain risk – all within a single workflow. Protecting this dynamic and rapidly evolving attack surface requires an approach that spans identity security, cloud security, application security, data security, software development security, and more.

The task for security leaders is to implement the tools, policies, and frameworks to mitigate these novel, expansive, and cross-disciplinary risks.

However, within most enterprises, AI policy creation remains in its infancy. Just 37% of security leaders report that their organization has a formal AI policy, representing a small but worrisome decrease from last year. Conversations about AI abound: in 52% of organizations, there’s discussion about an AI policy. Still, talk is cheap, and leaders will need to take action if they’re to successfully enable secure AI innovation.

To govern and protect their AI systems, organizations must take a multi-pronged approach. This requires building out policies, but it also demands that they are able to:

  • Monitor the prompts driving GenAI assistants and agents in real time. Organizations must be able to inspect prompts, sessions, and responses across enterprise GenAI tools, low- and high-code environments, and SaaS and SASE so that they can detect clever conversational prompt attacks and malicious chaining.
  • Secure all business AI agent identities. Security teams need to identify all the agents acting within their environment and supply chain, map their connections and interactions via MCP and services like Amazon S3, and audit their behavior across the cloud, SaaS environments, and on the network and endpoint devices.
  • Maintain centralized, comprehensive visibility. Understanding intent, assessing risks, and enforcing policies all require that security teams have a single view that spans AI interactions across the entire business.
  • Discover and control shadow AI. Teams need to be able to identify unsanctioned AI activities, distinguish the misuse of legitimate tools from their appropriate use, and apply policies to protect data, while guiding users towards approved solutions.

Scaling AI safely and responsibly

The approach that most cybersecurity vendors have taken – using historical patterns to predict future threats – doesn’t work well for AI systems. Because AI changes its behavior in response to the information it encounters while taking action, previous patterns don’t indicate what it will do next. Looking at past attacks can’t tell you how complex models will behave in your individual business.

Securing AI requires interpreting ambiguous interactions, uncovering subtleties that reveal intent within extended conversations, understanding how access accumulates over time, and recognizing when behavior – both human and machine – begins to drift towards areas of risk. To do this, you need to understand what “normal” looks like in each unique organization: how users, systems, applications, and AI agents behave, how they communicate, and how data flows between them.

Darktrace has spent more than a decade designing AI-powered solutions that can understand and adapt to evolving behavior in complex environments. This technology learns directly from the environment it protects, identifying malicious actions that deviate from normal operations, so that it can stop AI-related threats on the very first encounter.

As AI adoption reshapes enterprise operations, humans and machines will collaborate more and more often. This collaboration might dramatically expand the attack surface, but it also has the potential to be a force multiplier for defenders.

Explore the full State of AI Cybersecurity 2026 report for deeper insights into how security leaders are responding to AI-driven risks.

Learn more about securing AI in your enterprise.

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